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City of Lewiston Engineer,
Defendants-Respondents
and
JACK JOSEPH STREIBICK, a single man, and Person al
Representative of THE ESTATE OF MAUREEN F.
STREIBICK, deceased, AND DOES 1-20,
Defendants.
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Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal.

John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw
Date

Code

User

10/22/2009

NCOC

KATHY

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Carl B. Kerrick

ATTR

KATHY

Plaintiff: Block, John Attorney Retained Ronald J
Landeck

Carl B. Kerrick

KATHY

Filing: A -All initial civil case filings of any type not Carl B. Kerrick
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: Landeck, Ronald J (attorney for
Block, John) Receipt number: 0344213 Dated:
10/22/2009 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: Block,
John (plaintiff)

COMP

KATHY

Complaint Filed

Carl B. Kerrick

FSUM

KATHY

Summons Filed/Jack Streibick

Carl B. Kerrick

FSUM

KATHY

Summons Filed/City of Lewiston

Carl B. Kerrick

FSUM

KATHY

Summons Filed/Lowell J Cutshaw

Carl B. Kerrick

11/10/2009

KATHY

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Carl B. Kerrick
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
Clements et al Receipt number: 0345107 Dated:
11/10/2009 Amount: $18.00 (Check)

12/7/2009

JENNY

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Cantril!
Skinner Sullivan & King Receipt number:
0346525 Dated: 12/8/2009 Amount: $58.00
(Check) For: Streibick, Jack Joseph (defendant)

Carl B. Kerrick

NOAP

JENNY

Notice Of Appearance

Carl B. Kerrick

ATTR

JENNY

Defendant: Streibick, Jack Joseph Attorney
Retained Clinton 0. Casey

Carl B. Kerrick

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - plf

Carl B. Kerrick

MSOS

JENNY

Motion For Service Outside The State

Carl B. Kerrick

osos

JENNY

Order For Service Outside The State

Carl B. Kerrick

FSUM

JENNY

Out-of-State Summons Filed

Carl B. Kerrick

12/11/2009

ACSV

JENNY

Acceptance Of Service/Jack Streibick

Carl B. Kerrick

12/16/2009

AFSV

JENNY

Affidavit Of Service - City of Lewiston served
12/9/09

Carl B. Kerrick

12/30/2009

PRSV

JENNY

Proof Of Service of Process

Carl B. Kerrick

NOAP

JENNY

Notice Of Appearance

Carl B. Kerrick

ATTR

JENNY

Defendant: City Of Lewiston Attorney Retained
Don L Roberts

Carl B. Kerrick

ATTR

JENNY

Defendant: Cutshaw, Lowell J Attorney Retained
Don L Roberts

Carl B. Kerrick

1/19/2010

NOTC

JENNY

Notice of Association of Counsel

Carl B. Kerrick

1/22/2010

ANSW

JENNY

Answer (Streibick)

Carl B. Kerrick

2/3/2010

ANSW

JENNY

Answer and Demand for Jury Trial (Julian)

Carl B. Kerrick

12/10/2009

2/11/2010

Judge

~~STER e.JINN't:TIONS Notice Of Service - def

Carl B. Kerrick

Notice Of Service - def

Carl B. Kerrick

NTSV

JENNY

ial District Court~ Nez Perce Cou
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Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal.

John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw
Date

Code

User

4/30/2010

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - plf

Carl B. Kerrick

5/13/2010

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - def

Carl B. Kerrick

5/24/2010

MTSJ

JENNY

Motion for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

MEMO

JENNY

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

JENNY

Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

NTHR

JENNY

Notice Of Telephonic Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Motion Hearing
07/27/2010 10:00 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

6/3/2010

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - def

Carl B. Kerrick

6/21/2010

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - plf

Carl B. Kerrick

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - plf

Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

JENNY

Subpoena Duces Tecum (Custodian of Records
of USKH Inc.)

Carl B. Kerrick

AFSV

JENNY

Affidavit Of Service

Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

JENNY

Subpoena Duces Tecum (Custodian of Records
of Allwest Testing & Engineering)

Carl B. Kerrick

AFSV

JENNY

Affidavit Of Service

Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

JENNY

Subpoena Duces Tecum (Custodian of Records
of Strata Engineering)

Carl B. Kerrick

AFSV

JENNY

Affidavit Of Service

Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

JENNY

Subpoena Duces Tecum (Custodian of Records
of Keltic Engineering, Inc.)

Carl B. Kerrick

AFSV

JENNY

Affidavit Of Service

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Affidavit of Travis Wambeke

Carl B. Kerrick

MEMO

JENNY

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Affidavit of John Block

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl

Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

JENNY

Reply in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

6/23/2010

7/13/2010

7/16/2010

REGISTER OF ACTIONS

Judge
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Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal.

John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw
Date

Code

User

7/27/2010

MINE

JENNY

Minute Entry
Carl B. Kerrick
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment
Hearing date: 7/27/2010
Time: 10:06 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: JENNY
Tape Number: CTRM#1
*RON LANDECK FOR BLOCK
*CLINTON CASEY FOR STREIBICK
*STEPHEN ADAMS FOR CITY OF LEWISTON &
CUTSHAW

ADVS

JENNY

Hearing result for Telephonic Motion Hearing held Carl B. Kerrick
on 07/27/2010 10:00 AM: Case Taken Under
Advisement Motion for Summary Judgment

DCHH

JENNY

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

Carl B. Kerrick

9/14/2010

DEOP

JENNY

Memorandum Opinion and Order on Motion for
Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

9/17/2010

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of John Block Carl B. Kerrick

9/23/2010

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - plf

Carl B. Kerrick

9/28/2010

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - plf

Carl B. Kerrick

10/21/2010

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - def

Carl B. Kerrick

11/1/2010

ROTS

JENNY

Request For Trial Setting - plf

Carl B. Kerrick

11/3/2010

RRTS

JENNY

Response To Request For Trial Setting - def

Carl B. Kerrick

11/8/2010

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Continued Deposition Duces Tecum of Carl B. Kerrick
John Block

RRTS

JENNY

Defendant Streibick's Response To Plaintiff's
Request For Trial Setting

Carl B. Kerrick

11/10/2010

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - plf

Carl B. Kerrick

11/23/2010

OPSC

JENNY

Order For Telephonic Scheduling Conference

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling
Conference 12/07/2010 10:45 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

HRHD

JENNY

Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling
Conference held on 12/07/2010 10:45 AM:
Hearing Held

Carl B. Kerrick

OSTP

JENNY

Order Setting Trial & Pre-trial Conference

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
09/16/2011 01:30PM)

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/26/2011 09:00 Carl B. Kerrick
AM)

12/29/2010

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - plf

2/4/2011

~f@JSTER ~i4f:TIONS Notice Of Service - def

12/7/2010

Judge

Carl B. Kerrick
Carl B. Kerrick
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Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal.

John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw
Date

Code

User

2/24/2011

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum
-Travis Wambeke

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum- Scott Carl B. Kerrick
Neumann

3/4/2011

MISC

JENNY

Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosures

Carl B. Kerrick

3/9/2011

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - plf

Carl B. Kerrick

3/10/2011

NDEP

JENNY

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces
Tecum - Scott Neumann

Carl B. Kerrick

NDEP

JENNY

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces
Tecum -Travis Wambeke

Carl B. Kerrick

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces TecumWarren Watts

Carl B. Kerrick

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces TecumGary Stone

Carl B. Kerrick

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Continued Deposition Duces Tecum of Carl B. Kerrick
John Block

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum- John Carl B. Kerrick
Swift

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum- Eric Carl B. Kerrick
Hasenoehrl

4/4/2011

RTSV

JENNY

Return Of Service- subpoena duces tecum
served 3/30/11

Carl B. Kerrick

4/18/2011

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - def

Carl B. Kerrick

4/21/2011

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces TecumTerry Rudd

Carl B. Kerrick

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Continued Deposition Duces Tecum of Carl B. Kerrick
John Block

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Continued Deposition Duces Tecum
Eric Hasenoehrl

Carl B. Kerrick

STIP

JENNY

Stipulation to Extend Defendants' Discosure of
Expert Witnesses

Carl B. Kerrick

4/25/2011

ORDR

JENNY

Order Extending Defendants' Disclosure of Expert Carl B. Kerrick
Witnesses

5/11/2011

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - def

Carl B. Kerrick

5/16/2011

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum- Terry Rudd

Carl B. Kerrick

5/19/2011

STIP

JENNY

Stipulation for Extension of Time for Defendants
to Disclose Their Damage Expert Reports

Carl B. Kerrick

ORDR

JENNY

Order Extending Defendants' Disclosure of
Damage Expert Reports

Carl B. Kerrick

6/3/2011

DCWT

JENNY

Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell Cutshaw's Carl B. Kerrick
Expert Witness Disclosure

6/7/2011

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - def

3/14/2011

Judge

~ISTER ~~'CTIONS Defendant Streibick's Liability Expert Witness
Disclosure

Carl B. Kerrick

Carl B. Kerrick
Carl B. Kerrick
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Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal.

John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw
Date

Code

User

6/10/2011

MTSJ

JENNY

Motion for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

MEMO

JENNY

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

AFSP

JENNY

Affidavit of Daniel J. Skinner In Support of
Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

NTHR

JENNY

Notice Of Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 07/26/2011 09:00AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Affidavit of David Vanderostyne in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service- plf

Carl B. Kerrick

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - def

Carl B. Kerrick

DCWT

JENNY

Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure

Carl B. Kerrick

DCWT

JENNY

Defendant Streibick's Damage Expert Witness
Disclosure

Carl B. Kerrick

MTSJ

JENNY

Motion for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

MEMO

JENNY

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

JENNY

Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

NTHR

JENNY

Notice Of Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 07/26/2011 09:00AM) Def City of
Lewiston and Cutshaw

Carl B. Kerrick

MEMO

JENNY

Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion Carl B. Kerrick
for Summary Judgment

AFFD

JENNY

Second Affidavit of Daniel J. Skinner in Support of Carl B. Kerrick
Summary Judgment

AFFD

JENNY

Affidavit of Brad Dodge

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Affidavit of Ken Morrison

Carl B. Kerrick

6/29/2011

AFFD

JENNY

Affidavit of Kari Ravencroft in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

7/1/2011

MISC

JENNY

Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application or, Alternatively,
Motion to Continue Hearing on Defendants'
Pending Motions for Summary Judgment and
Brief

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support of
Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application or, Alternatively,
Motion to Continue Hearing on Defendants'
Pending Motions for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application or, Alternatively,
Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

6/21/2011

6/27/2011

6/28/2011

~STER efff'JJ\ICTIONS

Judge

Seco

Date: 3/27/2012
Time: 01:26PM
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Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal.

John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw
Date

Code

User

7/1/2011

NTHR

JENNY

Notice Of Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Carl B. Kerrick
Time for Hearing and Plaintiffs Motion to
Continue Hearing

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing on Motions
07/05/2011 10:00 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

MINE

JENNY

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Mtn to Continue Hearing
Hearing date: 7/5/2011
Time: 10:05 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: JENNY
Tape Number: CTRM #1
RON LANDECK FOR PLAINTIFF
DAN SKINNER FOR STREIBICK
STEPHEN ADAMS FOR CITY OF
LEW/CUTSHAW

Carl B. Kerrick

ORDR

TERESA

Order to Continue Hearing on Defendants'
Pending Motions for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

CONT

TERESA

Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment
08/09/2011 10:30 AM) Streibick

Carl B. Kerrick

CONT

TERESA

Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment
08/09/2011 10:30 AM) Def City of Lewiston and
Cutshaw

Carl B. Kerrick

GRNT

JENNY

Hearing result for Hearing on Motions scheduled
on 07/05/2011 10:00 AM: Motion Granted

Carl B. Kerrick

DCHH

JENNY

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

Carl B. Kerrick

JENNY

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Carl B. Kerrick
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
Clements Brown & McNichols Receipt number:
0011851 Dated: 7/7/2011 Amount: $7.00
(Check)

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service - def

Carl B. Kerrick

MEMO

JENNY

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant City's Second Motion for Summary
Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Second Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support Carl B. Kerrick
of Plaintiffs Objections to Defendant City's Motion
for Summary Judgment

AFFD

JENNY

Second Affidavit of John Block

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Second Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Affidavit of John R. ("Hank") Swift

Carl B. Kerrick

NOTC

JENNY

Notice of Vacating Defendant Streibick's Motion
for Summary Judgment Hearing Only

Carl B. Kerrick

7/5/2011

7/7/2011

7/26/2011

7/29/2011

REGISTER OF ACTIONS

Judge

Date: 3/27/2012

User: DEANNA

udicial District Court - Nez Perce Cou

Time: 01:26 PM

ROAReport
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Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal.

John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw
Date

Code

User

7/29/2011

HRVC

JENNY

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Carl B. Kerrick
scheduled on 08/09/2011 10:30 AM: Hearing
Vacated Streibick

8/1/2011

MOTN

JENNY

Motion to Strike Expert Testimony and/or Vacate
Trial

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

JENNY

Motion to Shorten Time

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of Motion
to Strike and/or Vacate and Motion to Shorten
Time

Carl B. Kerrick

NTHR

JENNY

Notice Of Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing on Motions
08/09/2011 10:30 AM) Motion to Strike and/or
Vacate Trial

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

JENNY

Motion to Strike Portions of Second Affidavit of
John Block, Second Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl,
Affidavit of John R. "Hank" Swift, and Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant City's
Second Motion for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of Motion
to Strike

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

JENNY

Motion to Shorten Time

Carl B. Kerrick

NTHR

JENNY

Notice Of Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 08/09/2011 10:30
AM) Motion to Strike

Carl B. Kerrick

8/3/2011

MISC

JENNY

Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

8/5/2011

STIP

JENNY

Carl B. Kerrick
Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice of
Defendant Jack J. Streibick, a Single man and as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Maureen
F. Streibick

8/8/2011

NTSV

JENNY

Notice Of Service

ORDR

JENNY

Order of Dismissal of Defendant Jack J. Streibick, Carl B. Kerrick
A Single Man and As Personal Representative of
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick

CD IS

JENNY

Civil Disposition entered for: Streibick, Jack
Joseph, Defendant; Block, John, Plaintiff. Filing
date: 8/8/2011

Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

JENNY

Plaintiffs Response to City's Motion to Strike
Expert Testimony and/or Vacate Trial and To
City's Motion to Strike portions of Affidavits and
Plaintiffs Memorandum

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

JENNY

Third Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support of Carl B. Kerrick
Response to City's Motion to Strike Expert
Testimony and/or Vacate Trial and To City's
Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavits

Judge

ElE(llffiTER GHNN~TIONS Plaintiffs First Supplemental Expert Witness
Disclosure

Carl B. Kerrick

Carl B. Kerrick

Date: 3/27/2012

Seco

Time: 01 :26 PM
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Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal.

John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw
Date

Code

User

8/9/2011

ADVS

JENNY

Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on
08/09/2011 10:30 AM: Case Taken Under
Advisement Motion to Strike

Carl B. Kerrick

ADVS

JENNY

Hearing result for Hearing on Motions scheduled
on 08/09/201110:30 AM: Case Taken Under
Advisement Motion to Strike and/or Vacate Trial

Carl B. Kerrick

ADVS

JENNY

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Carl B. Kerrick
scheduled on 08/09/2011 10:30 AM: Case
Taken Under Advisement Def City of Lewiston
and Cutshaw

DCHH

JENNY

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

Carl B. Kerrick

HRVC

JENNY

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
09/26/2011 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Carl B. Kerrick

HRVC

JENNY

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 09/16/2011 01:30PM: Hearing Vacated

Carl B. Kerrick

OSTP

JENNY

Amended Order Setting Trial & Pre-trial
Conference

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
01/27/2012 10:00 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/06/2012 09:00 Carl B. Kerrick
AM)

8/11/2011

MINE

JENNY

Carl B. Kerrick
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Mtn for Summary Judgment!Mtn to
Strike
Hearing date: 8/9/2011
Time: 11:04 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: JENNY
Tape Number: CTRM #1
RON LANDECK FOR PLAINTIFF
BRIAN JULIAN FOR DEF CITY OF LEW &
STREIBICK

8/24/2011

NDEP

JENNY

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum (John "Hank" Carl B. Kerrick
Swift)

8/25/2011

NOTC

JENNY

Notice of Citation of Additional Authority

8/26/2011

STIP

JENNY

Stipulation to Extend Defendants' Expert Witness Carl B. Kerrick
Disclosures

8/29/2011

ORDR

JENNY

Order Extending Defendants' Expert Witness
Disclosures

Carl B. Kerrick

9/2/2011

NDEP

JENNY

Amended Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum
(John " Hank" Swift)

Carl B. Kerrick

10/14/2011

DEOP

JENNY

Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second
Motion for Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

8/10/2011

REGISTER OF ACTIONS

Judge

Carl B. Kerrick

Date: 3/27/2012

Seco

Time: 01:26PM

User: DEANNA

icial District Court - Nez Perce Cou
ROA Report
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Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal.

John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw
Date

Code

User

10/14/2011

MISC

JENNY

**The Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J.
Cutshaw's Second Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby GRANTED.**

Carl B. Kerrick

HRVC

JENNY

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 01/27/2012 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Carl B. Kerrick

HRVC

JENNY

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
02/06/2012 09:00AM: Hearing Vacated

Carl B. Kerrick

CD IS

JENNY

Carl B. Kerrick
Civil Disposition entered for: City Of Lewiston,
Defendant; Cutshaw, Lowell J, Defendant; Block,
John, Plaintiff. Filing date: 10/14/2011

STAT

JENNY

Case Status Changed: Closed

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

JENNY

Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Second Motion for
Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

MEMO

JENNY

Carl B. Kerrick
Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration of Memorndum Opinion and
Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment

AFSP

JENNY

Fourth Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support
of Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Second Motion for
Summary Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

MEMC

JENNY

Defendant's Memorandum Of Costs - fax filed

Carl B. Kerrick

AFSP

JENNY

Affidavit Of Stephen Adams In Support of
Defendants' Memorandum of Costs - fax filed

Carl B. Kerrick

MEMC

JENNY

Defendant's Memorandum Of Costs -original

Carl B. Kerrick

AFSP

JENNY

Affidavit Of Stephen Adams In Support of
Defendants' Memorandum of Costs - original

Carl B. Kerrick

11/1/2011

MEMO

JENNY

Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion for Carl B. Kerrick
Reconsideration of Memorandum Opinion and
Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment

11/4/2011

NTHR

JENNY

Notice Of Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 11/29/2011 09:00
AM) Motion for Reconsideration

Carl B. Kerrick

STAT

JENNY

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Carl B. Kerrick

11/10/2011

MISC

JENNY

Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Memorandum Carl B. Kerrick
of Costs and Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow

11/14/2011

NTHR

JENNY

Notice Of Telephonic Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JENNY

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 11/29/2011 10:00
AM) Motion for Costs

Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

JENNY

Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

JENNY

Reply in Support of Defendants' Memorandum of Carl B. Kerrick
Costs

10/28/2011

10/31/2011

11/18/2011

11/25/2011

It~ffiSTER ()}N~CTIONS

Judge

Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration

Carl B. Kerrick

Date: 3/27/2012

User: DEANNA

icial District Court - Nez Perce Cou

Time: 01 :26 PM

ROAReport
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Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal.

John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw
Date

Code

User

11/29/2011

ADVS

JENNY

Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on
11/29/2011 09:00AM: Case Taken Under
Advisement Motion for Costs

Carl B. Kerrick

ADVS

JENNY

Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on
11/29/2011 09:00AM: Case Taken Under
Advisement Motion for Reconsideration

Carl B. Kerrick

DCHH

JENNY

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

Carl B. Kerrick

MINE

JENNY

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Mtn for Reconsideration/Mtn for
Costs
Hearing date: 11/29/2011
Time: 9:51 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: JENNY
Tape Number: CTRM #1
RON LANDECK FOR PLAINTIFF
STEPHEN ADAMS FOR DEFENDANT

Carl B. Kerrick

DEOP

JENNY

Memorandum Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration and Defendants'
Memorandum of Costs

Carl B. Kerrick

CD IS

JENNY

Carl B. Kerrick
Civil Disposition entered for: City Of Lewiston,
Defendant; Cutshaw, Lowell J, Defendant; Block,
John Gustav, Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/4/2012

JDMT

JENNY

Judgment

Carl B. Kerrick

STAT

JENNY

Case Status Changed: Closed

Carl B. Kerrick

APSC

DEANNA

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Carl B. Kerrick

NTAP

DEANNA

Notice Of Appeal

Carl B. Kerrick

DEANNA

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Carl B. Kerrick
Supreme Court Paid by: Landeck, Ronald J
(attorney for Block, John Gustav) Receipt
number: 0002126 Dated: 2/9/2012 Amount:
$101.00 (Check) For: Block, John Gustav
(plaintiff)

BNDC

DEANNA

Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 2127 Dated
2/9/2012 for 290.00)

BONG

DEANNA

Condition of Bond Estimate Reporters Transcript Carl B. Kerrick

BNDC

DEANNA

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 2128 Dated
2/9/2012 for 100.00)

Carl B. Kerrick

BONG

DEANNA

Condition of Bond Estimate Clerk's Record

Carl B. Kerrick

2/27/2012

SCRT

DEANNA

Supreme Court Receipt- Clerk's Record and
Reporter's Transcript must be filed at the SC by
April 25, 2012

Carl B. Kerrick

3/13/2012

~STER

f))(fAAfJ.AIONS Supreme Court Receipt- Clerk's Certificate filed

Carl B. Kerrick

1/4/2012

2/1/2012

2/9/2012

Judge

at the SC

Carl B. Kerrick

FILED
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RONALD J. LANDECK
JSB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
)
)
)
)
)

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased,
CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation
of the State of Idaho, and its employee, LOWELL
J. CUTSHAW, CityofLewiston Engineer, and
DOES 1-20

'

Defendants.

(\vn 9 -·02219

Case~.

COMPLAINT
Fee Categories (I)(A) $88.00

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

)
)

Plaintiff John G. Block, for causes of action against Defendants, complains and alleges as
follows:
I. PARTIES

1.

Plaintiff John G. Block ("Block" or "Plaintiff') is a single man.

COMPLAINT -- 1

2.

Defendant Jack J. Streibick ("Streibick"), upon information and belief, is a single

3.

Defendant Jack J. Streibick, upon information and belief, is or was the personal

man.

representative ("Personal Representative") of the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased (the
"Maureen Streibick Estate").
4.

Defendant City of Lewiston ("City of Lewiston") is a municipal corporation of the

State ofldaho.
5.

Defendant Lowell J. Cutshaw ("Cutshaw") was an employee of the City of

Lewiston and its City Engineer.
6.

DOES I - 20 are unknown employees, agents, or servants of City of Lewiston

("Others").
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7.

This action asserts claims in tort and contract based upon conduct and occurrences

in Nez Perce County, Idaho and affecting real property located in Nez Perce County, Idaho. All
claims in this action are within the personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction of this
Court.
8.

The amount in controversy in this Complaint exceeds the jurisdiction ofthe

Magistrate Division.
9.

None of the Defendants are entitled to immunity under Idaho law in regard to

Plaintiff's causes of action set forth in this Complaint.
10. Any notice required by law prior to commencement of this action has been given by
Plaintiff.

COMPLAINT -- 2

III. GENERAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
11.

On or about August 10, 2005, Block, as "Buyer," entered into a Real Estate

Purchase And Sale Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") with Streibick and the Maureen
Streibick Estate, represented by the Personal Representative, as "Seller," to purchase Lots 1, 2, 3
and 4, Amended Administrative Plat of Sunset Palisades No. 8 to the City of Lewiston,
according to the recorded plat thereof, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho (individually "Lot 1,"
"Lot 2," "Lot 3" and "Lot 4," respectively, and collectively the "Property"). On or about
December 2, 2005, Streibick and the Maureen Streibick Estate, represented by the Personal
Representative, conveyed the Property to Block by Warranty Deed recorded in the records of
Nez Perce County, Idaho (the "Streibick Deed"). On information and belief, at all times
relevant, Streibick and his wife, Maureen F. Streibick, (i) owned the Property until Maureen F.
Streibick's death whereupon the Estate of Maureen Streibick succeeded to Maureen F.
Streibick's interests therein until the Property was sold to Block and (ii) had developed the
Property by constructing the required infrastructure and platting the Property.
12. At all times relevant, Streibick was a real estate developer engaging, in part, in the
platting and development of subdivisions and the sale of residential lots to building contractors
for construction of residential dwellings.
13. Prior to Block's purchase of the Property on December 2, 2005, Block had
purchased other residential building lots from Streibick located in Lewiston, Idaho, that had been
platted and developed by Streibick and upon which Block had thereafter constructed residences.
14. On or about early 2006, Block made application to the City of Lewiston to
resubdivide Lot 4 into three lots and such resubdivision application was reviewed and approved
by Cutshaw and/or Others and by the City of Lewiston as Lot 1, Lot 2 and Lot 3, Administrative
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Plat of Canyon Greens, City of Lewiston, a resubdivision of Lot 4 of Amended Administrative
Plat of Sunset Palisades No. 8, and such lots are commonly known and addressed, respectively,
as 155 Marine View Drive, Lewiston, Idaho ("155"), 159 Marine View Drive, Lewiston, Idaho
("159") and 153 Marine View Drive, Lewiston, Idaho ("153") ("collectively "Canyon Greens").
15. In 2006, Block made application to the City of Lewiston to resubdivide Lot 1, Lot 2
and Lot 3 of Amended Administrative Plat of Sunset Palisades No. 8 into eight lots, and such
resubdivision application was reviewed and approved by Cutshaw and/or Others and by the City
of Lewiston as Lots 1 through 8 of Canyon Greens No. 2 to the City of Lewiston, a resubdivision
of Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Amended Administrative Plat of Sunset Palisades No.8 (collectively
"Canyon Greens No. 2").
16. On or about May 15, 2006, Block made application to the City ofLewiston and
building permits were approved and issued by the City of Lewiston and/or Others to construct
residences on 153 and 155. On or about August 22, 2006, Block made application to the City of
Lewiston and a building permit was approved and issued by the City of Lewiston and/or Others
to construct a residence on 159. The City of Lewiston and/or Others approved Block's request to
construct, pursuant to plans prepared by Block's engineer, retaining walls within the area of 153,
155 and 159 and issued building permits for and inspected and approved such construction.
Block thereafter constructed single-family residences on 153, 155 and 159. City of Lewiston
and/or Others issued certificates of occupancy for the residences constructed by Block on 153,
159 and 155 on May 30, 2007, May 30, 2007 and June 12, 2008, respectively. Block then put
the residences he constructed on 153, 159 and 155 on the market for sale. On or about April30,
2007, Block sold and conveyed 159 to a purchaser.
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17. Between January, 2006 and June, 2009, Block made application to the City of
Lewiston and was issued building permits by the City of Lewiston and/or Others to construct
residences on Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Canyon Greens No.2. Block has constructed
residences on Lots 2, 4, 5 and 7 of Canyon Greens No. 2. Block is in the process of constructing
residences on Lots 1, 3 and 6 of Canyon Greens No. 2. Block sold Lot 8 of Canyon Greens No.
2 to a purchaser as vacant land. Block sold Lots 4 and 7 of Canyon Greens No. 2 to purchasers
with residences constructed by Block. Block continues to own Lots 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Canyon
Greens No. 2.
18. All residential construction by Block on 153, 155, 159 and Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
has been done in accordance with all laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations and codes required
by the City of Lewiston, Others and any other governmental agency having jurisdiction thereof,
including, but not limited to, all required soil compaction testing.
19. On or about October 23,2007, a realtor showing 153 to a prospective purchaser
observed settling in the northwest comer of 153 and the realtor informed Block. On or about
early November, 2007, the owner of 159 told Block that there was a crack in the basement floor
of 159. On or about early November, 2007, Block observed settling under an exterior door of
155. On November 13, 2007, Block consulted with professional engineers Keltic Engineering,
Inc. and Strata Inc. Based upon professional advice from those engineers that 153, 155 and 159
were experiencing settlement problems, Block entered into a contract on December 14, 2007
with a contractor, Montana Helical Inc., to resolve the settlement problems by making structural
adjustments to the structures on 153, 155 and 159 in areas where settlement had occurred by
constructing a series ofhelical piers, and those structural adjustments were made in December,
2007.
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20. On or about December 14, 2007, to appease the owner's dissatisfaction with the
condition of 159 and to be able to resolve the settlement problems to 159, Block reacquired 159
from the owner. During the spring of 2008, Block made non-structural repairs and
improvements to 153, 155 and 159 that were related to the settlement problems and the
subsequent helical pier construction activity.
21. Block rented 155 to a tenant on June 1, 2008. Block rented 153 to a tenant in July,
2008. Block rented 159 to a tenant on December 1, 2008.
22. In February, 2009, the tenant in 159 called Block, who was in California, and stated
that they noticed settlement in the foundation of 159. Several weeks after that, the tenant in 153
called Block, who was still in California, and stated that there was settlement in the driveway and
basement area of 153. Block returned to Idaho in March, 2009, inspected 153, 155 and 159,
observed settlement to the structures on 153, 155 and 159 and observed cracks in the surface of
the ground within the area of 153, 155 and 159. On or about May 11, 2009, a natural gas leak
occurred at 153. On May 12, 2009, the City of Lewiston and/or Others inspected 153, 155 and
159 and posted notice that the residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. The
tenants of 153 and 159 vacated the premises that same day. The City of Lewiston and/or Others
required Block to submit an abatement plan to address the unsafe conditions, and Block
immediately prepared and submitted an abatement plan for review and approval by the City of
Lewiston. That plan, as approved by the City of Lewiston and/or Others, required the demolition
of 153 and 159 and structural repairs to 155. In accordance with the approved plan, Block
demolished and removed the structures on 153 in June, 2009 and removed the main floor,
remodeled the garage on site, although the City of Lewiston and/or Others have denied Block's
request to provide electrical service to said garage and have determined the garage violates the
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City of Lewiston's zoning ordinance as there is no longer a residential structure on this lot, and
demolished and removed the remaining structures on 159 in August, 2009. Block has made
improvements required by the City of Lewiston and/or Others to allow 155 to be occupied.
23. In late May, 2009, Sandra E. Lee, a reporter for the Lewiston Tribune sent Block a
copy of a May 20, 1999 Lewiston Tribune article that reported that earth movement had occurred
in 1999 in the area of Marine View Drive in the vicinity of 153, 155 and 159. Block reviewed
City of Lewiston records and other information he obtained regarding the development history of
the Property and determined that (i) the City of Lewiston had issued two (2) separate permits to
Streibick allowing Streibick in 1993, to place and grade fill in the area of 153, 155 and 159 and
requiring Streibick to make and file daily compaction reports in regard to such fill activity,
however, Block could not locate any such compaction reports in the City of Lewiston's records;
(ii) in 1994, the City of Lewiston and/or Others required Streibick to obtain approval for a storm
water drainage and detention plan for the development of the Palisades #4 subdivision, a storm
water drainage and detention plan was submitted to the City of Lewiston by Streibick's engineers
in October, 1994, and no detention pond was constructed as required by such plan in the
development of the Palisades #4 subdivision; (iii) in 1999 Streibick and the City of Lewiston,
Cutshaw and Others knew that substantial earth movement occurred within the area of 153, 155
and 159 and the City of Lewiston memorialized this occurrence in the City of Lewiston's records
related to Palisades #4 subdivision; (iv) upon information and belief, Streibick, between the earth
movement in 1999 and Block's initial inspection ofthe Property in 2005, placed and graded fill
within the area of 153, 155 and 159 that intentionally covered up any evidence of such earth
movement; (v) upon information and belief, neither the City of Lewiston, nor Cutshaw nor
Others required Streibick to conduct any soil stability testing or evaluation prior to Streibick's
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filling and grading activities within the area of 153, 155 and 159 to address the earth movement
that the City of Lewiston knew had occurred in the vicinity of 153, 155 and 159, and/or imposed
any condition(s) of approval on any and all subdivision plats submitted by Streibick for approval
to the City of Lewiston that related in any way to the development in the area now known as 153,
155 and 159 including, but not limited to, the Palisades No.4 and Palisades No.8 subdivisions,
and (vi) in 2005, the City of Lewiston and/or Others required construction of a storm water
detention facility in the area now described as 153 as a condition of Streibick' s resubdivision of
Block 3 of Palisades No. 4 subdivision in a newly created Sunset Palisades No. 8 subdivision;
however, the City of Lewiston and/or Others, at Streibick's request, approved the relocation of
that proposed detention facility from the location within the area of 153 originally shown in such
1994 detention plan to another location within the area of 153, and Streibick constructed that
detention facility in 2005 on that new location prior to Block's purchase ofthe Property.
24.

Neither the City of Lewiston, nor Cutshaw nor Others required Streibick at the

time(s) he sought approvals for the Plats related to Palisades No.4 and Palisades No. 8 that the
earth movement with 153, 155 and 159 needed to be eliminated or properly abated nor did they
require Streibick to complete the required storm water improvements in 1994 for the Palisades
No. 4 subdivisions.
25.

Neither the City of Lewiston nor Cutshaw nor Others advised or warned Block at

the time(s) he sought approval for the plats of Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens No.2 and/or
at the time of Block's application for building permits for 153, 155 and/or 159 and/or for Lots 1,
2, 4, 5, 6 and/or 7 of Canyon Greens No.2 of the earth movement within 153, 155 and/or 159 of
which the City of Lewiston had actual knowledge since on or about April, 1999. The City of
Lewiston and Others did not, as a condition of such subdivision approval(s) and/or permitting,
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require Block (i) to undertake any soil stability testing or evaluation to determine the cause or
extent of such earth movement, other than standard soil compaction testing which Block did as
required, to determine whether the land in the area of 153, 155 and 159 was stable enough for
residential construction or (ii) to undertake any reasonable measures prior to constructing
residences on 153, 155 and 159 to eliminate or properly abate such earth movement known to the
City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others.
26. On information and belief, approval by the City of Lewiston and/or Others of
Streibick's construction of a detention pond in 2005 within 153 near an area where the City of
Lewiston had knowledge of earth movement contributed to the settling and earth movement that
occurred within 153, 155 and 159 from 2007 through 2009 as set forth above.
27. The fair market value of all lots and/or improvements thereon owned by Block
within the Property have been substantially diminished and/or rendered valueless as a proximate
result of the acts and conduct of Defendants as set forth above. Block's reputation as a
contractor and Block's ability to conduct business in the manner in which he had previously
conducted business, including, but not limited to, his ability to procure credit, his ability to
complete ongoing construction projects and the availability of working capital to undertake
additional projects, his capital reserves having been exhausted on costs associated with
abatement of the settlement and earth movement discussed above, have been substantially and
adversely affected as a direct and proximate result of the acts and conduct of Defendants. Block
has made reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages and losses in connection with his interests in
this matter.
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II. CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT ONE- MISREPRESENTATION
28. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 27 of the Complaint as if set
forth fully herein.
29. In connection with the transaction involving the Purchase Agreement and Streibick
Deed (the "Transaction"), Streibick did not disclose to Block any information concerning the
earth movement that had occurred within the area of 153, 155 and 159 in 1999, did not disclose
to Block that Streibick had filled and graded within the area of 153, 155 and 159 between April,
1999 and December2, 2005, and intentionally concealed all evidence of such earth movement
and did not disclose to Block that Streibick had not taken any measures to eliminate and/or
properly abate such earth movement and that there was a substantial risk and/or probability that
additional earth movement would likely occur within the area of 153, 155 and 159 (collectively
"the Defective Condition").
30. At all times relevant, Streibick knew of the Defective Condition and the Defective
Condition was unknown to Block.
31. The Defective Condition was not discoverable upon reasonable inspection by Block
prior to July, 2009.
32.

Streibick had superior knowledge regarding the Defective Condition and Block was

ignorant of the facts regarding the Defective Condition. Streibick dealt from a condition of
superior knowledge in connection with the Transaction and knew that Block did not know of the
Defective Condition. Streibick knew that Block was being misled by believing that the Property
was suitable for residential construction.
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33. A confidential relationship existed between Streibick and Block in regard to the
Transaction.
34. Streibick knew that his failure to disclose the Defective Condition might justifiably
induce Block to purchase the Property.
35. Streibick was under a duty to Block to exercise reasonable care to disclose the
Defective Condition to Block.
36.

Streibick's nondisclosure of the Defective Condition constituted a material

misrepresentation of the condition ofthe Property.
37.

Streibick intended that Block rely on the nondisclosure of the Defective Condition

and purchase the Property in the Transaction.
38. Block was entitled to rely upon Streibick's nondisclosure ofthe Defective
Condition, and Block relied thereupon to Block's consequent and proximate injury and damage.
39. Streibick's material misrepresentation and nondisclosure of the Defective Condition
as set forth above was made and/or done in Streibick's individual capacity and in Streibick's
fiduciary capacity as Personal Representative.
40. Streibick is personally liable to Block in his individual capacity and in Streibick's
fiduciary capacity as Personal Representative of the Maureen Streibick Estate for such material
misrepresentation and nondisclosure as set forth above.
41. Maureen Streibick Estate is liable to Block for the Personal Representative's
material misrepresentation and nondisclosure as set forth above.
COUNT TWO- BREACH OF AFFIRMATIVE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE
42. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 41 of the Complaint as if set
forth fully herein.
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43. Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate had an affirmative
duty to disclose to Block that the Property was not suitable for residential construction and failed
to do so.
COUNT THREE- BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
44. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 43 of the Complaint as if set
forth fully herein.
45. Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate had a duty to
Block to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the Property was suitable for residential
construction and failed to do so.
46. Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate impliedly
warranted and represented to Block in the Transaction that the Property was suitable for
residential construction and breached that warranty and representation.
47. Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate impliedly
warranted to Block in the Transaction that the Property had been developed in a good and
workmanlike manner and breached that warranty.
48. Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate impliedly
warranted to Block in the Transaction that the Property would, upon proper residential
construction, be suitable for habitation and breached that warranty.
COUNT FOUR- BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
49. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 48 of the Complaint as if set
forth fully herein.
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50. Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate impliedly
covenanted to Block in the Transaction to act in good faith and deal fairly and breached that
covenant by nullifying any benefit to Block from the Transaction.
COUNT FIVE- NEGLIGENCE/STREIBICK
51. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 50 of the Complaint as if set
forth fully herein.
52. Streibick's work in (i) placing fill and grading within the area of 153, 155 and 159
between 1999 and the sale of the Property to Block and (ii) the construction of the detention
pond and related improvements within the area of 153 as set forth above were not performed in a
workmanlike manner.
53.

Streibick had a duty to place and grade such fill and to construct such detention

pond and related improvements in a workmanlike manner, to use ordinary care not to injure
others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him and to do his work to
avoid any such injury, and Streibick breached this duty.
COUNT SIX- NEGLIGENCE/CITY OF LEWISTON, CUTSHAW AND OTHERS
54.

Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 53 ofthe Complaint as if set

forth fully herein.
55. The City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others had a duty to act with reasonable care
under the circumstances and without negligence. The City of Lewiston, Cutshaw, the City
Engineer(s) and Others, acting within the course of their employment or duties, breached that
duty of care by (i) failing to notify and/or warn Block at the time he sought building permits for
153, 155 and 159 and Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 ofCanyon Greens No.2 of earth movement that
the City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and Others knew had occurred in 1999 within the area of 153,
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155 and 159 and that such earth movement had neither been eliminated nor properly abated in
any manner, (ii) failing to take any action to prevent, restrict or regulate development within the
area of 153, 155 and 159 until such earth movement had been eliminated or properly abated, (iii)
failing to require that such earth movement in the area of 153, 155 and 159 be eliminated or
properly abated by Streibick and/or Others prior to Block's purchase of the Property, (iv) failing
to prevent Streibick from developing and selling 153, 155 and 159 to Block without notice
and/or warning to Block that such earth movement had occurred in 1999 or without having
eliminated or properly abated such earth movement, (v) failing to require Streibick to complete
the required storm water improvements in 1994 for Palisades No. 4 subdivision and approving
and allowing Streibick' s construction of a storm water detention pond within the area of 153
where the City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others knew earth movement had occurred in 1999,
thereby contributing to the instability of the soil in that area, (vi) approving the plats of Canyon
Greens and Canyon Greens No.2 without notifying and/or warning Block that earth movement
had occurred on 153, 155 and 159 in 1999 and had not been eliminated or properly abated; (vii)
failing to require an approved design or plan incorporating engineering standards applicable to
the grading, filling, compacting of soil, detaining of storm water and constructing of residences
on the Property and failing to approve such a design or plan and/or to require compliance with
such design or plan prior to any such improvements being allowed by the City of Lewiston,
Cutshaw and/or Others and/or undertaken to eliminate or properly abate such earth movement
within the area of 153, 155 and 159; (viii) failing to act with ordinary care to protect against the
likely risks, danger and adverse consequences from such earth movement the City of Lewiston,
Cutshaw and/or Others knew had occurred in the area of 153, 155 and 159 in 1999; (ix) failing to
require and/or compel Streibick to eliminate or properly abate the dangerous condition caused by
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and/or existing as a result of such earth movement in the area of 153, 155 and 159; (x) failing to
supervise Streibick's development activities within the area of 153, 155 and 159 between 1999
and 2006 thereby allowing concealment of such earth movement and the creation of a dangerous
condition and risk of harm; and (xi) failing to inspect and/or make an inadequate inspection of
Streibick's development activities within the area of 153, 155 and 159 between 1999 and 2006
thereby allowing concealment of such earth movement and the creation of a dangerous condition
and risk of harm.
COUNT SIX- GROSS NEGLIGENCE
56. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 55 of the Complaint as if set
forth fully herein.
57. The City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others, while acting within the course and
scope of their employment, did or failed to do those acts set forth above in this Complaint which
acts a reasonable person in a similar situation would, with a minimum of contemplation, be
inescapably drawn to recognize a duty to do or not do and that failing that duty showed
deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to Block. The City of Lewiston, Cutshaw
and/or Others intentionally and knowingly did or failed to do those acts set forth in this
Complaint above creating an unreasonable risk of harm to Block and persons occupying the
Property and involving a high degree of probability that such harm would result. In so doing or
failing to do those acts set forth above, the City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others, acting
within the course and scope of their employment, acted with gross negligence or recklessly,
willfully or wantonly.
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III. DAMAGES
58. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 57 of the Complaint as if set
forth fully herein.
59. As a direct and proximate result ofthe acts and conduct ofStreibick, Personal
Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate, Block has suffered property damages, actual
damages, consequential damages, economic losses, loss of reputation and devaluation ofthe
Property and Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate are liable to Block
for all such damages and/or losses. The exact nature, extent and amount of such damages will be
proven at trial.
60. As a direct and proximate result of such negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or
omissions and the gross negligence and/or reckless, willful and wanton conduct of the City of
Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others as set forth above in this Complaint, Block has suffered
property damages, actual damages, consequential damages, economic losses, loss of reputation
and devaluation of the Property and the City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others are liable to
Block for all such damages and/or losses. The exact nature, extent and amount of such damages
will be proven at trial.
IV. ATTORNEYFEES
As to All Claims
61. In order to recover damages referred to above, Block was required to retain the
services of Ronald J. Landeck, P.C. to represent him in this action. Defendants should be
ordered to pay to Block an amount as and for reasonable attorney fees as the Court deems just
and for costs incurred pursuant to Idaho law, including, but not limited to, Idaho Code sections
12-120 and 12-121.
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RIGHT TO AMEND
62.

Block reserves the right to amend this Complaint as this matter proceeds.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief against Defendants, as follows:
a.

For judgment for misrepresentation, breach of affirmative duty of disclosure,
breach of implied warranty, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
negligence and gross negligence, as more particularly set forth in Counts One
through Six of the Complaint, including allowable damages in amounts to be
proven at trial;

b.

For statutory prejudgment interest;

c.

For an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily incurred in this
action;

d.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable and just.

Dated this 22nd day of October, 2009.
RONALD J. LANDECK, P .C.

By:_(~~~:2__~::_L__::_fu..4:~··ltut,__=-=--:.:=====::--~
Ronal J. Landeck
Atto eys for Plaintiff John G. Block
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Latah
)
John G. Block, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that he is Plaintiff in the
above-entitled action, that he has read the foregoing Complaint and that he believes the facts
stated to be true to the best of his knowledge.

Jo

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of October, 2009.

;'~: (/Ytn:

c &/

(l/11:;)

NOTARY PUBLIC for the State ofldaho
My commission expires: g -1 7 -;;; D/5
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Attorneys for Defendant, Jack J. Streibick,
individually and as personal representative of
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick,
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a
municipal corporation of the State of Idaho,
and its employees, LOWELL J.
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and
DOES 1-20,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV09 02219
ANSWER

COMES NOW, the above-entitled Defendeant Jack J. Streibick a single man and Jack
Streibick, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick by and through his
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attorneys of record, Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King, LLP, and answers Plaintiffs' Complaint as
follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
The Complaint fails to state a claim against this answering Defendant upon which relief can
be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE
I.

Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not herein expressly and
specifically admitted.
II.

Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
III.

Answers to paragraphs 7 and 8, the Defendant Streibick admits that the jurisdiction and
venue appear to be proper. All remaining allegations contained therein are denied.
IV.
To the extent the allegations contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 are directed at this
answering Defendant, the allegations contained therein are denied.

v.
In answer to paragraph 11, this Defendant admits that a real estate purchase and sale

agreement containing the date August 10, 2005, or at least a portion thereofwas signed by John
Block as buyer and Jack Streibick as seller. Defendant also admits that he has a copy of a
ANSWER -2

warranty deed dated December 2, 2005, purporting to convey the property to Block but
Defendant's copy is unsigned. In addition, Defendant admits that he owned the property set forth
in said paragraph 11 at the date listed on the purchase and sale agreement and the unsigend
warranty deed. The remaining allegations contained in paragraph 11 are denied.
VI.

In answer to paragraph 12, the Defendant admits that at various times the Defendant did
own real estate some of which he developed. The remaining allegations contained therein are
denied.
VII.

In answer to paragraph 13, the Defendant agrees that prior to December 2, 2005, he sold
undeveloped real estate lots located in Lewiston, Idaho to the Plaintiff upon which the Plaintiff
thereafter constructed residences. The remaining allegations contained in paragraph 13 are
denied.
VIII.

In answer to paragraph 14, this Defendant is without sufficient information or knowledge
to either admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraph 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 and therefore Defendant denies the same.

IX.
In answer to paragraph 28, the Defendant incorporates herein by reference the answers to
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 above as if set forth in their entirety herein.

ANSWER -3

X.
The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41.
XI.

In answer to paragraph 42, this Defendant incorporates by reference herein the answers to

paragraphs 1 through 41 above as if set forth in their entirety herein.
XII.

The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 43.
XIII.

In answer to paragraph 44, this Defendant incorporates herein answers to the allegations

contained in paragraphs 1 through 43 above as if set forth in their entirety herein.
XIV.

Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 45, 46, 4 7 and 48.
XV.

In answer to paragraph 49, the Defendant incorporates herein answers to the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 48 above as if set forth in their entirety herein.
XVI.

Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 50.
XVII.

In answer to paragraph 51, This Defendant incorporates herein answers to the allegations

contained in paragraphs 1 through 50 above as if set forth in their entirety herein.
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XVIII.
Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 52 and 53.
XIX.

Count Six of Plaintiffs Complaint set forth in paragraphs 54 and 55 of Plaintiff's
Complaint does not allege a cause of action against this Defendant and therefore no response is
necessary.

XX.
Count Six of Plaintiffs Complaint set forth at paragraphs 56 and 57 does not raise
allegations against this Defendant and therefore no answer is required.

XXI.
In answer to paragraph 58, this Defendant incorporates herein answers to the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 57 above as if set forth in their entirety herein.

XXII.
Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 59, 60, 61, and 62 of Plaintiffs
Complaint.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
1.

The negligence of Plaintiff Block in not conducting his own geotechnical studies

and/or due diligence prior to purchase of the property and/or prior to construction of homes on
the property exceeded the negligence of this Defendant, if any.
2.

The Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

3.

The Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver and/or estoppel.
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RONALD J. LANDECK
ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
)
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the
)
)
Estate ofMaureen F. Streibick, deceased,
CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation )
of the State ofldaho, and its employee, LOWELL)
J. CUTSHAW, CityofLewiston Engineer, and
)
DOES 1-20
)

Case No. CV09-02219

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)

'

Defendants.

)
)
INTRODUCTION

John G. Block, doing business as The Block Group ("Block") presented a Notice of
Claim for Damages to the City of Lewiston, a municipal corporation ofthe State ofidaho ("City
of Lewiston") and Lowell J. Cutshaw ("Cutshaw") in his capacity as City of Lewiston Engineer
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on August 26, 2009 to recover money damages under the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA"). On
October 22, 2009 Block filed a Complaint against Defendants, Jack J. Streibick, City of
Lewiston, and Cutshaw. Defendants City of Lewiston and Cutshaw were served with the
Complaint and Summons on December 9 and December 18,2010, respectively. Defendant City
of Lewiston has moved for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Block failed to timely file a
Notice of Tort Claim and that Block is barred from pursuing damages against the City of
Lewiston and Cutshaw. Block opposes this motion as there are either genuine issues of material
fact that preclude summary judgment or the material facts conclusively establish that the Notice
of Tort Claim was timely filed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In December 2005, Block purchased property located in Lewiston, Idaho from Defendant
Jack Streibick and the Estate of Maureen Streibick that was, in part, pursuant to Block's
application, approved by the City of Lewiston, for resubdivision into three (3) residential lots
that are commonly known as 153 Marine View Drive ("153"), 155 Marine View Drive ("155"),
and 159 Marine View Drive ("159") (collectively the "Canyon Greens" subdivision). In May
2006, Block received building permits from the City of Lewiston to construct homes on 153, 155
and 159. Block assumed that all grading and fill on the Canyon Greens property had been done
and placed correctly under permit from the City of Lewiston and under its supervision and
inspection. Block constructed a home on each lot and the City of Lewiston conducted
inspections, found those homes to be constructed in accordance with applicable building codes
and standards and issued certificates of occupancy for the homes. Complaint, pp. 3-4, Affidavit
of John Block ("Block Aff."), p. 2.
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On or about October 23, 2007, while showing 153 to a prospective purchaser, a realtor
observed settling on the northwest corner of 153 and then informed Block of what she had
observed. In November 2007, the owner of 159 reported settlement ofthe basement floor to
Block. Also in November 2007, Block observed settling under an exterior door of 155. Block
Aff., p. 2. On or about mid-November, 2007, Block consulted with Keltic Engineering regarding
possible solutions to the settlement that was observed on the three properties. Eric Hasenoehrl, of
Keltic Engineering, then contacted Strata, Inc., a geotechnical engineering firm, to assist on this
project. Affidavit ofEric Hasenoehrl ("Hasenoehrl Aff."), p. 2; Block Aff., p. 2. Mr. Block and
Andrew Abrams, a Strata representative, met on site on December 6, 2007 to observe the
conditions of distress to the homes. Mr. Abrams stated that without detailed subsurface
knowledge and engineering evaluation, he could not provide an engineering opinion of the
causes of the "observed settlement." Mr. Block, desiring an immediate repair of these homes,
asked for options and Mr. Abrams stated that a deep foundation system such as helical piers was
an alternative. Block Aff., pp. 3-4; Hasenoehrl Aff., p. 3. Block then consulted with Keltic
Engineering and decided to utilize the helical piers system because it had been recommended by
Mr. Abrams to remedy foundation settlement. On December 14, 2007, Block, with Keltic's
assistance, entered into a contract with Montana Helical, Inc. to install the helical piers system on
and underneath the properties. The piers were installed in December 2007, and the installation
was overseen by representatives of Keltic and Strata. Block also hired Keltic to monitor the
structural stability of the residences by surveying prior to installation of the helical piers and
surveying at least monthly after installation of the helical piers through December 2008. Based
upon this constant monitoring over this one-year period, Block and Keltic believed that the
installation of the piers had remedied the localized settling that had been observed on the
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properties. Block, confident that the helical piers had remedied the settling, undertook needed
repairs to 153, 155 and 159 during Spring 2008. No further problems were observed or reported
until February 2009. Hasenoehrl Aff. pp. 3-4; Block Aff., p. 3.
In February 2009, the tenant of 159 called Block, who was out-of-state, and stated that
they had noticed settlement in the foundation of 159. Several weeks after that, the tenant in 153
called Block, who was still out-of-state, and stated that there was settlement in the driveway and
basement of 153. Block returned to Idaho in March 2009 and promptly inspected 153, 155 and
159 and observed settlement ofthe structures on 153, 155 and 159 and cracks in the ground
surface of all three properties. On or about May 11, 2009, a natural gas leak occurred at 153. On
May 12, 2009, the City of Lewiston inspected 153, 155 and 159 and posted notice that the
residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. The tenants vacated the premises
that same day. The City of Lewiston required Block to submit an abatement plan which, as
approved by the City of Lewiston, required the demolition of 153 and 159 and structural repairs
to 155. Block demolished and removed the structures on 153 in June 2009 and the structures on
159 in August 2009. Block made improvements required by the City of Lewiston to allow 155 to
be occupied. Block Aff., pp. 3-4
In late May 2009, Sandra E. Lee, a reporter for the Lewiston Tribune sent Block a copy
of a May 20, 1999 Lewiston Tribune article that reported slope movement had occurred in 1999
in the area ofMarine View Drive in the vicinity of 153, 155 and 159. Block Aff., p.4. In late
May, 2009, Block started researching City of Lewiston records regarding the development
history of the Property and found that the City had issued two separate permits to Streibick in
1993 that allowed Streibick to place and grade fill in the area of 153, 155 and 159. On June 5,
2009, Block then discovered from the City's records that the City of Lewiston knew in 1999 that
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substantial slope movement occurred within the area of 153, 155 and 159 and that the City of
Lewiston memorialized this occurrence in the City of Lewiston's records related to the Palisades
#4 subdivision and pledged to deal with the problem before development of that area. Id.

Although, Keltic and Hasenoehrl had provided substantial engineering services related to
153, 155 and 159, the City of Lewiston had not made them aware of the 1999 landslide in the
area of 153, 155 and 159. It was not until Block shared the documents and photograph from
Lewiston's records and the 1999 Tribune article from Ms. Lee that Hasenoehrl realized the
settlement conditions that he had observed in late 2007 were more likely caused by slope
movement than settlement as he had previously believed. Hasenoehrl Aff. pp. 4-5. Hasenoehrl
surveyed the fault line of the 2009 slope movement, compared that line with the fault line shown
in the 1999 photograph and concluded that the lines are almost identical. Id. at p. 5. Hasenoehrl
believes that Block acted reasonably in deciding to utilize helical piers to stabilize the settlement
conditions that were observed by him, Hasenoehrl and Abrams in December 2007 and to monitor
that situation. Hasenoehrl opines that it would not be reasonable to conclude that Block or
Hasenoehrl should have known or should have attempted to discover, prior to May 2009, that the
observed settlement in 2007 was slope movement and not settlement. Id.
Block presented and filed his Notice of Claim for Damages with the City of Lewiston,
including Cutshaw in his capacity as City of Lewiston Engineer, to recover money damages
under the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA") on August 26, 2009. Exhibit B to Affidavit of
Stephen Adams dated May 21,2010. On October 22, 2009 Block filed a Complaint against
Defendants, Jack J. Streibick, City of Lewiston, and Cutshaw. Block made no attempt to effect
service of process of the Complaint and Summons in this case on any defendant until 90 days
had elapsed from the date of filing of Block's Notice of Claim For Damages with the City of
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Lewiston. The Complaint and Summons were served on Defendant City of Lewiston December
9, 2009, and on Defendant Cutshaw on December 18, 2009. Block Aff. pp. 4-5.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In assessing the City's motion for summary judgment, all disputed facts are to be

liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Mallory v. Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 447,
885 P2d 1162, 1163 (Ct. App. 1994). The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests
at all times upon the moving party. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364
(1991). This burden is onerous because even circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue
of material fact. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P2d 1238 (1986). The court must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Block. Id. The court must look to the "totality of the
motions, affidavits, depositions, pleadings, and attached exhibits," not merely to portions of the
record in isolation." Id. at 469, 716 P2d at 1241. All doubts are to be resolved against the moving
party. !d. In order to survive a motion for summary judgment the plaintiff need not prove that an
issue will be decided in its favor at trial; rather, it must simply show that there is a triable issue.
G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P2d 851, 861 (1991). The motion
must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn and if reasonable
people might reach different conclusions. Id. at 518, 808 P2d at 855.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
John Block timely filed a Notice ofTort Claim.
In late October 2007, Block was notified about settling to the foundation of 153 and the
following month to settlement in the basement floor of 159 and to an exterior door of 155. Block
then sought engineering advice and undertook reasonable repair ofthe damage to the homes that

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-- 6

was caused by what appeared to him, to his geotechnical engineer, Andrew Abrams of Strata,
Inc., and to his civil engineer, Eric Hasenoehrl of Keltic Engineering, to be normal settling.
Block monitored the helical pier system repair for one year, and no further settling was observed.
However, in February 2009, until Block, who was not in Idaho, learned of additional settling to
159 and several weeks later, to 153. Block returned to Idaho in March, 2009 and observed
settlement of the structures on 153, 155 and 159. Structural conditions worsened later that
Spring, and, after rupture of a natural gas line in May 2009, the City posted 153 and 159 as
unsafe to occupy.
On or about May 27, 2009, Block first learned from Sandra E. Lee, a reporter for the
Lewiston Tribune, that a landslide had occurred in 1999 in the area of Marine View Drive where
he had constructed the residences on 153, 155 and 159. Ms. Lee had written a report published in
the Lewiston Tribune on May 20, 1999, stating that slope movement had been observed in the
area of Marine View Drive, that officials of the City of Lewiston had been provided aerial
photographs ofthat movement and that the City of Lewiston Engineer, at that time, Tim Richard,
had stated that the City will document the slope movement information and, if plans for that
property are submitted, will deal with it at that time. On June 5, 2009, Block reviewed the City's
subdivision records and located a photograph taken in March, 1999 showing a landslide within
the area of 153, 155 and 159. At this point, Block first realized that the damages to structures on
153, 155 and 159 were most likely not the result of foundation settlement, rather, that they
resulted from a landslide in the exact area in which there had been a previous landslide of which
the City had actual knowledge that had been documented in its records.
The Idaho Tort Claim Act § 6-906 states that all claims against a political subdivision
arising under the provisions ofthis act and all claims against an employee of a political
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subdivision for any act or omission of the employee within the course or scope ofhis
employment shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the political subdivision
within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have
been discovered, whichever is later. (emphasis added).
The question of when the claimant reasonably should have discovered the governmental
entity's role is a question of material fact, which if genuinely disputed, is inappropriate for
determination on a motion for summary judgment. Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 577 P2d 33
(1978). In Trosper, the critical date was not and is not the date of injury but the date of
reasonable discovery of the claim. The court explained that "determining when the county's
interest in the gravel pond reasonably should have been discovered is a question of material fact
which, by its very nature, is inappropriate for determination on a motion for summary
judgment." Compare Full Circle, Inc. v. Schelling, 108 Idaho 634, 701 P2d 254 (Ct. App. 1985)
(question of reasonable diligence to discover fraud under applicable statute of limitation is a
question of fact for the jury).

In Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 758 P2d 710 (Ct. App. 1988), the plaintiff neither
know nor had sufficient facts to cause her to properly inquire further that a county employee was
involved in her injury. There were facts in existence at the time ofthe injury that plaintiff did not
know, and could not have been reasonably expected to discover until a later time when some
knowledge beyond her initial reach, was imparted to her.
In Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P2d 1238 (1986), the court explained that
Plaintiffs had no reason to know of and possessed no knowledge that would cause them to
investigate into the district's hiring of an offending teacher. It was only after preparation of a
presentence investigation of the teacher in a criminal action did the parents learn of potential
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liability of the school district. Thus, the statute was properly tolled until the parents received
information that led them to inquire further into the school's knowledge. The court stated that
"obviously, a claim is not necessarily discovered the instant the injury or damages occur." Id. at
474, 716 P2d at 1246. The, then, 120-day limit only began to run after the claimant became fully
apprised of not only the injury or damages but also of the governmental entity's role. Id.
Likewise, here, normal or localized settlement that occurs commonly on construction and
building projects is not typically an occurrence that would involve the City government. The
City's knowledge ofthe substantially more severe slope movement was not discovered by Block
until he became aware in May 2009 that slope movement had occurred in 1999 and that the City
knew that slope movement had occurred. Block knew nothing of the role of the City until a
point well within the 180-day period preceding filing of his Tort Claim Notice. Surely, the City
does not suggest that normal or localized settlement on a construction site raises a presumption
that the City had prior knowledge or was somehow involved.
Conversely, in Mallory v. Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 885 P2d 1162 (Ct. App. 1994), the
court, in focusing on the interpretation of the language "the claim ... reasonably should have
been discovered" stated that "knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person
on inquiry" triggers the running of the time limitation. Id. at 448, 885 P2d at 1164. The court
concluded that the undisputed facts of the case were that the possible cause of Mallory's injury
during the softball game was revealed by a cursory inspection of the field and the city's
ownership was determined with minimal effort. Id. at 449, 885 P2d at 1165. There being no
questions regarding a latent injury and no other hidden facts, Mallory was held to have been put
on inquiry notice of the city's role in her injury when sustained. Id. These circumstances are
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dissimilar to the facts of this case where Block had no notice of the extent ofthe foundation
problem much less any idea as to the City's knowledge ofthe 1999 landslide.
The situation in this case is analogous to that in Leafv. City of San Mateo, 104 Cal App
3d 398 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1980). In Leaf, plaintiffs appealed from a summary judgment entered
against them. Id. at 402. In January 1972, the Leafs, purchased a parcel of real property that
included a duplex in the City of San Mateo. Id. at 403. Final completion and acceptance of the
subdivision to which it was a part of was believed to have occurred in 1965. Id. In June 1972, the
Leafs discovered that the floors were unlevel and the exterior of the building was cracking. I d.
After consulting two different engineering firms, in August 1972, and July, 1973, the Leafs were
told that the structural problems were caused by differential settlement and subsidence due to
movement of the fill on the lot caused by water absorption. !d. The recommendation was for the
Leafs to install a drainage system and that the structure be repaired. Id. In August 1976, the Leafs
began construction of the recommended drainage system. During construction, the Leafs
discovered that the City's storm and sanitary sewer trenches on and near the Leaf's property had
not been compacted and were funneling water onto the Leaf's property. Id. at 403-04. The Leafs
filed a claim against the City on November 5, 1976 and civil action on January 28, 1977. Id. at
404.
The court explained that the question of when the Leaf's cause of action accrued was a
mixed question oflaw and fact. Id. at 406. The City argued that the cause of action accrued when
the Leafs became aware of the damage to their property, i.e., when they noticed the unlevel
floors and cracks in the building exterior. Id. at 406. The Leafs argued that the "rule of
discovery" would start the statute running only when they were aware ofthe damage but also
became aware ofits negligent cause, i.e., at the time of the cave-in. Id. The court noted that the
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discovery rule operates to protect the plaintiff who is "blamelessly ignorant" of his cause of
action. !d. at 408. Thus, the court stated "we do not think that plaintiffs' cause of action in this
case should accrue from the occurrence of the last essential fact, nor from discovery of the
damage to their property, as defendant contends, but rather from the point in time when plaintiffs
became aware of defendant's negligence as a cause, or could have become so aware through the
exercise of reasonable diligence. Id. (emphasis added).
In determining whether the Leafs exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the
negligent cause of their injuries, the court explained that there was no reason to start the statute
of limitations running when plaintiffs, at the outset, made reasonable, but unsuccessful efforts to
identify the negligent cause of damage. The plaintiffs consulted with professional engineers as to
the source oftheir injury and were entitled to rely upon that advice. !d. "It would be contrary to
public policy to require that plaintiffs file a lawsuit against City of San Mateo at a time when the
evidence available to them failed to indicate a cause of action against this defendant." !d. at 40809. (emphasis added). Further, whether plaintiffs in fact exercised reasonable diligence in
discovering the negligence of the City was a question of fact. !d. at 409.
Here, Block, was "blamelessly ignorant" ofthe facts upon when his claim against the
City of Lewiston is based until May 28, 2009. As in Leaf, it would be contrary to public policy,
under these circumstances to require that Block file a notice of claim and subsequent lawsuit
against the City of Lewiston at a time, that is, in 2007 or 2008, when the evidence available to
him failed to indicate a cause of action against this defendant. This public policy is not only
recognized in California, but was also recognized in Idaho by the dissent in Mitchell v. Bingham

Memorial Hospital, 130 Idaho 420, 426, 942 P2d 544, 550 (1997) ("Accusing an institution of
misdeeds without an adequate basis is not something people of honor do.").
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Further, whether Block exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the negligence of
the City is a question of fact as it was in Leaf.Jd. at 409. In November, 2007, when he observed
settlement in the homes on 153, 155 and 159, Block consulted with two engineering
professionals, Mr. Abrams of Strata and Mr. Hasenoehrl ofKeltic. Mr. Abrams indicated some
potential causes ofthe observed settlement and recommended a system to remedy the settlement
by installation of a deep foundation system utilizing helical piers, which system Block
subsequently implemented. Block's efforts were reasonable. Block was entitled to reasonably
rely on Mr. Abrams' recommendation and Mr. Hasenoehrl's consultation to address the observed
settlement. In addition, the helical piers installation was monitored by Keltic from installation in
December, 2007 through December, 2008, without sign of settlement or slope movement, which
supports the conclusion that it was not reasonable to believe that a claim against the City had
arisen in late 2007. Mr. Hasenoehrl has opined that it would not be reasonable, under the
circumstances, to expect that he or Block should have known that slope movement had occurred
in 2007 or should have attempted to eliminate slope movement as a cause of the settlement they
had observed in late 2007.
Block had knowledge that fill had been placed on these properties, which is not an
uncommon building practice in the City of Lewiston. The foundations for these properties also
met all compaction test standards for construction ofthese three residences. The AllWest
disclaimer is not notice that the properties were subject to past slope movement or landslide
activity, rather, its disclaimer merely states that AllWest did not test compaction of all fill on
these properties. Further, it has been recognized by courts that having knowledge that a house is
located on fill is not the same as having knowledge of preexisting slides and springs on such
property. Barnhouse v. City ofPinole, 133 Cal App 3d 171, 178 (1982). "The repair of a
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preexisting slide, which may reoccur, is a complicated structural job, whereas the typical fill is
merely a beautification measure. Id. at 189. Having notice that a home was on a filled lot was not
notice of other independent soil conditions, i.e., preexisting seeps, springs and slides. !d. at 190.
At the very least, whether Block's knowledge of fill on these properties translates to knowledge
the earth movement that has caused these substantial damages is a question of material fact.
Relationship with the Federal Tort Claims Act
"The Idaho legislature largely modeled the ITCA on the FTCA." Doe, 110 Idaho at 473,
716 P2d at 1245, FN 2. Thus, there is a presumption that when the legislature adopts the statute
of another jurisdiction, it also adopts the prior construction of that statute by courts of the other
jurisdiction. Id. The following FTCA case provides some guidance as to when a plaintiff has
knowledge that is required to set the statute of limitations running.
When there are two causes of an injury, and only one is the government, the knowledge
that is required to set the statute oflimitations running for a claim under Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) is knowledge ofthe government cause, not just ofthe other cause; thus, the limitations
period begins to run either when the government cause is known, or when a reasonably diligent
person in the tort claimant's position reacting to any suspicious circumstances of which he might
have been aware would have discovered the government cause-whichever comes first. Garza v.

US. Bureau ofPrisons, 284 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 2002). As applied to this case, Block's discovery
of extensive earth movement, as contrasted to normal settlement, most certainly did not occur
prior to December, 2007, and most assuredly occurred in May, 2009, was not of itself notice or
knowledge ofhis claim against the City. That knowledge or the reasonable discovery of that
knowledge did not occur and was not reasonably discoverable until at least late May, 2009, when
Block learned that the 1999 landslide had been investigated and reported on by a Lewiston
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Tribune reporter and that her reporting included interviews with City officials. Even if Block had
known of the landslide in December, 2007, which he did not, such knowledge would not have
precluded him from rightfully filing a notice of claim against the City on August 26, 2009, as he
did. The limitation period against the City of Lewiston did not begin to run until Block had
knowledge of or reasonably should have discovered the City's negligence in failing to either
abate the dangerous condition, prevent development until abatement had been completed or
inform Block about the 1999 landslide before he developed the properties. That discovery as has
been demonstrated, did not occur until Block read the Lewiston Tribune article in late May, 2009
and located the City's record of the 1999landslide in the City's files on June 5, 2009.
Block's complaint should not be dismissed on the grounds it was filed prematurely.
The City's Motion For Summary Judgment has been made on the singular ground that
Plaintiff failed to timely file a Notice of Tort Claim. Motion For Summary Judgment, p. 2.
Despite not having pled that the Complaint should be dismissed on other grounds, the City has
included argument in its Memorandum that the Complaint should be dismissed because the
Complaint was filed prior to the expiration of a 90 day period following Block's filing Notice of
his tort claims against the City. City has not cited any authority for its argument other than
referencing I.C. § 6-910. City's argument on this point should not be considered by the Court as
it has not been properly pled and is not relevant to the only grounds stated in the City's Motion
For Summary Judgment, however, if considered, the argument should be denied for the reasons
set forth below.
Idaho Code § 6-908 states that "no claim or action shall be allowed against a
governmental entity or its employee unless the claim has been presented and filed within the
time limits prescribed by this act." Emphasis added. Pursuant to § 6-909, the governmental entity
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within ninety (90) days after the filing of the claim shall act thereon and notify the claimant in
writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end of the
ninety (90) day period the governmental entity has failed to approve or deny the claim. Under
LC. § 6-910, ifthe claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court against
the governmental entity or its employee in those circumstances where an action is permitted by
this act.
In this case, Block presented and filed his Notice of Tort Claim on August 26, 2009.
Thereafter, Block filed his Complaint on October 22, 2009; however, the Defendant City of
Lewiston was not served with a Summons and Complaint until December 2, 1009, more than 90
days after the Notice was filed and presented to the City and also after the claim had been
deemed denied because ofthe City's failure to approve or deny the claim during the ninety (90)
day period.
Courts adhere to the universal rule of statutory construction that a statute must be
construed in light of its intent and purpose. Jorstad v. Lewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 125, 456 P2d 766,
769 (1969). "The object of the statute must be kept in mind, and it should not be given a
construction which will defeat the ends of justice." !d. at 126, 456 P2d at 770. In Cobbley v.

Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 59 P3d 959 (2002), the court noted the purpose of LC. § 6-906 which is
to (1) provide an opportunity for resolution of the claim and save the expense oflitigation, (2)
allow the governmental entity to fully investigate the claim to determine its liability, if any, (3)
allow the governmental entity to prepare its defenses. !d. at 157, 59 P3d at 962. A liberal
approach is taken in interpreting the notice requirement of the ITCA. Doe, 110 Idaho at 474, 716
P2d at 1246.
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Thus, although Block's complaint was filed prior to the passing of 90 days, it was not
served upon the City until90 days had passed, therefore none of the purposes ofi.C. § 6-906
were diminished. The City had sufficient time to resolve the claim, investigate the claim and
prepare its defenses as the time for responding to the complaint would not begin to run until
service was made.
Moreover, Idaho Code § 6-910, by its express terms, neither prohibits the filing of suit
within 90 days of filing a tort claim notice nor bars the bringing of suit under ITCA for filing a
"premature" complaint. In Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283,869 P2d 1378 (1994),
Farnworth, on February 21, 1989, filed a notice of claim with Blaine County and on March 7,
1989, Farnworth sued Femling and the county seeking damages for wrongful termination under
42 USC § 1983 and requesting an allowance to amend the complaint to add additional actions
and tort claims as may be necessary upon denial of the tort claim. !d. at 284-85, 869 P2d at 13 7980. After Femling and the county moved for summary judgment, Farnworth, on May 21, 1990,
filed an amended complaint and added a claim against the county for the tort of wrongful
discharge, among others. !d. The trial court concluded that Farnworth's ITCA claim was barred
because the amended complaint related back to the date of the original complaint, therefore
violating I.C § 6-910. !d. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and reasoned that the bar to
bringing suit under ITCA is effective "when the notice of claim is not filed with the
governmental entity within the time permitted by ITCA." !d. at 288, 869, P.2d at 1383. The

Farnworth Court determined that the case before it, just as the case before this Court, presented a
"different question" and concluded there was no legal basis for the trial court to dismiss
Farnworth's ITCA claim on the ground it was filed prematurely. !d.
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Section 6-910 does not provide express authority for an action to be disallowed or
dismissed due to a premature filing nor does the actual language of Section 6-910 prohibit the
filing of a complaint prior to 90 days after the filing of a tort claim notice. In this case, although
the Complaint was filed within 90 days of filing the Notice, no defendant was served until the
claim was deemed denied. Thus, applying the express language of Section 6-910, Block did not
"institute an action in the district court against the governmental entity or its employee" because
the City and Mr. Cutshaw were not served with summons and complaint until the 90 days had
passed. There is no legal authority under Idaho law that supports disallowance or dismissal of
Block's claim against the City for premature filing of a complaint. Moreover, the City has not
been prejudiced in any manner as a result of the filing and service as it occurred.
CONCLUSION
This Court should deny the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and enter judgment
that Block's Notice of Tort Claim was timely filed.
DATED this 13th day of July, 2010
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
By:',

'!u_(tbt..tit.t/~---~

Ro ld J. Landeck
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I hereby certify that on this 13th day of July, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of this
document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
CLINTON 0. CASEY
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 TYRELL LANE
P.O. BOX359
BOISE, ID 83701
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STEPHEN L. ADAMS
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
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RONALD J. LANDECK
ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
)
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the
)
Estate ofMaureen F. Streibick, deceased,
)
CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation )
of the State ofldaho, and its employee, LOWELL)
J. CUTSHAW, CityofLewiston Engineer, and
)
DOES 1-20
)

)

'

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
)
County of Latah
John Block, upon oath, deposes and says:
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)
)

Case No. CV09-02219
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK

1.

I am over eighteen (18) years of age and make this affidavit upon my personal

knowledge.
2.

I am a Plaintiff in the within action and am competent to testify to the matters stated

3.

In December 2005, I purchased Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Amended Administrative Plat

herein.

of Sunset Palisades No. 8 from Defendants Streibick and submitted to Defendant, City of
Lewiston (sometimes "City") an application to resubdivide Lot 4 into 3 lots. In early 2006, City
and Defendant Lowell Cutshaw, City Engineer ("Cutshaw"), approved my application for
resubdivision resulting in the establishment of the lots commonly known and addressed as 153
Marine View Drive ("153"), 155 Marine View Drive ("155") and 159 Marine View Drive
(" 159") (collectively "Canyon Greens"). I applied for and the City of Lewiston granted building
permits to construct homes on 153, 155 and 159. Assuming that these lots had been properly
graded and filled under permit from the City and supervision and inspection by the City, I
constructed a home on each lot, and the City of Lewiston conducted inspections, found those
homes to be constructed in accordance with applicable building codes and standards and issued
certificates of occupancy for those homes.
4.

On or about October 23, 2007, while showing 153 to a prospective purchaser, a

realtor observed settling on the northwest comer of 153 and then informed me of what she had
observed. In November 2007, the owner of 159 reported settlement of the basement floor to me.
Also in November 2007, I observed settling under an exterior door of 155.
5.

On or about mid-November, 2007, I consulted with Keltic Engineering regarding

possible solutions to the conditions that were observed on the three properties. Eric Hasenoehrl,
of Keltic Engineering, met me on the site and then contacted Strata, Inc., a geotechnical
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engineering firm, to assist on this project. Andrew Abrams, a Strata representative, and I met on
site on December 6, 2007 to observe the conditions of distress to the homes. Mr. Abrams stated
that without detailed subsurface knowledge and engineering evaluation, he could not provide an
engineering opinion of the causes of the observed settlement, and he further discussed the scope,
cost and duration of such an evaluation. Desiring an immediate repair of these homes, I asked
for other options, and Mr. Abrams stated that a deep foundation system such as helical piers was
an alternative, but, without a detailed evaluation, such an installation may or may not remedy the
causes of distress.
6.

I then spoke with Eric Hasenoehrl of Keltic Engineering who then spoke with Mr.

Abrams about the helical pier system. Because helical piers had been recommended by Mr.
Abrams to remedy foundation settlement and because settlement is what we all had observed, I
decided to utilize the helical piers system. On December 14, 2007, with Keltic's assistance, I
entered into a contract with Montana Helical, Inc. to install the helical piers system on and
underneath the properties. The piers were installed in December 2007 with Keltic and Strata
representatives present to monitor the installation.
7.

I hired Keltic to monitor the structural stability of the residences by surveying the

properties prior to installation of the helical piers and surveying at least monthly after installation
of the helical piers through December 2008. Based upon this constant monitoring over this oneyear period, and based upon consultation with Eric Hasenoehrl, I believed that the installation of
the piers had remedied the localized settling. Confident that the helical piers had remedied the
settling, I undertook the needed repairs to 153, 155 and 159 during Spring 2008. No further
problems were observed or reported until February 2009.
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8.

In February 2009, the tenant of 159 called me, while I was out-of-state, and stated

that they had noticed settlement in the foundation of 159. Several weeks after that, the tenant in
153 called me, while I was still out-of-state, and stated that there was settlement in the driveway
and basement of 153. I returned to Idaho in March 2009 and promptly inspected 153, 155 and
159 and observed settlement ofthe structures on 153, 155 and 159 and cracks in the ground
surface of all three properties. On or about May 11, 2009, a natural gas leak occurred at 153.
9.

On May 12, 2009, the City of Lewiston inspected 153, 155 and 159 and posted

notice that the residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. The tenants vacated
the premises that same day. The City of Lewiston required me to submit an abatement plan to
address the unsafe conditions and I immediately prepared and submitted an abatement plan for
review and approval by the City of Lewiston. That plan, as approved by the City of Lewiston
and/or others required the demolition of 153 and 159 and structural repairs to 155. I demolished
and removed the structures on 153 in June 2009 and the structures on 159 in August 2009. I
made improvements required by the City of Lewiston to allow 15 5 to be occupied.
10. In late May 2009, Sandra E. Lee, a reporter for the Lewiston Tribune sent me a copy
of a May 20, 1999 Lewiston Tribune article that reported that earth movement had occurred in
1999 in the area of Marine View Drive in the vicinity of 153, 155 and 159, a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto and labeled 0140 Block.
11. In late May, 2009, I started researching City of Lewiston records regarding the
development history of the Property and found in those records documents establishing that the
City had issued two separate permits to Streibick allowing Streibick in 1993 to place and grade
fill in the area of 153, 155 and 159, true and correct copies of which are attached hereto and
labeled 0108 and 0109 Block. On June 5, 2009, I then discovered documents and a photograph in
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the City's records establishing that in 1999 the City of Lewiston knew that substantial earth
movement had occurred within the area of 153, 155 and 159 which the City of Lewiston had
memorialized this occurrence in the City of Lewiston's records related to the Palisades #4
subdivision, true and correct copies of which are attached hereto and labeled 0134-0137 Block.
12. I presented and filed my Notice of Claim for Damages with the City ofLewiston,
including Cutshaw in his capacity as City of Lewiston Engineer, to recover money damages
under the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA") on August 26,2009. On October 22,2009 I filed a
Complaint against Defendants, Jack J. Streibick, City of Lewiston, and Cutshaw. I made no
attempt to effect service of process of the Complaint and Summons in this case on the City or
Cutshaw so as to not initiate the action as to them until 90 days had elapsed from the date of
filing of my Notice of Claim For Damages with the City of Lewiston. Accordingly, the
Complaint and Summons were served on Defendant City of Lewiston December 9, 2009, and on
Defendant Cutshaw on December 18,2009, well beyond the 90 days from the filing of my
Notice of Claim For Damages.
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this 13th day of July, 2010.

John
SUBSCR1BED AND SWORN TO before me this _ _ day ofJuly, 2010.
I r·--

~~

(~\

Cl/lJ_l[fJ)JlL h . --~
I

/

'

NOTARY PUBLIC foc4e State of Idaho
My commission expires:f2JZ2/2DI4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of July, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of this
document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
CLINTON 0. CASEY
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLNAN & KING LLP
1423 TYRELL LANE
P.O. BOX359
BOISE, ID 83701
BRIAN K. JULIAN
STEPHEN L. ADAMS
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. MOORE PLAZA
250 SOUTH FIFTH STREET, SUITE 700
POST OFFICE BOX 7426
BOISE, IDAHO 83707-7426
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[ ] Hand Delivery
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Linda Nelson
From:

To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Sandra Lee" <sfee@lmtribune.com>
"John G Block" <linnelson@clearwire.net>
Wednesday, May 27, 2009 4:55 PM
story one

Lewiston Tribune
Section: Local/Regional
Date: 05/20/1999
Page: 8A
Keywords: Mudslide
Caption: Terry Howard photo
Cracks that are the telltale marks of moving earth line the sides of the gully below the 11th hole at the
Lewiston Golf and Country Club.
It's tough to stop geology; Hillside near Lewiston•s Marine View Drive is slowly, but surely, slipping
away
Byline: Sandra Lee
The earth is slipping on a hillside north of Marine View Drive, a few lmndred feet from some of
Lewiston•s most expensive homes.
It probably will stop before it tlm:atens any homes in the area, Moscow geotechnical engineer Terry R.
Howard said. But something needs to be done about the water that is poudng into the hillside, he said,
and the cracks created by the slips should be closed up.
The movement is below and to the west of a bridge that connects the 11th fairway at the Lewiston Golf
and Country Club.
South ofthere, above Atlas Sand and Rock, a chunk of earth above a settling pond has broken loose.
Both are south of the Snake River Avenue slide that has threatened the Lewiston Elks Temple and
hampered traffic through the area since May 4, 1998.
They were discovered while reviewing aerial photographs taken ofthe area this spring, Howard said.
Copies of the photographs were provided to both city of Lewiston and Nez Perce County officials, but
neither poses an immediate threat to any dwelling, business or road.
Eventually it will stabilize itselfthrough a proc.ess in which the toe washes out, earth slips down, and
the process repeats itself over and over, retired Lewiston Public Works Administrator BudJ1:.Y~ne
said of the slump below the golf course":""''EVeiffii'afly it will be stable. How far back it will go, I don't
know."
He won't live long enough to see it stabilize, Van Stone said. !!Jt's a Jong-tenn situation ...
The second site above the settling pond will do the same thing until it forms a gully up the hillside
unless it's stopped by placing rock to stop the erosion, he said.
Not all of the movement closest to Marine View Drive appears to be new this year, Van Stone and
Howard said.
~ed ~1e street_}vas built. Howard said. ,"That subdivistm~Jandslid~~~
Lewiston•s policy 1s to retain water on-site, and it tells the deveToper to do thai, he said.
The goal of retention is to hold the water until it evaporates or it soaks into the ground. If the ground
becomes saturated, it causes a landslide.
The city also uses dry wells, which are just catch basins that let water seep into the ground, he said.
One is at tl1e lower end of Marine View Drive.
As the dirt slides down the south face of the gully nearest Marine View Drive, it forces the stream of
''later to the other side, where it's now eating into that slope. It will become steeper until it fails, too,
6/1/2009
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LICENSE NO.

0
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USE OF

8 Change of use from/to
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DAYS AT ANY TIME AFTERWORK~JS·COMMENCED.

~~~~~ey~~~T~6::E~~ ~.~ttv;R';;~~~~~~~ ~~~~';.~~soA:~~~~~~~~:e:~~~~ i~~ss:;:~~~

WORK WILl liE COMPliED WITH WHETHER SPECIFIED HEREIN OR NOT. THE GRANTING OF. A PERMIT
DOES NOT PRESUME TO GIVE AUTHORITY TO VIOI.ATE OR CANCEl THE PROVISIONS OF ANY
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REPAIR
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AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK

City of Lewiston

MEMORANDUM
Date:

April 9, 1999

To:

File- Sunset Palisades #4

From:

Tim Richard, City Engineer

Subject:

Slope Movement

Attached is a photograph provided by Ten-y Howard, P.E. of Strata showing slope
movement in Sunset Palisades #4 subdivision. This photo was received ii·om Terry
Howard on 3/26/99. The area is located at the nmih end of Marine View Drive. It is on a
side slope to the east-west running drainage draw located just north of this subdivision.
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r:J For your action

OAt your request
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0 For your approval
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~lor your information
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RONALD J. LANDECK
ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner A venue
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
)
)
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the
)
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased,
CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation )
of the State ofldaho, and its employee, LOWELL)
J. CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and
)
DOES1-20
)

)

,

Defendants.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
County of Nez Perce )
Eric Hasenoehrl, upon oath, deposes and says:

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL -- 1

Case No. CV09-02219

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC
HASENOEHRL

1.

I am over eighteen (18) years of age and make this affidavit upon my personal

knowledge.
2.

I am a licensed civil engineer in the State of Idaho. I am qualified to render the

testimony and opinions expressed in this affidavit.
3.

I am employed by Keltic Engineering, Inc., an Idaho professional services

corporation ("Keltic"), as a civil engineer and am a principal of that business and its President.
4.

Keltic provided engineering services to John Block beginning in mid-November,

2007 in regard to the condition ofhomes constructed by Mr. Block in a subdivision known as
Canyon Greens, and, specifically on Lot 1, Lot 2 and Lot 3, Administrative Plat of Canyon
Greens, City of Lewiston, a resubdivision of Lot 4 of Amended Sunset Palisades No.8. Such
lots are commonly known and addressed as 153 Marine View Drive (" 153 "), 155 Marine View
Drive ("155") and 159 Marine View Drive ("159") (collectively "Canyon Greens").
5.

Keltic had been previously engaged by the prior owners of Canyon Greens, the

Streibicks, to prepare of the Administrative Plat of Sunset Palisades No. 8 and the Administrative
Plat of Amended Sunset Palisades No. 8, which platting was completed and accepted by the City
of Lewiston and recorded in November, 2005, shortly before Mr. Block purchased the Canyon
Greens property.
6.

John Block then retained Keltic in December 2005 to provide engineering services in

regard to his application for Canyon Greens, which resubdivided Lot 4 of Amended Sunset
Palisades No.8 and, Keltic provided those services for Mr. Block by preparing the
Administrative Plat for Canyon Greens which was accepted by the City of Lewiston and
recorded on February 15, 2006.
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7.

As a result of providing the foregoing engineering services, I have had substantial on-

site experience as well as in-depth interaction with the City of Lewiston, its engineers and other
staff personnel in matters related to the platting and development of the real property that
eventually became 153, 155 and 159.
8.

During the course of construction of the homes on 153, 155 and 159 in 2006, Keltic,

on Mr. Block's behalf, engaged AllWest Testing & Engineering to test compaction of finished
grade for the footings on those lots. As Mr. Block's engineer representative, I received and
reviewed testing reports from AllWest, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit A. The
reports established that all foundation locations were compacted in accordance with applicable
building standards prior to construction on those lots. AllWest's compaction testing reports on
153, 155 and 159 also disclosed that fill had been placed in the area of the testing, that AllWest
did not test all areas of the lots and that AllW est would assume no responsibility for areas not
tested. AllWest's statements to that effect are a standard engineering disclaimer, emphasizing
that AllWest's duties did not extend beyond compaction testing of footings. Further, it is
important to understand that the placement of fill on a building lot is common practice in the
City of Lewiston and that the placement of fill is subject to permitting and review by the City for
compliance with code requirements. Placement of fill on a building lot, of itself, provides no
evidence or indication of slope movement or the probability of slope movement.
9.

In mid-November, Mr. Block requested that I view the condition of the homes on

153, 155 and 159, which I did. I observed settlement in certain areas ofthe foundations. Mr.
Block asked me what he should do. I suggested that we contact a geotechnical engineering firm,
and I recommended Strata, Inc. ("Strata") to Mr. Block. He agreed and I then contacted Strata to
discuss the matter with a Strata representative and arranged for a Strata representative to meet
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Mr. Block at the site in early December 2007. After meeting with Mr. Abrams, Mr. Block
consulted with me about his meeting with Mr. Abrams. I received a copy of Mr. Abrams' report
ofthis meeting, (a copy of which is attached and labeled SE 2) and noted Mr. Abrams' reference
in that report to "the observed settlement." I followed up by speaking several times to Mr.
Abrams about the helical piers system which Mr. Abrams had recommended as an option to
address foundation settlement. I shared this information with Mr. Block, and Mr. Block decided
to pursue the installation ofhelical piers to remedy the settlement that was observed.
10. I contacted Montana Helical Piers, Inc. on Mr. Block's behalf and monitored
Montana Helical's December 2007 installation ofthe helical piers system on 153, 155 and 159.
11. Prior to the helical piers being installed, Keltic established a methodology for
monitoring movement ofthe structures on 153, 155 and 159 and began by performing an initial
survey on December 5, 2007. Thereafter, Keltic performed an approximately, monthly survey
that recorded the movements of all 3 structures at 32 different locations through December 15,
2008. A portion of that survey data is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit B. Based upon that
one-year survey data, I concluded that the helical piers had performed their intended function of
stabilizing the structures on 15 3, 15 5 and 15 9.
12. Throughout the course of my dealings and interactions with the City of Lewiston,
neither I nor anyone at Keltic was ever made aware by the City that slope movement had
previously occurred in the area of 153, 155 and 159, nor, during the substantial time I spent on
the site in 2005, did I observe any evidence of slope movement in the area of 153, 155 and 159.
It was not until John Block met with me in June 2009 and showed me a copy of documents and a

photograph he told me he had obtained from the City of Lewiston's records and of a 1999
Lewiston Tribune article that he had received from Sandra Lee (copies of which are attached
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hereto and labeled Block 0135, 0136, 0137, 0138, 0140 and 0141) did I realize that slope
movement had previously occurred in the area of 153, 155 and 159 and that the City of Lewiston
had been made aware of that slope movement in 1999 and maintained that information in its
records.
13. What I observed in June, 2009 from the 1999 photograph that Mr. Block located in
the City's records was slope movement, more commonly known as a landslide, in the area of
153, 155 and 159 where Mr. Block had constructed 3 homes. Upon viewing the photograph, I
realized for the first time that the settlement conditions that we had observed to those homes on
153, 155 and 159 in November and December 2007 were more likely than not caused by slope
movement or, in other words, by a landslide and not by foundation settlement as I had reasonably
believed to that point. Mr. Block then asked me to survey the fault line of the 2009 slope
movement, and I did so as set forth on the attached document labeled Block 0261. Comparing
that 2009 survey line of the slope movement with the 1999 photograph from the City of
Lewiston's records, I concluded that the fault line of the 2009 slope movement that is, the line
from which the slope broke away and moved, is almost identical to the fault line ofthe 1999
slope movement.
14. The distressed condition ofthe structures on 153, 155 and 159 that I observed in
November and December 2007 did not cause me, as a licensed professional engineer, to
recommend that Mr. Block conduct an evaluation to determine whether or not the slope was
unstable and/or whether the foundation settlement conditions we observed were other than
normal settlement. There was no overt evidence of slope movement in December 2007. Mr.
Block, with the information available to him, acted reasonably in deciding to utilize the helical
pier system to stabilize the settlement conditions that were observed in December 2007 by
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Block, Abrams and me and to properly, effectively monitor that situation. In my opinion, it
would not be reasonable to conclude that Mr. Block or I should have known or should have
attempted to discover, prior to May, 2009, that the settlement observed in 2007 was slope
movement and not settlement.
15. The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this 13th day of July, 2010.

Eric Hasenoehrl

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this __ day ofJuly, 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of July, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of this
document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
CLINTON 0. CASEY
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 TYRELL LANE
P.O. BOX 359
BOISE, ID 83701
BRIAN K. JULIAN
STEPHEN L. ADAMS
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. MOORE PLAZA
250 SOUTH FIFTH STREET, SUITE 700
POST OFFICE BOX 7426
BOISE, IDAHO 83707-7426
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[ X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Email
[X] FAX (208) 345-7212
[ ] Hand Delivery

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Email
[X] FAX (208) 344-5510
[ ] Hand Delivery

~

Nci.

ALL WEST Testing & Engineering
DAILY PROJECT FIELD REPORT
Project: Canyon Green Phase 1
Project Address: Lewiston, ID
Permit#
Compaction
Type of Testing/Inspection:
No
Deficiencies Noted:
Jon Block/ Eric H.
of
Reported To:

Project: 306-014
Weather:
Clear
Date:
5/4/2006
Yes
X
If yes, explain below
Owner/ Keltic Engineering

Narrative:
Arrived on site to test compaction of finish grade for footings on lots 153, 155, and 159. Lot 153
had a large amount of oversized material that could not be tested with a moisture density gauge.
one location was tested which indicated compaction of 86% (104.5pcf@ 10.3% moisture). Finish
grade appeared scarified and uncompacted. Lot 159 was not tested due to scarification and no
compactive efforts. We were able to push by hand the testing probe to a depth of 12". Lot 155
appears to be a native cut and a 6' fill on NE section. Material is too rocky to test with a moisture
density gauge, however, three tests were taken in testable material that indicated compaction of
:84% to 96%. We recommend that material be scarified 12", moisture added and recompacted
with suitable equipment. Owner has agreed and further testing will be needed. Lot 153, 155, and
159 have had fill placed at earlier times. ALL WEST has no responsibility or liability for these
areas. ALL WEST test results are only indicated to there exact locations and elevations.

Received By:

Representative: , T. Nielson #21279
Codes

I

Compaction

Project Times
Begin

End

Hours

3:30

4:30

1 1/2

8:00

9:00

1 1/2

~

Equipment
X

Nuke
Coring Machine
Other

3600 E Main, Suite B • Lewiston, 10 83501 • (208) 743-5710 • Fax (208) 743-8270
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ALLWEST Testing & Engineering
FIELD DENSITY TEST REPORT for SOILS
Project:
Date:
Location:

Job#

Canyon Green Phase 1
5/4/2006

Weather:

Clear

Lewisotn, ID

306-018

Test Method:AASHTO T -130

Gauge:

Technician: T. Nielson

M.S.:

Contractor: Keltic Engineering

14079, Troxler 3440

D.S.:

Proctor Number

Soil Description

Optimum
Moisture

Maximum Density

Standard/Modified

1

Native Silty Sand

12.6

121.7

Modified

Test
Number

1
2

3

Test
Location

Lot 153/ N side of buildingFooting

Elevation

finish
grade

Proctor
Number

Probe
Depth

%
Moisture

Dry
Density

1

12"

10.3

104.5

4

Lot 155/ S corner- N side of Garaqe

5

Lot 155/ NW corner of house front ent.

86%

95

Loose Material

Lot 159
Lot 155/ N corner of house

%
Required
Compaction Compaction

finish
grade
finish
grade
finish
grade

1

12"

10.4

116.9

96%

95

1

12"

10.0

112.5

93%

95

1

12"

10.2

102.5

84%

95
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No.

ALLWEST Testing & Engineering
DAILY PROJECT FIELD REPORT
Project: Canyon Green Phase 1
Project Address: Lewiston, ID
Permit#
Type of Testing/Inspection:
Deficiencies Noted:
No
Jon Block
Reported To:

Project: 306-014
Weather:
Partly Cloudy
Date:
5/26/2006
Compaction
of

Yes
Owner

X

If yes, explain below

Narrative:
On site to retest footing areas that were tested on 5/4/06.
Contractor has used a sheeps foot trench roller to compact material, with locations and
testing results as follows on page 2. It appears that lots 153 and 159 have had fill placed
throughout location. ALL WEST has no responsibility and accepts no liability for these areas.
ALL WEST's test results are only indicative to their exact locations and elevations.

Representative:

T. Nielson #21279

I

Codes
Compaction

Received By: John Block

Project Times
Begin

10:30

End

12:30

Hours

I Miles I

2

Equipment
X

Nuke
Coring Machine
Other

3600 E Main, Suite B • Lewiston, 10 83501 • (208) 734-5710 • Fax (208) 743-8270
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ALL WEST Testing & Engineering
FIELD DENSITY TEST REPORT for SOILS
Project:
Date:

5/26/2006

Location:

jJob#

Canyon Green Phase 1
Weather:

Partly Cloudy

Lewisotn, ID

306-018

Test Method: compaction

Gauge:

Technician: T. Nielson

M.S.:

14079, Troxler 3440

616

Contractor: John block

D.S.:

2516

Proctor Number

Soil Description

Optimum
Moisture

Maximum Density

Standard/Modified

1

Native Silty Sand

12.6

121.7

Modified

Te::.i
Number

Test
Location

RETESTS

Lot 153

1

SW corner of S footing

FG

1

2

E footing, middle of footing

FG

1

TO ROCKY TO TEST

3

N trench footing, middle of footing

FG

1

TO ROCKY TO TEST

4

W footing, middle of footing

FG

1

TO ROCKY TO TEST

Elevation Proctor
Number

Probe
Depth

%
Moisture

Dry
Density

12"

12.3

117.9

%
Required
Compaction Compaction

97

95

Lot159

5

N trench, middle of footing

FG

1

12"

15.4

118.2

97

95

6

E footing of SE corner

FG

1

12"

18.7

111.5

92

95

7

S footing SW corner

FG

1

12"

15.3

112.9

93

95

8

W footing, middle of footing

FG

1

TO ROCKY TO TEST

3600 E Main, Suite B • Lewiston, ID 83501 • (208) 734-5710 • Fax (208) 743-8270
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No.

ALL WEST Testing & Engineering
DAILY PROJECT FIELD REPORT
Project: Canyon Green Phase 1
Project Address: Lewiston, ID
Permit#
Type of Testing/Inspection:
No
Deficiencies Noted:
Jon Block
Reported To:

Project: 306-014
Weather:
Clear
Date:
6/2/2006
Retest for Compaction
Yes
X
If yes, explain below
of
Owner

Narrative:
On site to retest area offooting in lot 159. We retested area where compaction had failed due to
high moisture in soil. The retest location appears to have lost moisture with compaction
ranging between 95-97%, with test results and location as followed on second sheet.
We also tested frost footing located on lot 153. Sub base was to rocky to test. Contractor has
proof rolled material to set large cobble and has placed 8"-12" of 5/8" minus base agg. In
locations with shots being taken on all levels of frost footing.
It appears fill has been placed throughout lots 153 and 159. A sample was pulled to verify a
proctor checkpoint. ALL WEST has no responsibility and accepts no liabilities for these areas.
ALL WEST test results are only indicative to their exact locations and test elevations.

Representative:

Received By: John Block

T. Nielson #21279
Project Times

Codes

Begin

Compaction

8:00

End

9:00

Hours

I Miles I

1 1/2

Equipment
X

Nuke
Coring Machine

'

Other

3600 E Main, Suite B • Lewiston, 10 83501 • (208) 734-5710 • Fax (208) 743-8270
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AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL

AL._
ST Testing & Engineering
FIELD DENSITY TEST REPORT for SOILS
Project:
Date:

Canyon Green Phase 1
Weather:

6/2/2006

'Job#
Clear

Location:

Lewisotn, ID
Contractor: John Block

306-014

Test Method:AASHTO T-130

Gauge:

Technician: T. Nielson

M.S.:

14079, Troxler 3440
2567
D.S.:

625

Proctor Number

Soil Description

Optimum
Moisture

Maximum Density

Standard!Modified

1

Native Silty Sand

12.6

121.7

Modified

2

Atlas 5/8" minus base agg.

8.4

137.5

Modified

Test
Nurnber

Test
Location

Elevation

Proctor
Number

Probe
Depth

%
Moisture

Dry
Density

1

12"

8.6

118.2

97%

18.7

111.5

92%

7.7

116.8

96%

15.3

112.9

93%

%
Required
Compaction Compaction

Retest Location of lot 159

1

Retest from 5/26/06 #6 E footing of SE
corner

FG

Previous Test #6 from 5/26/06
2

Retest from 5126106 #7 S footing, SW
corner

FG

1

12"

Previous Test #7 from 5/26/06
FG

1

12"

10.2

115.6

95%

NE upper section of frost footing

FG

2

6"

3.7

134.8

98%

5

N lower section of frost footing

FG

2

8"

3.8

135.3

98%

6

NW corner of upper section of frost
footing

FG

2

8"

4.2

133.8

97%

3

NW corner of frost footing
Lot 153: 8"-12" Base agg.

4
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3600 E Main, Suite 8 • Lewiston, ID 83501 • (208) 734-5710 • Fax (208) 743-8270

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL

Materials Testing • Geotechnical Engineering

June 1, 2006
To: John Block
Re: Density testing per lots 153, 155, and 159 for canyon Green, Phase 1 Subdivision
Dear Mr. Block,
ALLWEST was contracted by Keltic Engineering to do density testing on footing subgrade for lots 153, 155, and 159 for Canyon Green Phase 1 Subdivision, located in
Lewiston, Idaho. It appears that footings will be sitting on fill material that was not tested
for compaction by ALL WEST at time of placement.
Compaction testing performed by ALL WEST for footings are indicated to there exact
locations and elevations. ALL WEST assumes no liability of performance for existing fill.
The owner has acknowledged acceptance of all liability and long term performance of fill
placed for lots mentioned above.

Respectfully Submitted,

\

Area Manager

Chris Beck
Principal Engineer

CC: Eric Hasenhorl
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From:208
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PROJECT DAILY REPORT

10021

~H:-=elc:.;ic:.::a.:..;lP:.....i:.=;e~r~ln:.::st.:.:a:.::.lla:::.:t:.:.:io:.:.;n:.....-....:.M::..:;a::.:.r.:.:..in:.::e:....:V:..:.ie::.:w:.:.....::D:.:.:ric:..:ve:::..__ _ _ _ _ Client No:
Location: -=Le~w_i_st7o_n~,l~d_ah_o~~~~~------------- Pr~ectNo:
Date:
_T:.-ch;.:. :u::.:. rs::.. :d::.::a:..l.y!.,.;,D::.. e::.. :c:..:e:.:.:m.:.:b:..::e.:. .r.:::.!6,'--=2:.::0:.::::0.:. . 7_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Permit No:
Project:

Codes

MPJ

Description

From

BLOJOH
M07168A

Project
To

Hours

Project Engineer Site VisiUProject Coordination

Miles

2.5
'

EQUIPMENT

Nuke:
Per Diem:

Mobile Lab:
Lodging:

Torque Wrench:
Cylinders:

RebarLoc

EXPENSES
Other (describe):

Weather:
Approved Plans on S1te:
Yes
No
Date:
Archttect:
Type ofTesUinSRc:..:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

------

Deficiencies:

Action(s} Taken:
Results Reported to:

John Block

of
of

Narrative:
I arrived at the project site as requested by Mr. John Block to observe the condition of distress to homes which he has developed
along Marine View Drive in Lewiston, Idaho. The addresses of the homes were 153, 155 and 159 Marine View Drive. At the time I
arrived on site J met Mr. Block who showed me around the property and pointed out signs of distress to .the homes. Each of the homes
as well as site retaining walls constructed by Mr. Block exhibit visible cracking and signs of deformation and misalignment. Cracking
and misalignment was observed in the stem walls for the footings as well as slabs on grade for driveways and a pool patio. Mr. Block
indicated that the observed distress appeared to coincide with the timing of an extreme irrigation event which caused water to pond in
the yards which comprised backfill for the site retaining walls.
During our discussions Mr. Block indicated the site had been filled by a previous property owner and he was unaware of any
compaction testing or condition of fill placed prior to his ownership. Mr. Block inquired my opinion of potential solutions for the distress
and settlement issues observed. I indicated to Mr. Block that without detailed subsurface knowledge and engineering evaluation of
current site conditions I could not provide an engineering opinion of the causes of the observed settlement. However, I indicated that
some potential causes of the observed stress may include but are not limited to settlement offill placed for site grading or slope
instability of the development as a whole or in localized areas of the development. At that time I outlined verbally to Mr. Block a
conceptual geotechnical engineering scope of service which may help evaluate site conditions and potential causes of distress. This
scope outlined to him included subsurface exploration and sampling through soil borings extending to native soil below previously
placed fill. Also, a detailed site survey of existing surface conditions and historical information regarding previous grading at the site
would be required to make any detailed evaluation of potential slope stability problems at the site. I indicated to John that I could not
provide a detailed fee estimate of such a geotechnical scope at this time however the scope may be on the order of $25,000 depending
on the final scope authorized. I also indicated to John that this detailed exploration and evaluation may take 6 to a weeks to
accomplish. John indicated he did not Wish to proceed with such a detailed evaluation at this time. He then asked for other options or
alternatives. I indicated to John that another alternative may be to simply install a deep foundation system such as helical piers
beneath the homes experiencing distress. I clarified With John that without a detailed engineering evaluation of subsurface conditions
and factors influencing the observed distress such installation would be at his own risk with respect to the depth of piers installed and
whether or not they would actually remedy the causes of distress. I indicated to John that piers may help to remedy potential
embankment settlement beneath the homes by bypassing structural loads through the fill into native soil below however, helicaf piers
will not provide significant lateral restraint for stabilization for slope movement. John then indicated he would discuss the project with
his structural engineer, Keltic Engineering and decide how to proceed. John indicated he did not desire STRATA to perform any
additional services or prepare a detailed scope for geotechnical evaluation of the site at this time.

1. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Strata Representative: Andrew J. Abrams
2. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Received By:
Revised 1lf04
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Total Movements
Descrip.

Pt.#

Wall

1

H= .12 NE
V= .02 Higher

H= .12 NE
V= 0

Wall

2

H= .15 NE
V= .09 Lower

H= .17 NE
V= .11 Lower

Wall

3

H= .21 NE
V= .19 Lower

H= .23 NE
V= .21 Lower

Wall

4

H= .21 NE
V= .19 Lower

H= .23 NE
V= .23 Lower

Wall

5

H= .23 NE
V= .19 Lower

H= .24 NE
V= .23 Lower

Wall

6

H= .20 NE
V= .19 Lower

H= .24 NE
V= .20 Lower

Wall

7

H= .19 NE
V= .18 Lower

H= .19 NE
V= .20 Lower

Wall

8

H= .17 NE
V= .17 Lower

H= .17 NE
V= .20 Lower

House (Cor)

9

H=.15NE
V= .09 Lower

H= .16 NE
V= .10 Lower

House (Cor)

11

H=.15 NE
V= .15 Lower

H=.19 NE
V= .04 Lower

House (Side)

12

H= .17 NE
V= .09 Lower

H= .17 NE
V= .08 Lower

Wall

13

H= .17 NE
V=.09 Lower

H= .19 NE
V=.10 Lower

Wall

14

H= .16 NE
V= .11 Lower

H= .16 NE
V= .11 Lower

Wall

15

H= .16 NE
V= .12 Lower

H= .18 NE
V= .13 Lower

Wall

16

H= .18 NE
V= .16 Lower

H= .20 NE
V= .19 Lower

Wall

17

H= .09 NE
V= .15 Lower

H= .10 NE
V= .15 Lower

Wall

18

H=.10NE
V= .09 Lower

H= .12 NE
V= .10 Lower

Wall

19

H= .12 NE
V= .12 Lower

H= .12 NE
V= .13 Lower

House (Side)

20

Lost

Lost

House (Cor}_

21

H= .03 NW
V= .06 Lower

H= .03 SE
V= .10 Higher

Wall

22

H= .04 NW
V= .13 Lower

H= .06 NE
V= .13 Lower

Wall

23

H= .11 NW
V= .15 Lower

H= .11 NW
V= .17 Lower

Wall

24

H= .16 NW
V= .11 Lower

H= .16 NW
V= .14 Lower

Wall

25

H=.05 NW
V= .03 Lower

H= .07 NW
V= .03 Lower

House (Side)

26

H=.04 NW
V= .06 Lower

H= .05 NW
V= .05 Lower

House (Cor)

27

H= .04 NW
V= .10 Lower

H=.01 NW
V= .07 Higher

House (Side)

28

H= .02 NW
V= .02 Higher

H= 0
V= .03 Higher

Deck

29

House (Cor)

30

Lost
H=.03 NW
V=o

Lost
H= .03 NW
V= .01 Lower

House (Side)

31

Lost

Lost

32

H= .17 NE
V= .15 Lower

H= .18 NE
V= .17 Lower

Deck Post

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL

Total Since Jacks Total Since Beginning

EXHIBIT

·153 MARINE VIEW DR
Location of Pnt Pnt # From Beginning to Installation of Jacks
12/5/07 - 12/19/07
SE V0.01
0.15
1 HWall
SE V=
0.02
0.02
Wall
2 H=
0.02
SE V=
0.02
Wall
3 H=
SE V=
0.02
0.01
4 H=
Wall
0.02
NE V=
0.03
Wall
5 H=
NE V=
0.01
0.03
Wall
6 H=
0.02
SE V=
0.01
Wall
7 H=
SE V=
0.03
0.03
Wall
8 H=
NW V=
0.01
0.01
Wall
9 H=
SE V=
0.00
0.03
Wall
11 H=
sw V=
0.01
+
0.01
House
12 H=
+
SE V=
0.01
0.02
Wall
13 H=
SE V=
0.01
0.02
14 H=
Wall
NE V=
0.01
0.02
Wall
15 H=
NE V=
0.00
0.03
Deck Post
32 H=

-

Total Since Installation of Jacks
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
12
13
14
15
32

H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=

1/14/07 -12/15/08
NE
0.14
V0.18
NE
V=
0.21
NE
V=
NE
0.21
V=
NE
0.25
V=
0.19
NE
V=
0.19
NE
V=
0.17
NE
V=
NE
V=
0.17
0.17
NE
V=
0.19
NE
V=
NE
0.17
V=
NE
0.17
V=
NE
0.19
V=
NE
0.17
V=

0.06
0.07
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.21
0.19
0.16
0.08
0.12
0.07
0.06
0.10
0.12
0.15

Total Since Beginning
+

-

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
12
13
14
15
32

H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=

12/5/07-12/15/08
0.14
NE V=
NE V=
0.19
NE V=
0.24
NE V=
0.23
NE V=
0.26
0.23
NE V=
NE V=
0.20
NE V=
0.17
0.18
NE V=
NE V=
0.21
0.19
NE V=
0.19
NE V=
NE V=
0.17
0.20
NE V=
NE v=
0.18

0.03
0.09
0.22
0.24
0.23
0.22
0.21
0.20
0.09
0.01
0.06
0.06
0.11
0.14
0.17

+

-

-

-

159 MARINE VIEW DR

Total Since Installation of Jacks

Location of Pnt Pnt # From Beginning to Installation of Jacks

I

Wall
Wall
Wall
Wall
House
Wall
Wall
Wall
Wall
House

16
17
18
19
21
22
23
24
25
26

HH=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=

0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01

-------

12/5/07 - 12/19/07
0.02
SE V=
0.01
NE V=
NE V=
0.01
sw V= 0.01
SE V=
0.02
NE V=
0.02
NW V=
0.02
NE V=
0.01
0.02
V=
NW V=
0.01

-

-

-

-

-

16
17
18
19
21
22
23
24
25
26

HH=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=

1/14/07 - 12/15/08
0.18
NE
V0.09
NE
V=
NE
0.10
V=
0.12
NE
V=
NW V=
0.01
NE
0.05
V=
0.12
NW V=
NW V=
0.16
NW V=
0.08
0.03
NE
V=

0.17
0.15
0.09
0.12
0.04
0.13
0.16
0.12
0.02
0.07

Total Since Beginning

-

16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25
26

-

H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=
H=

12/5/07 - 12/15/08
0.20
NE VNE V=
0.10
NE V=
0.12
NE V=
0.12
SE V=
0.04
NE V=
0.06
0.12
NW V=
0.16
NW V=
NW V=
0.10
NW V=
0.04

0.21
0.15
0.09
0.13
0.11
0.14
0.18
0.15
0.03
0.06

+

-

-

.....:1
~

::r::
i:.Ll

0

~

if1

-<:
u

::r::
~

i:.Ll
~

0

-~
t-<

155 MARINE VIEW DR

Location of Pnt Pnt # From Beginning to Installation of Jacks
House
House
House

27
28
30

H=
H=
H=

12/5/07- 12/12/07
0.01
sw V=
0.01
0.02
NW V=
0.00
0.02
NW V=
0.01

+

Total Since Installation of Jacks
27 H=
28 H=
30 H=

12/19/07 - 12/15/08
0.02
NW V=
0.11
0.01
NW V=
0.04
0.01
NW V=
0.02
---

Total Since Beginning

-

27 H=
+ 28 H=
~ 30 H=

12/5/07 -12/15/08
0.01
sw V= 0.07
SE V=
O.D1
0.06
0.01
NW V=
0.01

Cl

+
+
+

~
~

-<:

2
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JOB

KELTIC ENGINEERING, INC.
315 Adams Lane· Lewiston, 10 83501 ·Phone (208) 743-2135
1621 N. 3rd St., Ste 500 . Coeur d'Alene, 10 83814 • Phone (208) 664-4836

SHEET NO. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

OF _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

CALCULATED BY_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

DATE _ _ _ _ _ _ __

CHECKED BY _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

DATE _ _ _ _ _ _ __

SCALE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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City of Lewiston

MEMORANDUM
Date:

April 9, 1999

To:

File- Sunset Palisades #4

From:

Tim Richard, City Engineer

Subject:

Slope Movement

Attached is a photograph provided by Teny Howard, P.E. of Strata showing slope
movement in Sunset Palisades #4 subdivision. This photo was received from Terry
Howru·d on 3/26/99. The area is located at the nmth end ofMarine View Drive. It is on a
side slope to the east-west running drainage draw located just north of this subdivision.
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linda Nelson
From:

To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Sandra Lee" <slee@lmtribune.com>
"John G Block" <llnnelson@clearwire.net>
Wednesday, May 27, 2009 4:55PM
story one

Lewiston Tribune
Section: Local/Regional
Date: 05/20/1999
Page: 8A
Keywords: Mudslide
Caption: Terry Howard photo
Cracks that are the telltale marks of moving earth line the sides of the gully below the 11th hole at the
Lewiston Golf and Country Club.
It's tough to stop geology; Hillside near Lewiston's Marine View Drive is slowly, but surely, slipping
away
Byline: Sandra Lee
The earth is slipping on a hillside north of Marine View Drive, a few hundred feet from some of
Lewiston's most expensive homes.
It probably will stop before it threatens any homes in the area, Moscow geotechnical engineer Terry R.
Howard said. But something needs to be done about the water that is pouring into the hillside, he said,
and the cracks created by the slips should be closed up.
The movement is below and to the west of a bridge that connects the 11th fahway at the Lewiston Golf
and Country Club.
South of there, above Atlas Sand and Rock, a chunk of earth above a settling pond has broken loose.
Both are south of the Snake River Avenue slide that has threatened the Lewiston Elks Temple and
hampered traffic through the area since May 4, 1998.
They were discovered while reviewing aedal photographs taken ofthe area this spring, Howard said.
Copies of the photographs were provided to both city of Lewiston and Nez Perce County officials, but
neither poses an immediate threat to any dwelling, business or road.
Eventually it will stabilize itself through a process in which the toe washes out, earth slips down, and
the process repeats itself over and over, retired Le':Yl.ston Pq~lic Works Administrator Bud R. Van§~
said of the slump below the golf course~'Eventuafly it will be stable. How far back it will go, I don't
know."
He won't live long enough to see it stabilize, Van Stone said. "It's a long-te1m situation."
The second site above the settling pond will do the same thing until it forms a gully up the hillside
unless it's stopped by placing rock to stop the erosion, he said.
Not all of the movement closest to Marine View Drive appears to be new this year, Van Stone and
Howard said.
}t li~ely has ham)ened since the~ was built,~~· "TI~t subd~~aused tlt~Jf!pdslid~.::
Lewiston's policy is to retain water on-site, and it tells the devcloper to do that, he said.
The goal of retention is to hold the water until it evaporates or it soaks into the ground. If the ground
becomes saturated, it causes a landslide.
The city also uses dry wells, which are just catch basins that let water seep into the ground, he said.
One is at the Io·wer end of Marine View Drive.
As the dirt slides down the south face of the gully nearest Marine View Drive, it forces the stream of
water to the other side, where it's now eating into that slope. It will become steeper until it fails, too,
6/1/2009
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Howard said.
"Geology loves to do that kind of stuff."
It's essentially the same thing that happened behind the Elks, where runoff went into dry wells, soaked
into the subsurface and eventually caused a problem.
The present slide isn't the first along Snake River A venue. Old news stories describe slides in the early
1970s, and there have been several in thls decade.
One inm1ediately below the Elks and adjacent to the current slide was stopped by installation of a
cribbing wall. One on the northem edge of the slide was stopped when county crews removed much of
the earth, installed drainage pipes to carry water to the river instead of into the hillside, and seeded the
surface.
"Understand, I'm not laying blame here," Howard said of the city's zero-runofipolicy. nThis is the way
cities do things. If anyone is to blame it's the founders who didn't set aside money for drainage. If they
had, those who followed would have continued."
The city tells the developer to deal with water, and that means retaining it or building a pipe to the
river, Howard said. A pipe could increase the cost of lots until they're not economically feasible.
New subdivisions should be dealing with water in a more positive manner, and they need to take
geology into consideration, he said.
'That's why we have the Elks (slide)-- geology and urbanization."
_1ewiston C,hy....fu:i.gin~et Tim Richard ®id no act!2!~yd for at this time tojeal w~t~
mov_£~11~;!,1L The~. will document the infonnatio!!, and ~~ tha!J!~ are submitt~:!,~
deal with it at tl~ ·

Sandra Lee
(208)848-2266

6/1/2009
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Brian K. Julian, ISB No. 2360
Stephen L. Adams, ISB No. 7534
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: {208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-551 0
E-Mail:
bjulian@ajhlaw .com
sadams@ajhlaw .com

FILED
16 Pl'l 2 17

Attorneys for Defendants City of Lewiston and
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Case No. CV 09-02219
Plaintiff,
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick,
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a
municipal corporation of the State of
Idaho, and its employee LOWELL J.
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer,
and DOES 1 - 20,
Defendants.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

COME NOW, the above-entitled Defendants, City of Lewiston and Lowell J.
Cutshaw, by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, and
hereby submit this Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I.
INTRODUCTION
On May 24, 2010, Defendants filed with this Court a Motion for Summary
Judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of
the Idaho Tort Claims Act, /.C. § 6-901, et seq. In response, Plaintiff attempts to
argue that he was "blamelessly ignorant with regard to knowledge of the cause of
his damages." Memorandum in Opposition, p. 11. Even if the Court were to adopt
this term, borrowed from the California courts, Plaintiff cannot show that he is
"blamelessly ignorant", blissfully unaware, or in any other way, ignorant of
potential causes of his damages. As discussed below, Plaintiff knew or should have
known in November 2007 of his claims, and was on notice at that point to begin
investigating potential causes, including the potential that the cause was slope
movement. The uncontroverted facts before the Court show that Plaintiff had all
the information that he needed to timely file a Notice of Tort claim within one
hundred eighty days from November 2007, but did not due to his own choice not
to investigate. These issues will be discussed in more detail below.

II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO INVESTIGATE HIS CLAIMS AND FILE A
NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM WITHIN ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY DAYS OF

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

NOVEMBER 2007, HIS
CUTSHAW ARE BARRED.

CLAIMS

AGAINST

DEFENDANT

CITY

AND

Plaintiff's essential argument is that he could not have known until May
2009 that the properties at issue were subject to slope movement, and not
settlement. See Memorandum in Opposition, p. 5. However, the law clearly states
Plaintiff must file a tort claim within one hundred eighty days "from the date the
claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later." /.C. §
6-905. There is no question about when the claim arose: Plaintiff admits that he
discovered evidence of settlement on the three properties in November 2007. See

Block Aff.,

,4.

Plaintiff argues that November 2007 is not the start of the one

hundred eighty day time period because he did not know of the City's involvement
at that point, and that the reason for the damage was slope movement.

Memorandum in Opposition, pp. 5, 8-14.

However, this is not the appropriate

standard for when the tort claim notice begins running. The notice period begins
running when Plaintiff: 1) incurred some damage, and 2) had some knowledge of
the City's involvement. Both of these elements were met in October and
November, 2007.
In Mitchell v. Bingham Mem. Hosp., 130 Idaho 420 (1997), the Idaho
Supreme Court laid out the standard for when the one hundred eighty day time
period runs.

In that case, the plaintiff was injured at a county hospital as a result

of an overdose. Mitchell, 1 30 Idaho at 421 . Plaintiffs were told by the hospital that
the overdose was the result of a malfunction in the machinery delivering the
medication. /d. Two months later, Plaintiffs were told that the overdose was a
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result

of nurse

error.

/d.

Plaintiffs then

filed

their Notice of Tort Claim

approximately one hundred eighty days after notification of nurse error, past 180
days after the overdose. /d. at 422. In resolving the dispute over which date was
the proper date to begin the running of the one hundred eighty days, the Court
stated:
This Court has held that "knowledge of facts which would put a
reasonably prudent person on inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge of
the wrongful act and will start the running of the [180 days]." The
Court has further held that the statutory period begins to run from the
occurrence of the wrongful act even if the full extent of damages is
not known at that time. In a recent case, the Court of Appeals
clarified the amount of knowledge required to begin the notice period:
"The statute does not begin running when a person fully understands
the mechanism of the injury and the government's role, but rather
when he or she is aware of such facts that would cause a reasonably
prudent person to inquire further into the circumstances surrounding
the incident." The claimant in [that case] had argued that the notice
period should not start running until she knew the exact cause of her
injury. The Court of Appeals held that "such an interpretation would
allow a party to delay completion of an investigation for months or
even years before submitting a notice under the [ITCA]."

The Mitchells were aware of the overdose and respiratory arrest on
the day the overdose occurred. The facts available to the Mitchells
were sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire further
into the circumstances surrounding the incident. Furthermore, even if
the cause of the overdose had been due to a malfunctioning infusion
machine, and although there may be ultimate shared responsibility
with a manufacturer in such a case, the hospital is entitled to timely
notice of a potential claim. Thus, we hold that the 180-day period
began to run on July 20, 1992 [the date of the overdose], even

though the Mitchells did not know the extent of the injury and Mrs.
Mitchell's damages or the extent to which the hospital was
responsible.
Mitchell, 130 Idaho at 423 - 24 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff cites a number of cases which indicate an exception to this rule,
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under which the tort claim notice period is tolled until the plaintiff has knowledge
of a governmental entity's involvement. These cases are inapposite to this
situation. In Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54 (1978), the plaintiff sued related to
the death of a family member in an excavation pond. /d., at 55. Plaintiff sued the
property owner, unaware that Canyon County was leasing the property. The
plaintiff did not learn about Canyon County's involvement until discovery had
started. /d.

Plaintiff could not have known of the lease and the County's

involvement until they had done discovery, at which point the Notice of Tort Claim
time limits began running.
In Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988), the question
involved disclosure of a magistrate's decision relevant to the case. /d. at pp. 552 553. Plaintiff did not learn about the disclosure until she had taken the deposition
of one of the other defendants. /d. at 553. She then filed a Notice of Tort Claim
which, the Court determined was timely. As the Idaho Court of Appeals stated,
the plaintiff did not know, nor did she have sufficient facts to cause
her to properly inquire further, that a county employee was involved in
her alleged injury. Once she gained such information, through the
testimony of her former husband during a bankruptcy proceeding, the
time limit of I.C. § 6-906 began to run.
Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 449 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). The
Mallory decision also distinguished Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, (1986), stating

In Doe v. Durtschi, the plaintiffs, parents of minor children who had
been molested by a teacher, had no reason to know of and possessed
no knowledge that would cause them to investigate into the school
district's hiring of the offending teacher with knowledge of his
improper proclivities. Only after the preparation of a presentence
investigation of the teacher in a criminal action did the parents learn of
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the potential liability of the school district. Thus, the statute was
properly tolled until the parents received information that led them to
inquire further into the school district's knowledge.
Mallory, 126 Idaho at 449. Regarding both of these cases, the Court stated "there

were facts in existence at the time of the injury that the plaintiffs did not know,
and could not have been reasonably expected to discover, until a later time when
some knowledge, beyond their initial reach, was imparted to them." /d.
The facts from these cases are all distinguishable from the present case.
Plaintiff knew in November 2007, that the Defendants were involved. In his
Affidavit, he stated that he assumed that the lots at issue had been "properly
graded and filled under permit from the City and supervision and inspection by the
City," at which point he constructed a home on each lot. Block Aff.,

13. 1

Thus,

Plaintiff knew about the Defendants' involvement prior to building on the
properties, and Plaintiff also admits that he obtained permits from the City of
Lewiston.

/d.

Therefore, unlike the plaintiffs in Trosper, Carmen and Doe v.

Durtschi, Plaintiff had full knowledge that the City was involved in some fashion as

early as 2005. Therefore, he cannot claim that he did not have sufficient
knowledge to put him on inquiry notice until May 2009.
Even assuming that the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Notice of Tort
Claim did not begin running until Plaintiff had notice of potential slope movement

Why Mr. Block assumed that the City supervised the grading and filling is beyond defense
counsel's understanding. There is no responsibility or duty for a city to supervise work done
under a permit. Regardless, Mr. Block admits that he knew the City was involved, or that
he assumed it was, in which case, he was on inquiry notice to determine if the City caused
his damages.
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as opposed to settlement, Plaintiff still was still put on inquiry notice in December
2007.

Both Plaintiff and his engineer, Eric Hasenoehrl, state that they were

advised that

na deep foundation system such as helical piers" was a sufficient

method for repairing the structures. Memorandum in Opposition, p. 3; Block Aff.

11

5 - 6; Hasenoehrl Aff.,

1 9.

These assumptions were based on statements from

Andrew Abrams, an engineer at Strata, Inc., who was retained to propose solutions
to the settlement problems. Hasenoehrl Aff., , 9. It is undisputed that Abrams
specifically told Plaintiff In December 2007 that one potential reason for the
problems with the property was slope movement. See Block Aft., ,

5. Mr.

Abrahams' report specifically states:
During our discussions Mr. Block indicated the site had been filled by a
previous property owner and he was unaware of any compaction
testing or condition of fill placed prior to his ownership. Mr. Block
inquired my opinion of potential solutions for the distress and
settlement issues observed. I indicated to Mr. Block that without
detailed subsurface knowledge and engineering evaluation of current
site conditions I could not provide an engineering opinion of the
causes of the observed settlement. However, I indicated that some
potential causes of the observed stress may include but are not limited
to settlement of fill placed for site grading or slope instability of the
development as a whole or in localized areas of the development. At
that time I outlined verbally to Mr. Block a conceptual geotechnical
engineering scope of service which may help evaluate site conditions
and potential causes of distress. This scope outlined to him included
subsurface exploration and sampling through soil boring extending to
native soil below previously placed fill. Also, a detailed site survey of
existing surface conditions and historical information regarding
previous grading at the site would be required to make any detailed
evaluation of potential slope stability problems at the site. I indicated
to John that I could not provide a detailed fee estimate of such a
geotechnical scope at this time however the scope may be on the
order of $25,000.00 depending on the final scope authorized. I also
indicated to John that this detailed exploration and evaluation may
take 6 to 8 weeks to accomplish. John indicated he did not wish to
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proceed with such a detailed evaluation at this time. He then asked for
other options or alternatives. I indicated to John that another
alternative may be to simply install a deep foundation system such as
helical piers beneath the homes experiencing distress. I clarified with
John that without a detailed engineering evaluation of subsurface
conditions and factors influencing the observed distress such
installation would be at his own risk with respect to the depths of
piers installed and whether or not they would actually remedy the
causes of distress. I indicated to John that piers may help to remedy
potential embankment settlement beneath the homes by bypassing
structural loads though the fill into native soil below however, helical
piers will not provide significant lateral restraint for stabilization for
slope movement. John then indicated he would discuss the project
with his structural engineer, Keltic Engineering and decide how to
proceed. John indicated he did not desire STRATA to perform any
additional services or prepare a detail scope for geotechnical
evaluation of the site at this time. [sic]
Hasenoehrl Aff., Ex. SE 2; Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit "A" (emphasis added). 2
Plaintiff attempts to rely on a number of non-Idaho cases to support his
conclusion that the tort claim notice period did not begin to run until he had full
knowledge of the City's involvement. First, he relies on Leaf v. City of San Mateo,
104 Cal. App. 3d 398, 408 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1980). The rule laid down in Leaf
has been rejected by Idaho. See Magnuson Props. P'ship. v. City of Coeur D'Alene,
138 Idaho 166, 169 (2002) (tort claim notice period begins to run from point at
which Plaintiff is put on inquiry, not the point at which they discover that the
defendant was a cause of their injuries). It is not clear that Leaf is good law in
California, let alone Idaho. See Donabedian v. Manzer, 153 Cal. App. 3d 592 (Cal.
2

This quote comes from a document submitted by both Plaintiff and Defendants responding
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, there is no dispute of material or
non-material fact regarding the contents of this document or what was recommended to
Plaintiff in December, 2007, and it is admissible and relevant for consideration by the Court.
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App. 1st Dist. 1984) (holding that it is questionable whether the "discovery rule"
applicable in Leaf is the appropriate standard). Further, the discussion in Leaf
revolves around Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 337.1 5, a code which is analogous to I. C. §
5-241, dealing with latent defects in construction. The analysis based on these
sections does not apply to the running of the tort claim notice period. Plaintiff tries
to supplement the analysis in Leaf by showing that it comports with the dissent in
Mitchell v. Bingham Mem. Hosp., supra. However, the logic employed in Justice
Schroeder's dissent in Mitchell is not the law in Idaho; the majority's opinion is the
law. The fact that Plaintiff relies on the dissent in Mitchell only shows that
Plaintiff's argument is not supported by law.
Plaintiff also relies on Garza v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 284 F.3d
930, 937 (8th Cir. 2002), apparently because of the discussion in a footnote in
Doe v. Durtschi, 11 0 Idaho 466, 4 73 ( 1986) 3 , wherein the similarities between the
Idaho Tort Claims Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act are outlined. There is no
need to rely on cases discussing the FTCA under these circumstances, because
there are numerous Idaho cases which already discuss the issue before the Court.
As the Supreme Court stated in Doe v. Durtschi, the only reason the Court looked
to cases discussing the FTCA was because the issue being discussed was a matter
of first impression, for which there was no relevant legislative history. Durtschi,
110 Idaho at 472. The issue in this case is not a matter of first impression, and
therefore there is no reason to look to cases outside of Idaho.

3

See Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 473 {1986) (fn. 2).
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Even if the Court were to look at the logic employed in Garza, it would find
that Garza in fact supports the Defendants' position. In Garza, the plaintiff sued the
U.S. Bureau of Prisons for the wrongful death of his sister at the hands of an
escaped convict. Garza, 284 F.3d at 933 - 34. The sister was murdered in 1995,
and the convict was convicted in March, 1996. /d. Plaintiff filed his administrative
claim on October 29, 1998, about a month after he found out that the employees
he alleged were responsible were employees of the Bureau. /d. at 933. The trial
Court determined that the notice accrual date occurred in February, 1996, based
on the grounds that plaintiff was on inquiry notice as of that date due to various
factors. /d. at 933 - 34. The 8th Circuit agreed, holding
The limitations period begins to run either when the government cause
is known or when a reasonably diligent person (in the tort claimant's
position) reacting to any suspicious circumstances of which he might
have been aware would have discovered the government cause-whichever comes first. Therefore, when catalytic circumstances
prescribe, a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence in inquiring
into the injury's cause. Although [a] claim does not accrue when a
person has a mere hunch, hint, suspicion, or rumor of a claim, . . .
such suspicions do give rise to a duty to inquire into the possible
existence of a claim in the exercise of due diligence. Also, a plaintiff's
assertion of when he gained actual knowledge is not determinative if
he did not act reasonably and, in effect, closed [his] eyes to evident
and objective facts concerning accrual of [his] right to sue.

/d. at 934 - 35 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "Where the
government or its agents have not misled or deceived a plaintiff, or otherwise
hidden the legal identity of alleged tortfeasors as federal employees, the cause of
action still accrues when the existence of an injury and its cause are known." /d. at
935. The Court also held that a plaintiff need not have conclusively known the
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details giving rise to the claim to be on inquiry notice. /d. at 936. Specifically,
regarding the knowledge of the relationship between the halfway house where the
convict lived prior to escaping and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, the Court held:
was sufficient to require inquiry into accountability of the respective
parties and their employees' status. Moreover, from the time [the
decedent]'s body was discovered, inquiry was in order into the
tragically obvious questions of whether she had been notified of [the
convict]'s escape, whether anyone was responsible to make such
notification and, if so, whom.

/d. at 936.
The same analysis applies in this case. Plaintiff was aware that there had
been fill on the property, and was acting under the assumption that the City had
been involved. Block Aff.,

1

3. Therefore, when settling was discovered on the

properties in November, 2007, Plaintiff was on inquiry notice as to whether the
settlement was due to the fill, or some other reason such as slope movement (for
which he claims the Defendants are liable). Plaintiff even had the opportunity to do
such an inquiry, and was told by the geotech engineering firm he hired that the
problem may be slope instability, see Hasenoerhl Aff., Ex. SE 2, but Plaintiff
ignored this advice, instead choosing a quick fix. Block Aff.,

1 5.

Plaintiff was not

allowed to wait until he knew the full details of the City's involvement before the
tort claim notice time period began running. Mitchell, 30 Idaho at 423 - 24. The
fact that Plaintiff knew the City was involved when he accrued damages in October
or November, 2007, was sufficient to start the tort claim notice period.
Idaho courts have been clear on this subject. When a Plaintiff does not know
that there is a connection between a governmental entity and a tortious act, the
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tort claim notice period does not begin to run until the Plaintiff has knowledge
indicating a connection. Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 55 (1978); Carman v.
Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 553 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988}; Doe v. Durtschi, 11 0 Idaho
466, 474 (1986). When a Plaintiff knows that there is a connection between a
governmental entity and a tortious act, however tenuous that knowledge, the
notice period begins running as of the day damages accrue. See Mitchell., 130
Idaho at 422 - 23; McQuillen v. Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722 (1987); Ralphs v.
Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 227 (1977); Magnuson Props. P'ship. v. City of Coeur
D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 169 (2002); Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 126 Idaho
446, 447 - 49 {Idaho Ct. App. 1994). In Mallory, the plaintiff was injured sliding
into second base at a City softball field on July 26, 1990. /d. at 447. On July 31,
1990, the plaintiff inspected the baseball field, and discovered that the base was
bolted down. /d. The plaintiff filed a notice of tort claim on January 24, 1991, 182
days after the injury, but 177 days after the inspection. /d. Summary judgment was
granted to the City, and the Court of Appeals upheld the decision, stating:
Whether the Mallorys' argument is correct depends upon how the
language "reasonably should have been discovered" is to be
interpreted. Our Idaho Supreme Court has stated, with regard to I.C. §
6-906, that, "knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably
prudent person on inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge of the
wrongful act and will start the running of the [180]-day period."
McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741,
744 (1987); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 717, 535 P.2d 1348,
1354 (1975}. The district court, in its order granting summary
judgment to the City, stated:
At the time of the injury to plaintiff, plaintiffs had sufficient
knowledge to put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry and
thus the 1 80 day time requirement began to run on July 26,
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1990. An investigation into whether or not the base was faulty
was not necessary to place plaintiffs on inquiry. It appears to
this court that there is no relationship between the late filing
and plaintiff's being put on inquiry notice. Plaintiff's notice of
tort claim was dated January 5, 1991 but not filed with the
City Clerk until January 24, 1991. Because plaintiffs failed to
give notice to the City within 180 days from the date the claim
arose, the complaint must fail.
We agree with the district court's conclusion. The undisputed facts of
this case are that Mallory was injured when she slid into second base
during the game. There is no question regarding a latent injury, the
extent or existence of which is unknown at the time of the "wrongful
act." Similarly, no other facts were hidden from Mallory that
subsequently became known and, therefore, put her on inquiry notice
of the City's role in her injury. Mallory's argument in this case is,
essentially, that because she did not know the exact cause of her
injury (allegedly the bolts) on July 26, her claim was not "discovered"
until she investigated the bases themselves. This argument misreads
the language of McQuillen. The statute does not begin running when a
eerson fully understands the mechanism of the injury and the
government's role, but rather when he or she is aware of such facts
that would cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire further into
the circumstances surrounding the incident.
The Mallorys' case shows quite clearly the difference between actual
knowledge and knowledge of facts that would put a reasonably
prudent person on inquiry notice. Although Mallory did not know of
the metal bolts, or perhaps even that the City owned the softball field,
at the time of her injury, the facts she was aware of led her to
investigate the incident further. Her cursory inspection of the field
revealed a possible cause of the injury and the City's ownership of the
field could have been determined with minimal effort. Armed with a
few simple facts, Mallory acted as a reasonably prudent person might
when she sought to find out the exact nature of the accident. This is
sufficient to constitute "inquiry notice." Moreover, Mallory does not
contend that there subsequently became known to her any facts
between July 26 and July 31 that led her to inspect the field. Thus,
knowledge of facts that prompted a further inquiry, where such
inquiry led to the discovery of facts necessary to formulate a claim
against a government entity, were sufficient to begin the running of
I.C. § 6-906 on July 26, even though the actual mechanics of the
injury were unknown.
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Further, if accepted, Mallory's argument would render the 180-day
time limit meaningless. Such interpretation would allow a party to
delay completion of an investigation for months and even years before
submitting a notice of claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Such is
not the purpose or intent of the discovery exception in the Act.

Mallory, 126 Idaho at 448 - 49 (emphasis added).
Based on these cases, there is only one issue of material fact. It is not how
much Plaintiff knew regarding the fill, or the level of the City's involvement
regarding the prior property owner's actions in placing fill on the properties, or even
the City's knowledge of previous slope movement in the area. The only material
fact relevant to this Court's determination of this case is whether Plaintiff knew
that the City had been involved. 4 As discussed above, this fact is undisputed:
Plaintiff admits that he knew the City had been involved as early as when he
started building on the properties. Block Aff., , 3. Thus, because of his knowledge,
he was on inquiry notice the date damages accrued, i.e., October or November,
2007. With a minimum of effort, he could have discovered the facts on which he
now relies to allege that the City is liable. Block Aff., , 11. Plaintiff could have
spent five minutes on the internet and discovered that the entire area on which he
was building was an ancient landslide area. 5 Plaintiff, who was previously the

4

Plaintiff has submitted the affidavit of his engineer, Eric Hasenoehrl, regarding whether it
was reasonable for Plaintiff to have discovered prior to May , 2009 that the settlement
observed was caused by slope movement. Hasenoehrl Aff., ,- 14. However, as the only
material fact relevant to this argument is whether Plaintiff knew that the City had some
involvement, and not the cause of the earth movement, Mr. Hasenoehrl's opinion is
irrelevant and moot.

5

See KURT L. OTHBERG, ROY M. BRECKENRIDGE, AND DANIEL W. WEISZ, SURFICIAL GEOLOGICAL MAP
OF THE LEWISTON ORCHARDS NORTH QUADRANGLE AND PART OF THE CLARKSTON QUADRANGLE, NEZ
PERCE
COUNTY
IDAHO,
(fdaho
Geological
Survey)
(2003),
accessible
at
http://www.idahogeology.org/PDF/Digital Data %28D%29/Digital Web Maps %28DWM%
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community development director for the City of Lewiston, could have spent five
minutes analyzing whether the property at issue, which is approximately .5 miles
south of the Elks Club, and is on the same hillside, was subject to the same
landslide issues that occurred below the Elks Club in May, 1998. Plaintiff could
have asked Strata, Inc., to actually determine what was causing the settlement
issues. Instead, he did none of these things. He went with a quick fix which did not
work. His choice to proceed with a quick fix instead of investigating the causes of
the settlement does not stop the notice period from running.
Based on the uncontroverted material facts in this case, Plaintiff knew the
City had some involvement in October or November, 2007, and incurred some
damages as of that date. The latest Plaintiff could have filed his notice of tort claim
was 180 days after he had notice, or approximately April 21, 2008 for 153 Marine
View Drive, and May 12, 2008 for 155 and 159 Marine View Drive.

6

He admits he

did not file a notice of tort claim until August 26, 2009. Block Aff., ,

12.

Therefore, Plaintiff has not filed a timely notice of tort claim, and his claims against
the City are absolutely barred. McQuillen v. Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722 (1987).
Defendants request that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants City and Cutshaw be
dismissed.

29/DWM-8-M.pdf, (last checked July 14, 201 0). See also IDAHO GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
PAMPHLET,
LANDSLIDE
HAZARDS
IN
IDAHO
(2008),
accessible
at
http://www .idahogeology .org/uploads/Hazards/Landslides/landSid bro final. pdf
(last
checked July 14, 2010).
6

See Complaint, , 19 (Plaintiff had notice on October 23, 2007, regarding settling at 153,
and knew by November 13, 2007 of settling at 155 and 159).
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B.

BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO WAIT THE FULL 90 DAYS AFTER
SUBMITTING A NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM TO FILE A COMPLAINT, HIS
COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Defendants have also moved for summary judgment on the grounds that

Plaintiff failed to wait until the tort claim was denied before filing the lawsuit.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants' "Motion for Summary Judgment has been made
on the singular ground that Plaintiff failed to timely file a Notice of Tort Claim."
Memorandum in Opposition, p. 14. This argument makes no sense, as Defendants

fully set forth at least two separate grounds for Summary Judgment in the
Memorandum in Support. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, pp. 7 - 8. Defendants included this affirmative defense in the Answer.
See Answer, pp. 4 - 6 {see the seventh, tenth, thirteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth

defenses). Therefore, Defendants have adequately set forth this argument as
grounds for summary judgment.
As to the substance of this argument, Plaintiff argues that the Idaho Tort
Claims Act cannot be construed to prevent Plaintiff from filing a Complaint prior to
the close of the 90-day period required by /.C. § 6-909. However, the plain
language of /.C. § 6-910 leaves no doubt that the tort claim must be denied before
an action is instituted. Where a statute is unambiguous, "the clear expressed intent
of the legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for construction."
In re Tax Appeal of Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425, 428 (1993). The

ITCA states
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If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity or its employee in those
circumstances where an action is permitted by this act.
/.C. § 6-910 (emphasis added). This language is not ambiguous; Plaintiff may

institute an action only if the claim is denied. A civil action is commenced by the
filing of the Complaint with the court. I.R.C.P. 3(a). Thus, Plaintiff admits that he
instituted this action before the tort claim notice was denied, in violation of the
ITCA. See Memorandum in Opposition, p. 15; Block Aff., , 12.
Plaintiff, instead, would have the Court construe /.C. § 6-910 such that it
has no effect. In other words, Plaintiff may institute an action immediately after
submitting a notice of tort claim, as long as it is not served until after the claim is
denied, or the 90-day period expires. It is not the Court's role to interpret code
such that a portion of a statute is essentially read out. "In determining the
legislative intent,

we

should

examine the

reasonableness

of the proposed

interpretations and the policy behind the statutes so that all of the applicable
sections can be construed together." State v. Seamons, 126 Idaho 809, 812
(Idaho Ct. App. 1995). "A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all
its provisions, so that no part will be rendered superfluous or insignificant." Brown
v.

Caldwell Sch.

Dist.

No.

132,

127 Idaho

112,

117

(1995).

Plaintiff's

interpretation would require the Court to ignore the portion of /.C. § 6-91 0 reading
"if the claim is denied", rendering it meaningless and superfluous. A liberal reading
of the ITCA does not mean rendering portions out of the statute superfluous.
Plaintiff puts forth no evidence that the Defendants denied Plaintiff's August

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 17

26, 2009 notice of tort claim; therefore the only way the tort claim could have
been denied was by the expiration of the 90-day period. Though the Court
construes the Idaho Tort Claim Act liberally, the Court may not construe a statute
so that it has no effect. Therefore, Plaintiff has violated the ITCA, and his
Complaint should be dismissed without prejudice. Compliance with the ITCA is
mandatory,

and failure

to comply is fatal. McQuillen,

113 Idaho at 722;

Independent Sch. Dist. v. Callister, 97 Idaho 59, 61 (1975) (overruled on other

grounds, Larson v. Emmett Joint Sch. Dist., 99 Idaho 120 (1978)}. The language
of I. C. § 6-910 makes it clear that the Court is not even allowed to consider an
action until the claim is denied. Because Plaintiff failed to wait until the tort claim
was denied to file his Complaint, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Complaint.

See I. C. § 6-914 (the rules under the lTC A govern over the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure). Compare Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir.
2001) (compliance with administrative rules prior to filing a Title VII complaint,
including rules regarding filing an administrative claim, is jurisdictional, and
abandonment of administrative process precludes judicial review).
Therefore, there is no excuse for Plaintiff to have filed the Complaint before
the notice of tort claim was denied, regardless of whether Plaintiff waited until
after 90 days to serve the Complaint. If one of the purposes of the ITCA is to save
expenses of litigation, Memorandum in Opposition, p. 15, it makes little sense for
Plaintiff to say that there is no harm filing a Complaint and waiting to serve it. It
only takes seconds to search the Idaho Repository to determine if a Complaint has
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been filed; once discovered, the governmental entity will incur costs related to
monitoring whether the Complaint is properly served. Thus, Plaintiff should be
required to abide by the plain language of the ITCA, and his Complaint against
Defendants City and Cutshaw should be dismissed without prejudice.

Ill.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants request that summary judgment be
granted, or in the alternative, Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this __ day of July, 2010.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

By

LLP

~ C~~~J<~
Brian K. Julian, Of the Firm
Attorneys for City of Lewiston and
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of July, 2010, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by
the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Ronald J. Landeck
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue
P. 0. Box 9344
Moscow, Idaho 83843
Telephone: (208) 883-1505
Facsimile: (208) 883-4593

[
[
[

]
]
]

[ >

1

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Clinton 0. Casey
CANTRILL, SKINNER SULLIVAN &
KING, LLP.
1423 Tyrell Lane
P.O. Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone; (208) 344-8035
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212

[
[
[ ]
[ -]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Attorneys for Defendant Jack J.
Streibick
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
)
)
)
)

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Plaintiff,
V.

)

)
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK )
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of )
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick,
)
)
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a
municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, )
and its employee LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, )
City of Lewiston Engineer, and DOES 1-20,)
)
Defendants.
)

CASE NO. CV 09-02219

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER ON MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter came before the Court on Defendants City of Lewiston and Lowell J.
Cutshaw's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff was represented by Ronald
Landeck, attorney at law.

Defendant~

City of Lewiston and City of Lewiston Engineer,

Lowell Cutshaw, were represented by Stephen Adams, of the firm Anderson, Julian &
Hull. Clinton Casey, of the firm Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King appeared
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telephonically on behalf of Defendant Streibick. 1 The Court heard oral argument on this
matter on July 27, 2010. The Court, having heard the argument of counsel and being fully
advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND
In 2005, Plaintiff John Block purchased property in Lewiston, Idaho, from
Defendant Jack Streibick and the Estate of Maureen Streibick (hereinafter "Streibick")
for purposes of real estate development. Affidavit ofJohn Block, at 2. The City of
Lewiston (hereinafter "City") 2 approved Block's application to resubdivide the property
into three residential lots. The lots were designated as 153 Marine View Drive, 155
Marine View Drive, and 159 Marine View Drive (hereinafter "153", "155", and "159").

!d.
Prior to Block's purchase of the property, the City had issued two separate
permits to Streibick, allowing Streibick to place and grade fill in the area of these lots.

Id. at 4 (a copy of the permits is attached). The placement of fill on a building lot is a
common construction practice in Lewiston, Idaho. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 3.
Placement of fill is subject to permitting and inspection by the City for compliance with
code requirements. !d.
In 2006, Block received building permits from the City for purposes of
constructing homes on all three lots. Complaint,

at~

16. During the construction of the

homes, Block hired engineering firms to test compaction of the finished grade for the
footings on these lots. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 3. The compaction testing reports
1

While counsel was present on behalf of Defendant Streibick, the issues before the Court were limited to
the Defendant City of Lewiston and employee Cutshaw's motion for summary judgment pursuant to the
Idaho Tort Claims Act.
2
For purposes of the motion before the Court, reference to the "City" encompasses both the Defendant City
of Lewiston, and City employee Lowell Cutshaw.
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established that the foundation locations were compacted in accordance with applicable
building standards. ld. The compaction testing reports also confirmed that fill had been
placed in the area ofthe testing. Jd. Following the construction of the homes, the City
conducted inspections and found the homes to be constructed in accordance with
applicable building codes and standards; thus, certificates of occupancy were issued by
the City for each of the three properties. Affidavit of John Block, at 2; Complaint, at, 16.
In April, 2007, Block sold 159 and the home thereon to a purchaser. Complaint,

at, 16. In October, 2007, a realtor observed settling in the northwest comer of the home
at 153 while showing this home to a perspective buyer. The realtor informed Block of
this observation. Affidavit ofJohn Block, at 2. In November, 2007, settling was also
observed under an exterior door of the home at 155. ld. Also in November, the owner of
159 reported to Block a crack in the basement floor of the home. Jd. As a result of these
observations, Block consulted with Keltic Engineering regarding possible solutions to the
settlement occurring on the three properties. ld.; Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 3-4.
Keltic Engineering sought the services of a geotechnical engineering firm, Strata, Inc., to
assist on the project. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 3-4.
In early December, 2007, Block repurchased 159 from the owners. Complaint, at
, 20. He also consulted with engineers from Keltic and Strata regarding options for
immediate repair to the homes. The installation of a deep foundation system consisting
of helical piers was suggested. Andrew Abrams, the engineer from Strata, did explain to
Block that without detailed subsurface knowledge and an engineering evaluation, he
could not provide an engineering opinion ofthe causes of the settlement occurring on the
three lots. Block ultimately decided to proceed with the installation of the helical pier
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systems at the homes, and this installation was completed in December, 2007. Affidavit
of John Block, at 3; Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 4.
In conjunction with the installation of helical piers, Block hired Keltic
Engineering to monitor the structural stability of the residences. The monitoring was
based upon surveys done prior to the installation of the helical pier systems, and by
surveying the properties monthly following the installation of the helical piers. The
surveying continued for a year, through December 2008. !d. Following successful
monitoring, Block elected to make repairs to all three residences during the spring
months of 2008. There were no further problems observed or reported at the residences
until February, 2009. !d.
In February, 2009, the tenant of 159 contacted Block about settling near the
foundation of that residence. Reports of settlement in the driveway and basement of 153
followed soon thereafter. Block inspected the properties in March, 2009, and observed
settlement at all three residences, as well as cracks in the ground surfaces of each lot.
Affidavit of John Block, at 4. In May, 2009, a gas leak occurred at 153; subsequently the
City inspected all three properties and posted notice that the residential structures on 153
and 159 were unsafe to occupy. !d. The City required Block to submit an abatement
plan. Ultimately, the abatement plan required the demolition to the structures on 153 and
159; however, the home at 155 remains, following improvements required by the City to
ensure safe occupancy of the residence. !d.
In late May, 2009, Block was contacted by Sandra Lee, a reporter from the local
newspaper, the Lewiston Tribune. Lee provided Block with a copy of an article from the
newspaper dated May 20, 1999. !d. The article reported that slope movement, in the
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form of a landslide, occurred in 1999 in the vicinity of the three lots owned by Block on
Marine View Drive. Prompted by the information contained in the 1999 newspaper
article, Block proceeded to research City records regarding the development history of
the property. !d. In June, 2009, Block discovered from City records that the City knew
in 1999 that substantial slope movement occurred within the area of Block's lots and that
the City filed information about the slope movements in records related to a different
subdivision, known as Palisades #4. Jd., at 4-5.
Eric Hasenoehrl, engineer with Keltic, was not made aware of the 1999 landslide
until informed by Block following Block's contact with Sandra Lee. Upon receiving this
information, Hasenoehrl surveyed the fault line of the 2009 movement, compared that
line with the fault line in the 1999 photograph and concluded the lines are almost
identical. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 4-5.
Block filed a Notice of Claim for Damages with the City ofLewiston, including
City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw, on August 26, 2009. Block filed the Complaint initiating
this lawsuit on October 22, 2009, but did not effectuate service of process on the
Defendants until ninety days had elapsed from the date Block filed the Notice of Claim
for Damages. Affidavit ofJohn Block, at 5.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P.
56(c). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must construe
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits in a light most favorable to the
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nonmoving party. Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 146, 106 P.3d 470,472 (2005),

citing Infanger v. City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45,44 P.3d 1100 (2002).
When a motion for summary judgment is "supported by a particularized affidavit,
the opposing party may not rest upon bare allegations or denials in his pleadings," but
must set forth "specific facts" showing a genuine issue. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Verbillis v.

Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335, 337, 689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). A
"mere scintilla" of evidence or only a "slight doubt" as to the facts is insufficient to
withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730
P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986), citing Snake River Equip. Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541,
691 P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,
238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005).
Finally, the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact is on the moving party, and once this burden is met, it is incumbent upon the
non-moving party to establish an issue of fact regarding that element. Yoakum v.

Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,923 P.2d 416 (1996).
ANALYSIS

The City contends the pending lawsuit must be dismissed against both the City
and its employee, Lowell Cutshaw, pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act (hereinafter
"ITCA"). The ITCA "abrogates the doctrine of sovereign immunity and renders a
governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts or omissions."

Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458, 886 P.2d 330, 334 (1994). "The
purpose of the ITCA is to provide 'much needed relief to those suffering injury from the
negligence of government employees.' The ITCA is to be construed liberally, consistent
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with its purpose, and with a view to 'attaining substantial justice."' Rees v. State, Dept.
of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 19, 137 P.3d 397,406 (2006) (internal citations
omitted).
1. Did the Plaintiff fail to file a timely notice of tort claim?

The ITCA sets forth a mandatory time frame for the filing of a claim against a
political subdivision or employee thereof.
All claims against a political subdivison [subdivision] arising under the
provisions of this act and all claims against an employee of a political
subdivision for any act or omission of the employee within the course or
scope of his employment shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or
secretary of the political subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days
from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered,
whichever is later.

I.C. § 6-906. Directly at issue in the case at hand is whether Block filed the notice of tort
claim within one hundred eighty days from the date his claim arose or reasonably should
have been discovered. The City argues that Block was aware of the settlement issues as
early as October and November, 2007, and thus, should have made inquiry during that
time in order to discover the extent of his claim; because he failed to do so, his claim
against the City is time barred. Block, on the other hand, argues that he was not aware he
had a claim against the City until May of 2009, after the newspaper article about the
slope movement activity from 1999 prompted him to research City of Lewiston records
about the development of the property.
Several Idaho cases have addressed the application of the 180 day time frame set
forth in I. C. § 6-906. In Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 885 P.2d 1162
(Ct. App. 1994) the Idaho Court of Appeals focused on the interpretation of the
"reasonably should have been discovered language" in conjunction with the 180 day time
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limit. In lvfallory, the plaintiff was injured during a softball game when she slid into
second base at the city softball field. The injury occurred on July 26, 1990; five days
later, the plaintiff went back to the field to inspect it and she discovered the bases were
bolted down.
Mallory's case against the city was ultimately dismissed because Mallory failed to
file notice with the city within the time limit required by the ITCA. The notice was filed
within 180 days of the date Mallory inspected the field; but not within 180 days from
when Mallory suffered her injury. Mallory argued that her claim could not reasonably
have been discovered until after she inspected the softball field. !d. The Mallory Court
focused upon the "reasonably should have been discovered" language ofl.C. § 6-906.
Whether the Mallorys' argument is correct depends upon how the
language "reasonably should have been discovered" is to be interpreted.
Our Idaho Supreme Court has stated, with regard to I. C. § 6-906, that,
"knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on
inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge of the wrongful act and will start
the running of the [180]-day period." McQuillen v. City ofAmmon, 113
Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711,
717, 535 p .2d 1348, 1354 (1975).
!d. at 448, 885 P .2d at 1164. The Mallory Court discussed the facts known to Mallory at

the time she was injured, as well as whether there were any facts hidden from Mallory
which subsequently became known.
The undisputed facts of this case are that Mallory was injured when she
slid into second base during the game. There is no question regarding a
latent injury, the extent or existence of which is unknown at the time of
the "wrongful act." Similarly, no other facts were hidden from Mallory
that subsequently became knovvn and, therefore, put her on inquiry notice
of the City's role in her injury. Mallory's argument in this case is,
essentially, that because she did not know the exact cause of her injury
(allegedly the bolts) on July 26, her claim was not "discovered" until she
investigated the bases themselves. This argument misreads the language of
McQuillen. The statute does not begin running when a person fully
understands the mechanism ofthe injury and the government's role, but
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rather when he or she is aware of such facts that would cause a reasonably
prudent person to inquire further into the circumstances surrounding the
incident.
The Mallorys' case shows quite clearly the difference between actual
knowledge and knowledge of facts that would put a reasonably prudent
person on inquiry notice. Although Mallory did not know of the metal
bolts, or perhaps even that the City owned the softball field, at the time of
her injury, the facts she was aware ofled her to investigate the incident
further. Her cursory inspection of the field revealed a possible cause of the
injury and the City's ownership of the field could have been determined
with minimal effort. Armed with a few simple facts, Mallory acted as a
reasonably prudent person might when she sought to find out the exact
nature of the accident. This is sufficient to constitute "inquiry notice."
Moreover, Mallory does not contend that there subsequently became
known to her any facts between July 26 and July 31 that led her to inspect
the field. Thus, knowledge of facts that prompted a further inquiry, where
such inquiry led to the discovery of facts necessary to formulate a claim
against a government entity, were sufficient to begin the running ofl.C. §
6-906 on July 26, even though the actual mechanics of the injury were
unknown.

!d.
A similar determination was made in Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial Hospital,
130 Idaho 420, 942 P.2d 544 (1997). In this case, a patient brought suit against the
county hospital after she received an overdose while admitted as a patient at the hospital.
The patient knew of her injuries on the date of the overdose; however, the patient was not
informed the overdose was due to a nurse's error until she was informed by her doctor
two months later. Id. at 421, 942 P.2d at 545. The Court held that the 180 day time
frame began at the time the injury occurred, not two months later when the doctor
informed the patient that the injury was due to the nurse's error.
The Mitchells were aware of the overdose and respiratory arrest on the day
the overdose occurred. The facts available to the Mitchells were sufficient
to cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire further into the
circumstances surrounding the incident. Mallory, 126 Idaho at 448, 885
P.2d at 1164. Furthermore, even if the cause of the overdose had been due
to a malfunctioning infusion machine, and although there may be ultimate
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shared responsibility with a manufacturer in such a case, the hospital is
entitled to timely notice of a potential claim. Thus, we hold that the 180day period began to run on July 20, 1992, even though the Mitchells did
not know the extent of the injury and Mrs. Mitchell's damages or the
extent to which the hospital was responsible.

!d. at 423-24, 942 P.2d at 547-48.
The Idaho Supreme Court revisited its analysis from Mitchell v. Bingham
Memorial recently in Steele v. Kootenai Medical Center, 142 Idaho 919, 136 P.3d 905
(2006). The Steele Court was careful to note that the application of the "or reasonably
should have been discovered, whichever is later" language from I. C. § 6-906 is dependent
upon the facts of each case.
The Bingham Memorial Court did not delete from Idaho Code § 6-906
the phrase "or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever was
later." Rather, it interpreted the phrase to mean, "The statute does not
begin running when a person fully understands the mechanism of the
injury and the government's role, but rather when he or she is aware of
such facts to inquire further into the circumstances surrounding the
incident." Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial Hospital, 130 Idaho 420, 423,
942 P.2d 544, 547 (1997) (quoting from Mallory v. City of Montpelier,
126 Idaho 446,448, 885 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Ct.App.1994)). The Court then
held that on the day of the overdose, "[t]he facts available to the [patient]
were sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire further into
the circumstances surrounding the incident." 130 Idaho at 423, 942 P.2d at
54 7. The patient knew on that day she had received an overdose of
medication from an infusion machine operated by a hospital nurse. A
reasonable investigation begun at that time would have and did reveal the
nurse's alleged negligence well before the expiration of the 180-day
period for giving a notice of tort claim. Whether or not a claimant has
sufficient knowledge to begin the running of the 180-day period depends
upon the facts of the case.

!d. at 921-22, 136 P.3d at 907-08.
Mallory v. City of Montpelier, Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial Hospital and Steele
v. Kootenai Medical Center all turn on the information known to the plaintiff at the time
the injury occurred. Each case was dismissed because the injured party had knowledge
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of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry regarding the
governmental entities' role in the cause ofthe injury. See also McQuillen v. City of
Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987)("[K]nowledge of facts which
would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge of the
wrongful act and will start the running ofthe [180]-day period.").
Whether an injured party had knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably
prudent person on inquiry has been determined to be a question of material fact in some
cases. See Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 577 P.2d 33 (1978) (Whether claim against
county was filed within 120 days of date when it reasonably should have been discovered
was a question of a material fact which precluded summary judgment.); Carman v.
Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 758 P.2d 710 (Ct. App. 1988); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,
716 P.2d 1238 (1986).
In Doe v. Durtschi parents and students filed suit against the school district for the
negligent hiring and retention of a teacher where the school district knew the teacher,
Durtschi, had sexually molested children. The plaintiffs asserted they learned of the
negligence of the school district in early August, 1980, when it was discovered through a
presentence investigation that the school district retained the teacher even after knowing
ofhis illicit tendencies. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho at 474, 716 P.2d at 1246. The
Durtschi Court held: "If these facts are established at trial, the plaintiffs hardly could
have discovered the negligent retention of the school district until early August, 1980. If
this is the case, notice for the adult plaintiffs' claims was entirely adequate." !d. at 47475, 716 P.2d at 1246-47.
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The Durtschi Court emphasized that the analysis regarding the application of the
time limit does not focus solely on the date a person is injured, but also on the date the
claimant becomes aware of the government's role.
Obviously, a claim is not necessarily discovered the instant the injury or
damages occur. The claimant only knows of his or her claim against the
governmental entity and the 120-day limit only begins to run after the
claimant becomes fully apprised of not only the injury or damages, but
also ofthe governmental entity's role.
Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho at 474, 716 P.2d at 1246.
In Carman, the plaintiff was in the midst of a divorce action. The plaintiffs soon
to be ex-husband was prematurely informed of the magistrate's decision on property
division. Before the magistrate's decision was issued, the plaintiff entered into a divorce
settlement. Once the plaintiff learned about the actions of the county employee, she
brought suit against the county alleging that the county official's premature disclosure of
the property division caused her to enter into a divorce settlement which was less
favorable than the magistrate's decision. The Idaho Court of Appeals determined that a
question of material fact existed regarding when the plaintiff should have discovered her
claim against the county.
A claimant "discovers" his claim against the governmental entity only
when he becomes fully apprised ofthe injury or damage and of the
governmental entity's role. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238
(1986). The question ofwhen the claimant reasonably should have
discovered the governmental entity's role is a question of material fact
which, if genuinely disputed, is inappropriate for determination on a
motion for summary judgment. !d.; Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 577
P.2d 33 (1978). Compare Full Circle, Inc. v. Schelling, 108 Idaho 634,
701 P.2d 254 (Ct.App.1985) (question ofreasonable diligence to discover
fraud under applicable statute of limitation is a question of fact for the
jury).
Here, a question of material fact exists concerning whether Cherie
reasonably should have discovered her claim against the county prior to
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1984. Consequently, the limitation period should not yet be applied. This
issue should be determined by the jury.

Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 553,758 P.2d 710,712 (Ct. App. 1988).
In the case at hand, the City contends that Block should have been on notice to
inquire about the cause of the earth settlement when the settling first became evident to
him in October and November of2007. The City argues that had Block fully inquired
into the cause of settlement at that time, he would have easily been able to discern that
the settlement may have been due to slope movement rather than earth settlement. Block,
however, argues that he was not on notice of the City's knowledge of the earth movement
in the area until he was contacted by the newspaper reporter in May, 2009. Affidavit of

John Block, at 4. Block argues the City had knowledge ofthe earth movement, but
during the building permit and inspection process failed to inform Block, or engineers
hired by Block, about their previous knowledge of earth movement in the area. Eric
Hasenoehrl, a civil engineer who worked with Block throughout the process of
attempting to remedy the settlement issues on the lots, stated that neither he nor Block
were informed of the previous landslides by the City.
Throughout the course of my dealings and interactions with the City of
Lewiston, neither I nor anyone at Keltic was ever made aware by the City
that slope movement had previously occurred in the area of 153, 155, or
159, nor during the substantial time I spent on the site in 2005, did I
observe any evidence of slope movement in the area of 153, 155, and 159.
It was not until John Block met with me in June 2009 and showed me a
copy of documents and a photograph he told me he had obtained from the
City of Lewiston's records and of a 1999 Lewiston Tribune article that he
had received from Sandra Lee ... did I realize that slope movement had
previously occurred in the area of 15 3, 15 5 and 15 9 and that the City of
Lewiston had been made aware of that slope movement in 1999 and
maintained that information in its records.
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Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 4-5. Further, Hasenoehrl opined that there was no overt

evidence of slope movement in December, 2007, and that it would not be reasonable to
conclude that he or Block should have known or attempted to discover that the settlement
initially observed in 2007 was a result of slope movement and not earth settlement. Id. at
5-6.
The case at hand is similar to those cases where a fact hidden from the plaintiff
subsequently became known. See Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 577 P.2d 33 (1978),
Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 758 P.2d 710 (Ct. App. 1988), and Doe v. Durtschi,

110 Idaho 466, 716 P .2d 123 8 ( 1986).

In the case at hand, based upon the record before

the Court, Block was not apprised of the City's knowledge of slope movement in the area
until he was informed by the newspaper reporter. Thus, it is a material question of fact
whether Block should have discovered his claim against the City prior to May, 2009.
Because a question of material fact exists, summary judgment is not appropriate on this
issue.
2. Should the Complaint be dismissed based upon the Plaintiff's failure to wait until
the tort claim was denied by the City?
The City contends the complaint filed against it should be dismissed because the
Plaintiff filed suit against the City prior to being informed his claim was denied, in
contravention of the requirements ofl.C. §§ 6-908-910. The provisions relied upon by
the City state:
6-908. Restriction on the allowance of claims.- No claim or action
shall be allowed against a governmental entity or its employee unless the
claim has been presented and filed within the time limits prescribed by this
act.
6-909. Time for allowance or denial of claims.- Effect of failure to
act.- Within ninety (90) days after the filing of the claim against the
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governmental entity or its employee, the governmental entity shall act
thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A
claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety (90)
day period the governmental entity has failed to approve or deny the
claim.
6-910. Suit on denied claims permitted.- If the claim is denied, a
claimant may institute an action in the district court against the
governmental entity or its employee in those circumstances where an
action is permitted by this act.
The City interprets these statutes to mean that only after a claim is denied (or deemed
denied) is the party making the claim then allowed to file suit. Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 7.
There is no case law in Idaho directly on point regarding the issue of whether the
ITCA requires a claim to be dismissed if it is filed before the governmental entity either
issues a denial of the claim in writing, or the 90 day time frame set forth in I. C. § 6-909
runs, effectively denying the claim. If the Court were to construe the statute in the
narrow fashion suggested by the City, the case against the City would be dismissed
without prejudice, simply to be refiled upon the receipt of this order.
Block argues that the express language ofl.C. § 6-910 does not require dismissal
of the suit; further, the purposes of the notice requirement have been served in this case,
where the City had sufficient time to either resolve the claim, or investigate and prepare
its defenses against the claim because the time for responding to the complaint did not
begin to run until service was made upon the City. Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 16.
The purposes of the notice claim requirement have been set forth in cases which
have addressed a separate issue; whether the form of notice given to the governmental
entity was sufficient under the requirements set forth in I.C. § 6-907.
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The purposes ofthe notice of claim requirement under the ITCA are to:
(1) save needless expense and litigation by providing opportunity for
amicable resolution of differences among parties, (2) allow authorities to
conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to
determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state
to prepare defenses.
Driggers v. Grafe, 148 Idaho 295, 297, 221 P.3d 521, 523 (Ct. App. 2009), citing Pounds
v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425,426-27, 816 P.2d 982, 983-84 (1991). The form ofthe notice
provided by Block is not at issue in this case; however the purpose of the notice
requirement is important in conjunction with the issue before the Court. The ITCA, in its
entirety, should be considered when determining whether dismissal of this case is
required, as argued by the City. In general, the purpose of the ITCA is to provide an
avenue of relief for those who are harmed by the negligence of government employees.
"The ITCA is to be construed liberally, consistent with its purpose, and with a view to
'attaining substantial justice."' Rees v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10,
19, 137 P.3d 397, 406 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
Considering the ITCA as a whole, this Court is not persuaded that the matter
before it should be dismissed based upon a narrow reading ofl.C. § 6-910. While it may
have been a better practice for the plaintiff to have filed suit against the nongovernmental entity defendants, then later amended the Complaint to include the City
defendants after the City was given 90 days to consider the claim, failure to do so does
not require a harsh remedy of dismissal. Thus, the Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment on this issue is denied.
CONCLUSION
Block is a real estate developer who purchased property from Streibick, and later
developed the property by dividing it into three lots and building a home on each. Block
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acquired building permits from the City, and each property was inspected and issued a
Certificate of Occupancy. In late 2007, damage from earth settlement occurred on each
of the properties. Block attempted to remedy the settlement by installing a helical pier
foundation system on each. In 2009, earth settlement caused damage to the properties
and ultimately rendered two of the homes uninhabitable. In 2009, Block received a copy
of a newspaper article written in 1999 that reported landslide movement in the area.
Following the receipt of the article, Block researched City records and determined that
the City was aware of slope movement near his lots as early as 1999, but the City did not
inform Block of this movement when it issued building and occupancy permits for the
lots.
The City is seeking summary judgment of the claims against it based upon the
180 day notice provision set forth in the ITCA. The City argues Block was put on notice
to inquire into the cause of the earth settlement in 2007, when the settlement first
occurred. Had Block thoroughly researched the issue, he would have learned of the slope
movement, and the City's knowledge of that slope movement at that time. Because
Block failed to file his notice of tort claim with the city within the 180 day time frame
after discovering the earth movement in 2007, the case must be dismissed.
Block, however, argues that he did not become aware of the City's knowledge
about the slope movement until receipt of the newspaper article in 2009. In the case at
hand, a question of material fact exists concerning whether Block reasonably should have
discovered his claim against the City prior to 2009. As a result, the City's motion for
summary judgment is denied.
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The City also argues summary judgment should be granted because Block filed
the current lawsuit before the City had denied the tort claim filed against it. The ITCA is
to be construed liberally, with a view toward attaining substantial justice. Thus, dismissal
ofthe lawsuit is not warranted on this basis. Therefore, the City's motion for summary
judgment is denied.

ORDER
The Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw's Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby DENIED.

Dated this JL(ftday of September 2010.

CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)
vs.
)
)
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK )
)
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick,
)
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a
)
municipal corporation of the State ofidaho, )
and its employee, LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, )
City ofLewiston, Engineer, and DOES 1-20,)

CASE NO. CV-09-02219
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

)

Defendants.

)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named case be set for JURY TRIAL
before the Honorable CARL B. KERRICK, District Judge, at the Nez Perce County
Courthouse, at Lewiston, Idaho, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on the 26th day of September,
2011, for EIGHT (8) days.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED parties shall comply with the following:
disclosure of Plaintiff's expert witnesses, including compliance with IRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(i), shall be on or before March 4, 2011;
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disclosure of Defendant's expert witnesses, including compliance with
IRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i), shall be on or before May 6, 2011;
all discovery shall be completed by August 26, 2011;
that a pre-trial conference shall be held on September 16, 2011, at the hour
of 1:30 p.m. Lead counsel trying the case must be present at the pre-trial conference.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED at the pre-trial conference each party shall:
1) Prepare in writing and submit to the Court in advance of the pre-trial
hearing, a concise statement of the claims and/or defenses asserted by
that party:
2) Prepare a list of exhibits and bring all exhibits to the pre-trial
conference to be marked;
3)

Each counsel shall make a request of opposing counsel for
stipulations to as many facts and issues as possible, and be prepared to
submit this stipulation to the Court at the pre-trial hearing;

4) Be prepared to stipulate the admission of any exhibits or to make
specific objections to its admissibility;
5) Furnish opposing counsel with the names and addresses of all
witnesses, the nature their testimony, experts' reports, and like
instruments, and complete all other matter which may expedite both
the pre-trial and trial of this case:
6) Discuss the possibilities of settlement;
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7) Submit to the court at the pre-trial hearing all contentions of law relied
upon:
8) Submit to the court and counsel a copy of all jury instructions counsel
intends to request. The jury instructions shall consist of two copies,
one copy containing citations of authority and one copy suitable for
submission to the jury. The Court uses the following instructions from
IDJI and it is not necessary for counsel to submit them: 1.00, 1.01,
1.03, 1.03.1, 1.09, 1.11, 1.13, 1.15.1, 1.15.2, 1.17, 1.20.1, 1.20.2,
1.24.1, 1.24.2, and 9.00.
DATED this

'7ft- day ofDecember, 2010.

CARL B. KERRICK-District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SETTING CASE FOR TRIAL
AND PRE-TRIAL CO~FERENCE was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at
Lewiston, Idaho, this
day ofDecember, 2010, on:

/f>

Ronald J. Landeck
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
Clinton 0. Casey
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King
P.O. Box 359
Boise, ID 83 701
Brian K. Julian
Stephen L. Adams
Anderson, Julian & Hull
C.W. Moore Plaza
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
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nRt l
Clinton 0. Casey, ISB #4333
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 Tyrell Lane
P. 0. Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-8035
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212
Attorneys for Defendant, Jack J. Streibick,
individually and as personal representative of
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,

)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick,
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a
municipal corporation of the State of Idaho,
and its employees, LOWELL J.
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and
DOES 1-20,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV09 02219
ORDER EXTENDING
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE
OF EXPERT WITNESSES

BASED upon stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Disclosure of Expert Witnesses deadline is
extended to June 3, 2011.
ORDER EXTENDING DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES - 1

DATED This

4._
r }
;25, 'J1.- day of_,_~....Lfr;{)=--1'_,_'
_ _ _ _, 2011.
~

Carl B. Kerrick
District Judge
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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,

I hereby certify that on the
day of
2011, I served a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by fuethod indicated below, upon:
Clinton 0. Casey
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King, LLP
1423 Tyrell Lane
PO Box 359
Boise, ID 83701
Attorneys for Defendant Streibick

[]
[]
L~
[]

Facsimile 208-345-7212
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Email: ccaseY@cssklavv.com

Ronald Landeck
Attorney at Law
693 Styner Avenue
PO Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
Attorney for Plaintiffs

[]
[]

Facsimile 208-883-4593
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Email: attornevsr(imoscow.com

Brian K. Julian
Stephen L. Adams
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick,
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a
municipal corporation of the State of Idaho,
and its employees, LOWELL J.
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and
DOES 1-20,
Defendants.
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Case No. CV09 02219

ORDER EXTENDING
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE
OF DAMAGE EXPERT REPORTS

BASED upon stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Disclosure ofDamage Expert Reports deadline
is extended to June 24, 2011.
ORDER EXTENDING DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF DAMAGE EXPERT REPORTS - 1
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District Judge
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Attorneys for Defendants City of Lewiston and
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Case No. CV 09-02219
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK as Personal Representative ofthe
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY
OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the
State ofldaho, and its employee LOWELL J.
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and
DOES 1-20,
Defendants.

COME NOW, the above-entitled Defendants, City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw,
by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, and hereby submit this
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff John Block is suing the City of Lewiston for negligence related to the
construction of homes within the Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens II subdivisions. The three
homes in Canyon Greens, located at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive, were allegedly
damaged as a result of slope movement which occurred on or near those properties. The
remaining houses have not experienced any structural damage, but Plaintiff is seeking monetary
damages related to those properties due to decrease in value. Plaintiff is seeking also lost
business income damages as a result of the claims outlined in his Complaint. The two causes of
action in the Complaint which are directed against the City are both based in negligence. See
Complaint,~~

54- 57. Paragraph 55 of the Complaint lists 11 actions or omissions by the City

and City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw which allegedly resulted in a breach of a duty owed to
Plaintiff, and Paragraph 57 alleges that these negligent acts were grossly negligent.
Defendants City and Cutshaw (collectively referred to as "Defendants") contend that they
are entitled to summary judgment on a number of grounds. First, a number of the allegedly
wrongful acts by the City occurred before Plaintiff owned the property, and the City and its
employees have no duty to all future property owners of a property to act in any specific way.
Second, the Defendants had no tort duty to protect against purely economic loss, which
encompasses all of Plaintiffs damages. Third, Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendants had any
duty to mandatorily require that he obtain a slope stability or other geotechnical analysis prior to
construction on the properties at issue. Fourth, Plaintiff cannot show that any action or inaction
of the Defendants caused slope movement and any additional economic loss resulting therefrom.
Fifth, the Defendants are immune from all of Plaintiffs claims pursuant to I. C. §§ 6-904(1), 6904(7), 6-904 B(3 ), and 6-904 B(4). Each of these issues will be discussed in more detail below.
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II.
NEGLIGENCE ARGUMENTS
A.

DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TOWARD PLAINTIFF WITH REGARD TO
THE PROPERTIES AT ISSUE PRIOR TO HIM PURCHASING THE
PROPERTY.
Plaintiffs allegations of negligence by the Defendants include the following:

(iii)

failing to require that such earth movement in the area of 153, 155, and 159 be
eliminated or properly abated by Streibick and/or Others prior to Block's
purchase of the Property;

(iv)

failing to prevent Streibick from developing and selling 153, 155, and 159 to
Block without notice and/or warning to Block that such earth movement had
occurred in 1999 or without having eliminated or properly abated such earth
movement;

(v)

failing to require Streibick to complete the required storm water improvements in
1994 for Palisades No. 4 subdivision and approving and allowing Streibick's
construction of a storm water detention pond within the area of 153 where the
City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others knew earth movement had occurred in
1999, thereby contributing to the instability of soil in that area;

(ix)

failing to require and/or compel Streibick to eliminate or properly abate the
dangerous condition caused by and/or existing as a result of such earth movement
in the area of 153, 155 and 159;

(x)

failing to supervise Streibick's development activities within the area of 153, 155,
and 159 between 1999 and 2006 thereby allowing concealment of such earth
movement and the creation of a dangerous condition and risk of harm; and

(xi)

failing to inspect and/or make an inadequate inspection of Streibick's
development activities within the area of 153, 155, and 159 between 1999 and
2006 thereby allowing concealment of such earth movement and the creation of a
dangerous condition and risk of harm.

Complaint,

~55.

Plaintiff purchased the property in or around December, 2005. Complaint,

~

13. Defendants contend that each of these allegations above concern acts or omissions prior to
Plaintiff purchasing the property. Ignoring the issues of whether the City actually had a duty to
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anyone at the times mentioned as Plaintiff alleges, Defendants contend that they had no duty to
Plaintiff with regard to the acts or omissions alleged.
The existence of a duty is a question of law. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247
(1999). "No liability arises from the law of torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the
plaintiff." Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389 (2001). Numerous Idaho cases have made
it clear that a party cannot recover from a governmental entity for failure to perform a duty owed
to the public at large. "[I]f the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty
to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a
public, not an individual, injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public
prosecution." Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Idaho 351, 359 (1943). See also Worden v. Witt, 4
Idaho 404, 406- 07 (1895).
Generally, a person has no common law duty to prevent a third person from
injuring another unless there is some kind of special relationship. Applying this
principle to governmental torts in what is called the "public duty rule" requires
that a governmental unit owe the plaintiff a duty different from that owed to the
general public in order for the governmental unit to be found liable.

Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Minn. 2005) (cited in Rees v. State, 143
Idaho 10, 16 (2006). In Udy v. Custer County, the plaintiff argued that a sheriff who saw rocks
lying on a road (which later caused a motor vehicle accident) had a duty to clear the rocks or
give notice to someone to move them. Udy, 136 Idaho at 389. The Idaho Supreme Court stated
Udy's claims are in reality claims for negligent police protection for which there
can be no recovery absent a special relationship with the victim. Here, the record
does not establish, nor does Udy argue that he or his passengers were in a special
relationship with Sheriff Roskelley. Thus, the fact that Udy's accident may have
been prevented through reasonable law enforcement actions is insufficient to
establish a duty to the Appellants or otherwise form the basis for Sheriff
Roskelley's liability in tort.

Udy, 136 Idaho at 391. In other words, absent a special relationship, there was no duty owed to
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the plaintiff just because there may have been a duty to the public at large.
The same is true in this case. Before Plaintiff owned the property at issue, there was no
duty owed by the City to him specifically with regard to the property. Similarly, there was no
special relationship between the Defendants and Plaintiff related to this property, as the property
was owned by Streibick. Until Plaintiff owned the property, the Defendants had no more duty to
him than it did to any other member of the public as regarding this property. Therefore, Plaintiff
should not be allowed to recover damages related to the actions/omissions discussed above, and
summary judgment should be granted to the Defendants on these claims. Further, should this
case proceed to trial, Plaintiff should not be allowed to use evidence of these claims as evidence
that the City was negligent after Plaintiff purchased the property, and should be prevented from
submitting evidence that these claims are a basis for his damages.

B.

BECAUSE ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES IN THIS CASE ARE ECONOMIC
LOSSES, DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TO PREVENT THE OCCURRENCE
OF SUCH DAMAGES.
All of Plaintiff's damages in this case constitute economic damages, including repair and

lost value on the homes at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive, lost business damages, and lost
value on six of the eight homes that were designated part of Canyon Greens II (none of which
had any physical damage related to slope movement). See Statement of Facts,

~

22. With limited

exception, economic losses are not recoverable in negligence actions. Duffin v. Idaho Crop

Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007 (1995). See also Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman
Elec., Inc., 244 P .3d 166, 170 (Idaho 201 0) ("The economic loss rule applies to negligence cases
in general; its application is not restricted to products liability cases.").
With regard to the definition of economic loss, the Supreme Court has stated that
"Economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 5

subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of
profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351
(197 5). This definition has been followed by a majority of cases addressing economic loss. 1
Based on this definition, in order for there to be economic loss, there has to be defective property
which is the subject of the transaction at issue in the lawsuit. See Brian & Christie, Inc. v.

Leishman Elec., Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 171 (Idaho 2010). This can apply to cases "involving the
purchase of defective personal property and real property." Id. at 170.
There are a number of cases addressing economic loss which parallel the facts of this
case. In Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37 (1987), the plaintiff purchased duplexes, and
found after purchase that the foundation on the properties was cracking. Id. at 40. The Court
stated that "The structural defects have caused damage to the duplexes themselves and to the
parking lot, and have caused losses in rental income, but Tusch Enterprises has suffered no
personal injuries and has suffered no damage to property other than that which was the subject of
the duplex sales transaction." Id. The Court then barred recovery of these damages, stating "the
only damages it alleges are lost rental income and property damage to the duplexes and the
parking lot. These losses are economic." Id.
A similar result was reached in Duffin. In Duffin, the plaintiffs purchased seed potatoes
which allegedly were infected with bacterial ring rot, despite having been inspected by the
Department of Agriculture. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005. The Department of Agriculture argued
that recovery was barred because the Department had no duty to protect against economic loss of

See Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007 (1995); Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113
Idaho 37, 41 (1987); Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300 (2005); Ramerth v. Hart, 133
Idaho 194, 196 (1999); Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., 147 Idaho 785, 790 (2009). Cf Brian & Christie, Inc.
v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 170 (Idaho 2010) (holding that the definition provided of economic
loss in the Salmon Rivers case does not apply to claims for economic loss related to services, as opposed to
defective property).
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the plaintiffs. I d. at 1006. The Court found that the losses related to the use of the infected seed
potatoes was economic, and not recoverable. Id. at 1007. The Court then went on to address the
various exceptions to the economic loss rule, and found that none were applicable. I d. at 1007 -

08.
In this case, there is clearly a defective property at issue. In the Complaint, Plaintiff

clearly acknowledges that the property he purchased had suffered slope movement prior to his
purchase, and that the property was subject to future slope movement.

Complaint,~

even refers to the condition of the property as a "Defective Condition". Complaint,

25. Plaintiff
~~

29 - 41.

This is the same as purchasing diseased seed potatoes2 , duplexes which had been built on fill and
which had cracks in the foundation 3, houses built on soil subject to settlement4, or defective
roofing materials. 5 Because the property allegedly had a "defective condition" when Plaintiff
purchased it, this meets the "defective property" requirement of the Salmon Rivers definition of
economic loss.
The remainder of the Salmon Rivers definition also is met. The defective property at
issue (the lots purchased by Plaintiff from Streibick) are clearly the subject of the transaction
between Block and Streibick, and are the subject transaction in this case. Complaint,

~

11. In

Blahd, the Court engages in a lengthy discussion of what the "subject of the transaction" is,
stating
In Tusch Enterprises, a seller hired a contractor to level a hill to prepare the area
for construction. The seller participated in the site preparation, hired a builder to
construct a duplex on the site and sold the duplex to a buyer. The buyer then
discovered the duplex was damaged because the foundation was defective. The
See Duffin, 126ldaho at 1005.
See Tusch Enters., 113 Idaho at 40.
4

See Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 299 (2005).
See State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336 (1984).
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buyer sued the seller and the builder alleging negligence in preparing the
foundation. This Court held the economic loss rule barred the negligence claims
because the damage to the duplex caused by the defective foundation was purely
economic. This Court later explained in another case that it "considered the
duplex itself, rather than its construction, to be the subject of the transaction."
In Ramerth, an airplane owner sued a repairman alleging the repairman's
negligent servicing and inspection of the airplane caused damage to the engine
and aircraft. The airplane owner argued the economic loss rule did not bar his
negligence claim because the subject of the transaction was the repairman's
services, not the engine or airplane that was serviced. This Court rejected that
argument and held the damage to the engine and the aircraft were purely
economic and therefore, subject to the economic loss rule. These cases indicate
the word "transaction," for purposes of the economic loss rule, does not mean a
business deal--it means the subject of the lawsuit.
Like the duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the Blahds' house is damaged because the
foundation is settling. The damage to the Blahds' house is similar to the duplex
damage in Tusch Enterprises, where this Court held the losses were economic.
The Blahds seek to distinguish their case by noting the buyer in Tusch Enterprises
did not sue the contractor who leveled the lot and did not allege the property had
been leveled negligently. The fact that the buyer in Tusch Enterprises only sued
the builder and the seller is immaterial. It is the subject of the transaction that
determines whether a loss is property damage or economic loss, not the status of
the party being sued. The Blahds purchased the house and lot as an integrated
whole. Like the leveled lot and duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the subject of the
transaction in this case is both the lot and the house. That being the case, the
damages to the Blahds' house are purely economic and the Blahds' negligence
claims against the Smith Entities and Jones are barred by the economic loss rule.

Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300-301 (2005). There is no need for the
Defendants to be part of the sale of property in order for it to be the transaction relevant to the
lawsuit; for example, in Duffin, the Department of Agriculture was not involved in the purchase
of the seed potatoes (other than inspecting them), yet was still allowed to argue the economic
loss defense. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005 and 1008. As in Blahd, Tusch, Duffin, and Ramerth,
the subject of the transaction was the purchase of the defective property, i.e. Plaintiffs purchase
of the land at issue.
Finally, all of the damages alleged by Plaintiff are economic in the sense that they are
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costs of repair and replacement of the defective property, or are commercial loss or consequent
loss of profits or use. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, 97 Idaho at 351. With regard to the
houses located at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive, the damage was caused by the slope
movement (which was the defect that existed in the property at the time of purchase), and the
losses on these houses are the loss of increased property value (which are profits) and repair of
the properties. This is economic loss. With regard to the damages allegedly related to the
properties at 161 Marine View Drive, and 101- 107 Canyon Greens Court, none ofthese houses
have suffered any physical damage. All loss is loss of value, which constitutes commercial loss
or loss of profits/use, which is economic loss. Statement of Facts,~ 22. Finally, with regard to
Plaintiffs business damages, this also clearly is commercial loss (equivalent to lost crop yield in

Duffin), and is economic loss. Also see Just's v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 468
(1978) ("The damages claimed by the plaintiff, lost profits, are purely economic losses").
All of Plaintiffs damages are economic losses, and the Defendants had no duty to protect
against such losses. The defect was in the soil at the time Plaintiff purchased the property, and
there is no evidence that Defendants caused the defect to exist. The defect in the soil later caused
Plaintiffs damages, resulting in economic loss. See Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec.,

Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 171 (Idaho 2010) (explaining how economic loss worked in the context of
purchasing a defective airplane in Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194 (1999)). The exceptions to
the economic loss rule do not apply. There is no special relationship between the Defendants and
Plaintiff. The term "special relationship" "refers to those situations where the relationship
between the parties is such that it would be equitable to impose such a duty. In other words, there
is an extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence extends its protections to a
party's economic interest." Blaltd, 141 Idaho at 301 (quoting Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008). There
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1s no evidence that the Defendants were performing professional or "quasi-professional"
personal services to Plaintiff. See Blahd, 141 at 301; MeA/vain v. General Ins. Co., 97 Idaho
777, 780 (1976). The fact that City employees reviewed plat maps and other documents for

compliance with City code is no more a personal service than was the inspection of seed potatoes
by the Department of Agriculture in Duffin. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008. Similarly, the City does
not hold itself out as having expertise regarding a specialized function any more than did the
Department of Agriculture. Blahd, 141 Idaho at 3 01. The "unique circumstances exception" also
does not apply. As the Court stated in Blahd, "The purchase of a residential house is an everyday
occurrence and does not create the type of unique circumstances required to justify a different
allocation of risk, particularly where it appears there may be other defendants available to
respond in contract damages." Id. at 302. The same is true for the purchase of real property
without improvements on it. Therefore, there is no exception to the economic loss rule, and
Defendants request that the Court determine that Defendants had no duty toward Plaintiff with
regard to economic loss. As all of Plaintiff's damages are economic damages, Defendants
request that summary judgment be granted on all of Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants.
C.

DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TO REQUIRE THAT PLAINTIFF OBTAIN A
GEOTECHNICAL OR SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION.
A main issue in Plaintiff's claim of negligence is that the City failed to require that

Plaintiff obtain a geotechnical or slope stability analysis prior to approving the plat for Canyon
Greens, or during the construction process. This argument fails because there was no duty owed
by the City to require Plaintiff to take such steps before the plat was accepted or building permits
were issued. The current Lewiston City Code, with regard to subdivisions, does not contain any
language mandating that a slope stability or geotechnical analysis be completed during the
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subdivision process. The only language which relates to such requirements is as follows:

Sec. 32-9. Preapplication Conference.

(2) Actions by the city. The city will discuss the proposal with the subdivider and
advise him of procedural steps, design and improvement standards, and general
plat requirements. Then, depending upon the scope of the proposed development,
they will proceed with the following actions:

e. Review and discuss with the developer the potential need for special studies,
which may include but are not limited to traffic, soil, slope stability. wetlands,
foundations or other studies that may be required as a result of site conditions, and
the implications of the findings of those studies. if required. The requirement o(
said special studies shall be determined bv the city engineer.

Sec. 32-20. Information required for preliminary plat submittal.
(c) Existing conditions data.
(2)

Soils stability analysis when required by the city engineer.

Sec. 32-31. General.
(e) Where the tract to be subdivided is located in whole or in part in terrain having
an average slope exceeding ten (1 0) percent, design and development shall
conform to the findings of a suitability study as required by the city engineer.

Lewiston City Code, §§ 32-9, 32-20, and 32-31. As can be seen from these code sections, it is
purely within the discretion of the Lewiston City Engineer to require a slope stability or
geotechnical analysis.
Based on this language, the Defendants had no affirmative statutory or regulatory duty to
require Plaintiff to complete a slope stability or geotechnical analysis. Such decision is left to the
discretion of the City engineer and the developer (in this case Plaintiff). This conclusion is
further emphasized by the fact that in 1997, when the City revised the subdivision code, it took
out a significant amount of language requiring mandatory slope stability analysis. Statement of

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 11

Facts,~

5. This modification oflanguage shows a clear intent on the part of the City Council to

adopt a policy of giving City employees discretion to require such analyses.
With regard to the building permits, City Building Official John Smith has testified that
he can require certain soil stability analysis be done before issuing a building permit. Statement

of Facts,~ 14. However, that is limited to compaction testing under the footings. In this case, the
compaction testing was required, and was completed. Statement of Facts,~~ 14- 15. Therefore,
to the extent there was a duty to require certain soil analysis prior to construction, there is no
question of fact but that the Defendants complied with such duty by requiring compaction testing
be completed.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants request that the Court find that there was no duty to
require Plaintiff to obtain a slope stability or geotechnical analysis prior to approving the plat for
Canyon Greens or issuing the building permits, and grant summary judgment with regard to
these issues.

D.

PLAINTIFF CANNOT SHOW THAT ANY ACTION OR INACTION BY THE
CITY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES.
In order to be able to prevail on a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must prove all four

elements of a negligence claim, "(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to
conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage." Nation

v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007). "The issue of causation is usually a question of fact for the
jury." Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 831 (1997). However, it can become a
question of law when there is insufficient evidence to support an inference of causation. I d.
In this case, there is a deficiency in Plaintiff's ability to prove that the Defendants'

actions caused his damages. It is clear that the damage to the houses at 153, 155, and 159 Marine
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View Drive was caused by the slope movement. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl (dated July 13,
2010),

1 13.

There is no claim that any action or inaction by the Defendants caused direct

damage to the properties (for example, there is no claim that any City employee ran into one of
the houses with a tractor). All claims of negligence against the City are for failure to warn,
inspect, give notice, prevent someone else from action, or similar actions. Complaint,

1 55.

There is no evidence that any action or inaction by the City directly caused the slope movement.
As is described in Streibick's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs expert have not
provided any testimony as to what is the cause of the slope movement. Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment (dated June 7, 2010), pp. 6-8. Because Plaintiff has failed

to do an in depth geotechnical analysis of the property, it will be impossible to ascertain what is
the cause of the slope movement (and thus the cause ofthe damage to 153, 155, and 159 Marine
View Drive). Because it is impossible to know what caused the slope movement, no evidence
can be provided to the Court stating whether or not any action or inaction by the City would have
prevented future slope movement. It is inadmissible for Plaintiff to argue that he doesn't know
what was and is causing the slopes to fail, but in the same breath say that had the City required a
slope stability analysis, no damage to the houses would have occurred. Plaintiffs cause of
action for negligence against the City must fail because Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, prove
that the Defendant's actions or inactions caused his damages.
III.
IMMUNITY ARGUMENTS

When summary judgment is requested on the grounds of immunity under the Idaho Tort
Claims Act, the Supreme Court has specified a three step analysis.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment against a governmental entity
and its employees under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), this Court must
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engage in a three step analysis. First, we must determine whether tort recovery
is allowed under the laws of Idaho. This is essentially a determination of whether
there is such a tort under Idaho Law. Second, this Court determines if an
exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged misconduct from
liability. Finally, if no exception applies, [we examine] whether the merits ofthe
claim as presented for consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle
the moving party to dismissal.

Rees v. State, 143 Idaho 10, 14 - 15 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Defendants concede that negligence is a recognized tort in the state of Idaho, see, e.g, Nation v.

State, 144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007); Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 487 (1995), and therefore do
not address this first step of the analysis. With regard to the second step, Defendants contend that
immunity applies to all claims pursuant to LR.C.P. §§ 6-904(1) and (7), 6-904B(3) and (4).
A.

DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FOR ANY CLAIM OF DAMAGE RESULTING
FROM THE ACCEPTANCE AND DESIGN OF SUBDIVISION PLAT MAPS
RELATING TO SUNSET PALISADES NO. 4, SUNSET PALISADES NO. 8,
CANYON GREENS, OR CANYON GREENS II.
Defendants are immune for claims arising out of
a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets,
bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is prepared in
substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in effect at the time
of preparation of the plan or design or approved in advance of the construction by
the legislative body of the governmental entity or by some other body or
administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give such approval

L C. § 6-904(7). There is no claim that the City was acting with malice or criminal intent, so
these exceptions do not apply. Complaint,

~

57. This language is interpreted to be broken into

two separate parts:
The addition by the legislature of the word "or" to I.C. § 6-904(7) clearly
indicates that immunity is available under the provision if the governmental entity
shows substantial conformance or advance approval. Therefore, under I.C. § 6904(7) as amended, the City was required to establish (1) the existence of a plan
or design that was (2) either prepared in substantial conformance with existing
engineering or design standards or approved in advance of construction by the
legislative or administrative authority.
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Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 459 (1994). Defendants claim that immunity applies
under both ofthe "substantial conformance" and "advance approval" elements of this statute.
With regard to the "substantial conformance" portion of the immunity, a brief
background of the property is helpful. This property has been subdivided up to four times.
Originally, it was titled Block 3 of Sunset Palisades No.4. Statement of Facts, 11 1, 6. In 2005,
it was resubdivided by Streibick as Sunset Palisades No. 8. Statement of Facts,

1 6. When

Plaintiff purchased the property, he subdivided the largest single lot in Sunset Palisades No. 8
into three lots (later designated 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Dr.), and called the subdivision
Canyon Greens. Statement of Facts,

1 11.

Plaintiff then subdivided the remaining three lots of

Sunset Palisades No. 8 into eight lots, calling the subdivision Canyon Greens II. Statement of

Facts, 121. At each of these subdivisions, a stamped, engineered subdivision plat was submitted
to the City, including roads, sewage lines and easements, storm drain lines and easements, and
other public property. See Statement of Facts,

11 1, 7, 12, 21. All of Plaintiffs claims against

Defendants arise out of the acceptance of these plat maps, allowing subdivision of the property.
The only way Plaintiff can avoid this immunity is by arguing that the plat maps were not
prepared in substantial conformance with design or engineering standards. However, Plaintiff
cannot do this, as the entity who prepared the plat maps for Sunset Palisades No. 8, Canyon
Greens, and Canyon Greens II is Plaintiffs engineering expert, Eric Hasenoerhl. Statement of

Facts,

11 6 -

7, 11 - 12. If Plaintiff alleges that Sunset Palisades No. 8 and Canyon Greens

subdivision plat maps are not prepared in substantial conformance with design and engineering
standards, he essentially admits that he (and his engineer) failed to comply with the standard of
care owed.
Second, with regard to the "advance approval" element of this immunity, there is no
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question but that every plat map and building permit was approved in advance by the person at
the City who had authority to approve such documents. In fact, each plat map must be signed and
approved by the City engineer, the City clerk, the County Treasurer, the City surveyor, and the
County sanitarian. Statement of Facts,,, 7, 12. There is no allegation that these persons do not
have authority to give such approval. Ultimately, each plat must be and was approved by the City
Council, as well. See Statement of Facts,~ 7, 12, 21. See also Lewiston City Code§§ 32-18 and
32-19 (requiring City Council approval of preliminary and final plats). The fact that each of
these plat maps was approved, and the property later subdivided, shows that the City Council did
review and approve the plan in advance. Therefore, immunity is applicable under this section.
Defendants contend that this immunity applies to all claims arising out of the plan or
design for construction of public property, including the streets and City rights of way included
on these maps. Defendants contend that this would include all damage to the properties related to
slope movement, as it affects all of the City easements included on the various subdivision plats.
Further, this immunity specifically includes all claims relating to or arising from placement of
storm water improvements, detention ponds, fill or retaining walls crossing City rights-or-way,
streets, or other improvements.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants contend that summary judgment is appropriate on all
of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to I. C. § 6-904(7).
B.

DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FOR ANY CLAIM OF DAMAGE RESULTING
FROM FAILURE TO REQUIRE A SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS, AS SUCH
DECISION RESULTED FROM A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION OF CITY
EMPLOYEES.
Defendants are immune for claims arising out of
any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity exerc1smg
ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a statutory or
regulatory function, whether or not the statute or regulation be valid, or based
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upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee
thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused

LC. § 6-904(1). As stated above, there is no claim for malice or criminal intent, and thus these
exceptions do not apply.
In order for an act to be immune under the discretionary function theory, the act must be
discretionary, and must be a planning or policy formation decision. See Dorea Enters. v. City of

Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 425 (2007). There are a number of discretionary decisions which
affected this case, and allow the immunity to apply. First, in 1997, the City of Lewiston enacted
Lewiston City Ordinance 4177, which significantly revised the Lewiston subdivision code.

Statement of Facts, ,-r 5. This revision took out all language mandatorily requiring that slope
stability or other geotechnical analysis be completed. All that remains in the Lewiston
subdivision code discussing slope stability studies is contained in §§ 32-9 and 32-20, discussed
above. These sections clearly give discretion to the City engineer to determine whether a slope
stability analysis is necessary. Based on these changes to the Lewiston City Code, a policy shift
occurred whereby mandatory slope stability analysis was no longer required. Plaintiffs experts
repeatedly state that the City does not often require slope stability analysis. There is no evidence
that the City Council did not exercise ordinary care when passing Ordinance 4177, and therefore,
it was policy based discretionary act by the City Council.
Second, the decision of the City engineer to not require a slope stability analysis itself
was a discretionary decision. As discussed above, the City engineer had the discretion to
determine whether or not to require a slope stability or other geotechnical analysis during the
subdivision process.
Third, the City has a policy of not doing the background research for a developer when
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an application is made to open a subdivision file. Similarly, the City does not move documents
from old files into new files when a new subdivision file is created. See Statement of Facts,~ 13.
In fact, the City, in its role as a records repository, does not take steps to ensure that every City
employee is aware of every document in every file that is relevant to a subdivision process.
Information stored in City files is available for use by the developer or the engineer working on a
project to inspect the information. 6 Plaintiff himself took the opportunity to inspect the files in
June, 2009, see

Complaint,~

23, but for some unexplained reason, neither he nor his engineers,

surveyors, or other agents ever took the time to look at available City records. Statement of

Facts,

~

9. It is clearly within the City's discretion to determine how much time, effort, and

personnel it wishes to utilize in doing background research on a property. In this and in all cases,
the City has made the decision that instead of acting as a source of all knowledge regarding the
conditions of a property, it retains information about properties in files open to the public and
available for review. See Redenbaugh Deposition, pp. 36:2 - 36:23. See also I.C. § 9-337, et

seq. This policy determination meant that in this case, Plaintiff had the opportunity and
obligation to search through City files prior to working on the property, and the City had no duty
or obligation to do that search for him. Because the files were available for public review, the
City did not have to expend the manpower resources, budgetary resources, or training resources
of searching through publicly available City files.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the City IS Immune for all claims pursuant to the
discretionary function immunity.
C.

DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FOR ANY CLAIM OF DAMAGE ARISING OUT
OF ISSUING BUILDING PERMITS, APPROVING SUBDIVISION PLATS, OR
MAKING OR FAILING TO MAKE INSPECTIONS.
This information is subject to the open records laws of the State ofldaho, and the only preliminary step that
is required prior to examining such information is to fill out a public records request. LC. § 9-337, et seq.
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Defendants are immune for any claim which
3.
Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate,
approval, order or similar authorization.
4.
Arises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an
inadequate inspection of any property, real or personal, other than the property of
the governmental entity performing the inspection.
I. C. § 6-904B. This immunity language is broad enough to cover any claims of negligence which

are based on issuance of building or other permits, approving subdivision plats, and inspecting or
not inspecting the property at issue. This would cover each of the claims of negligence included
in the Complaint against the Defendants. See

Complaint,~

55. This immunity does not apply if

the Defendants acted with reckless, willful, and wanton conduct, or with gross negligence. I. C. §
6-904B. These terms are statutorily defined. J.C. § 6-904C.
As a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendants acted with gross negligence
or reckless, willful and wanton conduct. In order to establish gross negligence, Plaintiff will have
to show that Defendants did or failed to do
an act which a reasonable person in a similar situation and of similar
responsibility would, with a minimum of contemplation, be inescapably drawn to
recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and that failing that duty shows
deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others.
I.C. § 6-904C(l). As discussed above, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants had any duty to

search through public records on Plaintiffs behalf, or mandatorily require that Plaintiff obtain a
soil stability or geotechnical analysis on the defective property at issue. There is no issue of fact
that a city or its employees is not "inescapably dravvn to recognize a duty" to do something that
Plaintiff could and should have done for himself, such as doing due diligence on a property.
In order to establish reckless, willful and wanton conduct, Plaintiff will have to show that
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the Defendants "knowingly [did] or fail[ ed] to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to
another, and which involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result." LC. § 6904C(2). As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence connecting the City's
actions with the slope movement and the economic loss Plaintiff has suffered. In order for there
to be a "high degree of probability" that the slope movement would cause damage to Plaintiffs
property, it would be necessary to know at a minimum what was causing the slope movement.
Unless it is known what was causing the slope movement, it is impossible to determine that any
action or inaction by the Defendants involves a high degree of probability that any harm would
result. Further, it is impossible to show that the issuance of building permits, approving plats,
inspecting or failing to inspect the property resulted in slope movement which damaged the
houses. As discussed above, that defect was in the ground when Plaintiff bought the property.
Until an in depth geotechnical survey is done, it cannot be known whether compacting
foundations, building houses, digging pools, and installing retaining walls would have stabilized
the property or not. Because no one knows what is causing the slope movement, know one can
say whether in 2006 and 2007, when the City actions/inactions occurred regarding subdivision
and construction, there was a high degree of probability that any damage would result.
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show, as a matter of law, that there was any reckless, willful and
wanton conduct.
IV.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Pursuant to I.C. § 6-911, Plaintiffs claims against the city are "forever barred, unless an
action is begun within two (2) years after the date the claim arose or reasonably should have
been discovered, whichever is later." Plaintiff has failed to meet the required statute of
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limitations.
According to the Complaint, Defendants' negligent acts all related to acts done before
Plaintiff owned the property, or are related to the approval of subdivision plats and issuance of
building permits. Complaint, ,-r 55. All of this was completed prior to May, 2007. Complaint, ,-r,-r
14 - 16. With regard to the allegedly negligent acts performed by the Defendants prior to
Plaintiff's purchase of the property, liability is barred by the statute of limitations. With regard to
allegedly negligent acts committed by the Defendants after Plaintiff purchased the property, the
Complaint was not filed until October 22, 2009. Under the circumstances of this case, where
Plaintiff purchased a property with a defect in it, his damages arose immediately. Therefore,
under Plaintiffs theory of the case, where the City should not have issued permits or approved
plats, such claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
There is no question but that Plaintiff was or reasonably should have been aware of the
City's involvement prior to October, 2007. He admits that prior to construction, he knew that fill
had been placed on the properties. Statement of Facts, ,-r 15. Plaintiff knew, at a minimum, that
the property had previously been subdivided, and that the City retained records that had been
provided to it related to such subdivisions. Plaintiff knew that the City had been involved in his
own construction and subdivision process. None of the documents that Plaintiff is alleging that
the City failed to tell him about were concealed from him. They were available for him to
review, free of cost, pursuant to the Idaho Public Record laws, J.C. § 9-337, et seq., and he
simply didn't go look. Particularly where the City has no policy of history of doing background
research on properties for developers, it is reasonable for a developer or his engineer to do his
own research.
Based on the foregoing, all of Plaintiffs claims against the City are barred by the statute
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of limitations outlined in I C. § 6-911.

v.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants City of Lewiston and Lowell Cutshaw request that
summary judgment be entered, and all claims against them be dismissed.
DATED this

L(

day of June, 2011.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

LLP

Brian K. Julian, Of the Firm
Attorneys for City of Lewiston and
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 22

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of June, 2011, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Ronald J. Landeck
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue
P. 0. Box 9344
Moscow, Idaho 83843
Telephone: (208) 883-1505
Facsimile: (208) 883-4593

[ >:']
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

[ Y]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Clinton 0. Casey
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN &
KING, LLP.
1423 Tyrell Lane
P.O. Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Telephone: (208) 344-8035
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212

Attorneys for Defendant Jack J Streibick

Brian K. Julian

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 23

ODI('
llJ
I\

Brian K. Julian, ISB No. 2360
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Attorneys for Defendants City of Lewiston and
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Case No. CV 09-02219
Plaintiff,
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick,
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a
municipal corporation of the State of
Idaho, and its employee LOWELL J.
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer,
and DOES 1 - 20,
Defendants.

COME NOW, the above-entitled Defendants, City of Lewiston and Lowell J.
Cutshaw, by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, and
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L

hereby submit this Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, submit this Motion for Summary Judgment. This Motion
for Summary Judgment is made on the grounds more fully stated in Defendants'
Memorandum in Support, which include that Defendants are immune for liability
from Mr. Block's claims pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act, and Plaintiff cannot
establish negligence as Plaintiff cannot either a duty or causation.
This Motion is supported by the pleadings on file, and by the following
documents submitted contemporaneously herewith:
1.

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

2.

Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

3.

Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment.
4.

Affidavit of Kari

Ravencroft in support of Motion for Summary

Judgment.
DATED this L L\, day of June, 2011.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

LLP

Brian K. Julian, Of the Firm
Attorneys for City of Lewiston and
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer
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Clinton 0. Casey
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Brian K. Julian, ISB No. 2360
Stephen L. Adams, ISB No. 7534
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83 707-7 426
Telephone:
(208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
bjulian@ajhlaw.com
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Attorneys for Defendants City of Lewiston and
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Case No. CV 09-02219
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK as Personal Representative ofthe
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY
OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the
State ofldaho, and its employee LOWELL J.
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and
DOES 1-20,
Defendants.

COME NOW, the above-entitled Defendants, City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw,
by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, and hereby submit this
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I.
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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff John Block is suing the City of Lewiston for negligence related to the
construction of homes within the Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens II subdivisions. The three
homes in Canyon Greens, located at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive, were allegedly
damaged as a result of slope movement which occurred on or near those properties. The
remaining houses have not experienced any structural damage, but Plaintiff is seeking monetary
damages related to those properties due to decrease in value. Plaintiff is seeking also lost
business income damages as a result of the claims outlined in his Complaint. The two causes of
action in the Complaint which are directed against the City are both based in negligence. See
Complaint,

~~

54

57. Paragraph 55 of the Complaint lists 11 actions or omissions by the City

and City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw which allegedly resulted in a breach of a duty owed to
Plaintiff, and Paragraph 57 alleges that these negligent acts were grossly negligent.
Defendants City and Cutshaw (collectively referred to as "Defendants") contend that they
are entitled to summary judgment on a number of grounds. First, a number of the allegedly
wrongful acts by the City occurred before Plaintiff owned the property, and the City and its
employees have no duty to all future property owners of a property to act in any specific way.
Second, the Defendants had no tort duty to protect against purely economic loss, which
encompasses all of Plaintiff's damages. Third, Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendants had any
duty to mandatorily require that he obtain a slope stability or other geotechnical analysis prior to
construction on the properties at issue. Fourth, Plaintiff cannot show that any action or inaction
of the Defendants caused slope movement and any additional economic loss resulting therefrom.
Fifth, the Defendants are immune from all of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to I.C. §§ 6-904(1), 6904(7), 6-904B(3), and 6-904B(4). Each of these issues will be discussed in more detail below.
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II.
NEGLIGENCE ARGUMENTS
A.

DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TOWARD PLAINTIFF WITH REGARD TO
THE PROPERTIES AT ISSUE PRIOR TO HIM PURCHASING THE
PROPERTY.

Plaintiff's allegations of negligence by the Defendants include the following:

(iii)

failing to require that such earth movement in the area of 153, 155, and 159 be
eliminated or properly abated by Streibick and/or Others prior to Block's
purchase of the Property;

(iv)

failing to prevent Streibick from developing and selling 153, 155, and 159 to
Block without notice and/or warning to Block that such earth movement had
occurred in 1999 or without having eliminated or properly abated such earth
movement;

(v)

failing to require Streibick to complete the required storm water improvements in
1994 for Palisades No. 4 subdivision and approving and allowing Streibick's
construction of a storm water detention pond within the area of 153 where the
City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others knew earth movement had occurred in
1999, thereby contributing to the instability of soil in that area;

(ix)

failing to require and/or compel Streibick to eliminate or properly abate the
dangerous condition caused by and/or existing as a result of such earth movement
in the area of 153, 155 and 159;

(x)

failing to supervise Streibick's development activities within the area of 153, 155,
and 159 between 1999 and 2006 thereby allowing concealment of such earth
movement and the creation of a dangerous condition and risk of harm; and

(xi)

failing to inspect and/or make an inadequate inspection of Streibick's
development activities within the area of 153, 155, and 159 between 1999 and
2006 thereby allowing concealment of such earth movement and the creation of a
dangerous condition and risk of harm.

Complaint,~

55. Plaintiff purchased the property in or around December, 2005. Complaint,

~

13. Defendants contend that each of these allegations above concern acts or omissions prior to
Plaintiff purchasing the property. Ignoring the issues of whether the City actually had a duty to
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anyone at the times mentioned as Plaintiff alleges, Defendants contend that they had no duty to
Plaintiff with regard to the acts or omissions alleged.
The existence of a duty is a question of law. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247
(1999). "No liability arises from the law of torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the
plaintiff." Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389 (2001). Numerous Idaho cases have made
it clear that a party cannot recover from a governmental entity for failure to perform a duty owed
to the public at large. "[I]fthe duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty
to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a
public, not an individual, injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public
prosecution." Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Idaho 351, 359 (1943). See also Worden v. Witt, 4
Idaho 404, 406 - 07 (1895).
Generally, a person has no common law duty to prevent a third person from
injuring another unless there is some kind of special relationship. Applying this
principle to governmental torts in what is called the "public duty rule" requires
that a governmental unit owe the plaintiff a duty different from that owed to the
general public in order for the governmental unit to be found liable.

Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Minn. 2005) (cited in Rees v. State, 143
Idaho 10, 16 (2006). In Udy v. Custer County, the plaintiff argued that a sheriff who saw rocks
lying on a road (which later caused a motor vehicle accident) had a duty to clear the rocks or
give notice to someone to move them. Udy, 136 Idaho at 389. The Idaho Supreme Court stated
Udy's claims are in reality claims for negligent police protection for which there
can be no recovery absent a special relationship with the victim. Here, the record
does not establish, nor does Udy argue that he or his passengers were in a special
relationship with Sheriff Roskelley. Thus, the fact that Udy's accident may have
been prevented through reasonable law enforcement actions is insufficient to
establish a duty to the Appellants or otherwise form the basis for Sheriff
Roskelley's liability in tort.

Udy, 136 Idaho at 391. In other words, absent a special relationship, there was no duty owed to
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the plaintiff just because there may have been a duty to the public at large.
The same is true in this case. Before Plaintiff owned the property at issue, there was no
duty owed by the City to him specifically with regard to the property. Similarly, there was no
special relationship between the Defendants and Plaintiff related to this property, as the property
was owned by Streibick. Until Plaintiff owned the property, the Defendants had no more duty to
him than it did to any other member of the public as regarding this property. Therefore, Plaintiff
should not be allowed to recover damages related to the actions/omissions discussed above, and
summary judgment should be granted to the Defendants on these claims. Further, should this
case proceed to trial, Plaintiff should not be allowed to use evidence of these claims as evidence
that the City was negligent after Plaintiff purchased the property, and should be prevented from
submitting evidence that these claims are a basis for his damages.
B.

BECAUSE ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES IN THIS CASE ARE ECONOMIC
LOSSES, DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TO PREVENT THE OCCURRENCE
OF SUCH DAMAGES.
All of Plaintiff's damages in this case constitute economic damages, including repair and

lost value on the homes at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive, lost business damages, and lost
value on six of the eight homes that were designated part of Canyon Greens II (none of which
had any physical damage related to slope movement). See Statement of Facts,~ 22. With limited
exception, economic losses are not recoverable in negligence actions. Duffin v. Idaho Crop

Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007 (1995). See also Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman
Elec., Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 170 (Idaho 2010) ("The economic loss rule applies to negligence cases
in general; its application is not restricted to products liability cases.").
With regard to the definition of economic loss, the Supreme Court has stated that
"Economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the
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subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of
profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351
(1975). This definition has been followed by a majority of cases addressing economic loss. 1
Based on this definition, in order for there to be economic loss, there has to be defective property
which is the subject of the transaction at issue in the lawsuit. See Brian & Christie, Inc. v.
Leishman Elec., Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 171 (Idaho 2010). This can apply to cases "involving the

purchase of defective personal property and real property." I d. at 170.
There are a number of cases addressing economic loss which parallel the facts of this
case. In Tusclt Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37 (1987), the plaintiff purchased duplexes, and
found after purchase that the foundation on the properties was cracking. Id. at 40. The Court
stated that "The structural defects have caused damage to the duplexes themselves and to the
parking lot, and have caused losses in rental income, but Tusch Enterprises has suffered no
personal injuries and has suffered no damage to property other than that which was the subject of
the duplex sales transaction." Id. The Court then barred recovery of these damages, stating "the
only damages it alleges are lost rental income and property damage to the duplexes and the
parking lot. These losses are economic." Id.
A similar result was reached in Duffin. In Duffin, the plaintiffs purchased seed potatoes
which allegedly were infected with bacterial ring rot, despite having been inspected by the
Department of Agriculture. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005. The Department of Agriculture argued
that recovery was barred because the Department had no duty to protect against economic loss of

See Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007 (1995); Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113
Idaho 37, 41 (1987); Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300 (2005); Ramerth v. Hart, 133
Idaho 194, 196 (1999); Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., 147 Idaho 785, 790 (2009). Cf Brian & Christie, Inc.
v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 170 (Idaho 2010) (holding that the definition provided of economic
loss in the Salmon Rivers case does not apply to claims for economic loss related to services, as opposed to
defective property).
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the plaintiffs. /d. at 1006. The Court found that the losses related to the use ofthe infected seed
potatoes was economic, and not recoverable. ld. at 1007. The Court then went on to address the
various exceptions to the economic loss rule, and found that none were applicable. /d. at 1007
08.
In this case, there is clearly a defective property at issue. In the Complaint, Plaintiff
clearly acknowledges that the property he purchased had suffered slope movement prior to his
purchase, and that the property was subject to future slope movement.

Complaint,~

even refers to the condition of the property as a "Defective Condition". Complaint,

25. Plaintiff
~~

29 - 41.

This is the same as purchasing diseased seed potatoes 2, duplexes which had been built on fill and
4
which had cracks in the foundation3 , houses built on soil subject to settlement , or defective

roofing materials. 5 Because the property allegedly had a "defective condition" when Plaintiff
purchased it, this meets the "defective property" requirement of the Salmon Rivers definition of
economic loss.
The remainder of the Salmon Rivers definition also is met. The defective property at
issue (the lots purchased by Plaintiff from Streibick) are clearly the subject of the transaction
between Block and Streibick, and are the subject transaction in this case. Complaint,

~

11. In

Blahd, the Court engages in a lengthy discussion of what the "subject of the transaction" is,
stating
In Tusch Enterprises, a seller hired a contractor to level a hill to prepare the area
for construction. The seller participated in the site preparation, hired a builder to
construct a duplex on the site and sold the duplex to a buyer. The buyer then
discovered the duplex was damaged because the foundation was defective. The

See Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005.
See Tusch Enters., 113 Idaho at 40.
4

See Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 299 (2005).
See State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336 (1984).
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buyer sued the seller and the builder alleging negligence in preparing the
foundation. This Court held the economic loss rule barred the negligence claims
because the damage to the duplex caused by the defective foundation was purely
economic. This Court later explained in another case that it "considered the
duplex itself, rather than its construction, to be the subject of the transaction."
In Ramerth, an airplane owner sued a repairman alleging the repairman's
negligent servicing and inspection of the airplane caused damage to the engine
and aircraft. The airplane owner argued the economic loss rule did not bar his
negligence claim because the subject of the transaction was the repairman's
services, not the engine or airplane that was serviced. This Court rejected that
argument and held the damage to the engine and the aircraft were purely
economic and therefore, subject to the economic loss rule. These cases indicate
the word "transaction," for purposes of the economic loss rule, does not mean a
business deal--it means the subject of the lawsuit.
Like the duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the Blahds' house is damaged because the
foundation is settling. The damage to the Blahds' house is similar to the duplex
damage in Tusch Enterprises, where this Court held the losses were economic.
The Blahds seek to distinguish their case by noting the buyer in Tusch Enterprises
did not sue the contractor who leveled the lot and did not allege the property had
been leveled negligently. The fact that the buyer in Tusch Enterprises only sued
the builder and the seller is immaterial. It is the subject of the transaction that
determines whether a loss is property damage or economic loss, not the status of
the party being sued. The Blahds purchased the house and lot as an integrated
whole. Like the leveled lot and duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the subject of the
transaction in this case is both the lot and the house. That being the case, the
damages to the Blahds' house are purely economic and the Blahds' negligence
claims against the Smith Entities and Jones are barred by the economic loss rule.
Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300-301 (2005). There is no need for the

Defendants to be part of the sale of property in order for it to be the transaction relevant to the
lawsuit; for example, in Duffin, the Department of Agriculture was not involved in the purchase
of the seed potatoes (other than inspecting them), yet was still allowed to argue the economic
loss defense. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005 and 1008. As in Blahd, Tusch, Duffin, and Ramerth,
the subject ofthe transaction was the purchase of the defective property, i.e. Plaintiffs purchase
of the land at issue.
Finally, all of the damages alleged by Plaintiff are economic in the sense that they are
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costs of repair and replacement of the defective property, or are commercial loss or consequent
loss of profits or use. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, 97 Idaho at 351. With regard to the
houses located at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive, the damage was caused by the slope
movement (which was the defect that existed in the property at the time of purchase), and the
losses on these houses are the loss of increased property value (which are profits) and repair of
the properties. This is economic loss. With regard to the damages allegedly related to the
properties at 161 Marine View Drive, and 101- 107 Canyon Greens Court, none ofthese houses
have suffered any physical damage. All loss is loss of value, which constitutes commercial loss
or loss of profits/use, which is economic loss. Statement of Facts,

~

22. Finally, with regard to

Plaintiffs business damages, this also clearly is commercial loss (equivalent to lost crop yield in

Duffin), and is economic loss. Also see Just's v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 468
(1978) ("The damages claimed by the plaintiff, lost profits, are purely economic losses").
All of Plaintiffs damages are economic losses, and the Defendants had no duty to protect
against such losses. The defect was in the soil at the time Plaintiff purchased the property, and
there is no evidence that Defendants caused the defect to exist. The defect in the soil later caused
Plaintiffs damages, resulting in economic loss. See Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec.,

Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 171 (Idaho 2010) (explaining how economic loss worked in the context of
purchasing a defective airplane in Ramertlt v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194 (1999)). The exceptions to
the economic loss rule do not apply. There is no special relationship between the Defendants and
Plaintiff. The term "special relationship" "refers to those situations where the relationship
between the parties is such that it would be equitable to impose such a duty. In other words, there
is an extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence extends its protections to a
party's economic interest." Blaltd, 141 Idaho at 301 (quoting Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008). There
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is no evidence that the Defendants were performing professional or "quasi-professional"
personal services to Plaintiff. See Blahd, 141 at 301; MeA/vain v. General Ins. Co., 97 Idaho
777, 780 (1976). The fact that City employees reviewed plat maps and other documents for
compliance with City code is no more a personal service than was the inspection of seed potatoes
by the Department of Agriculture in Duffin. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008. Similarly, the City does
not hold itself out as having expertise regarding a specialized function any more than did the
Department of Agriculture. Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301. The "unique circumstances exception" also
does not apply. As the Court stated in Blahd, "The purchase of a residential house is an everyday
occurrence and does not create the type of unique circumstances required to justify a different
allocation of risk, particularly where it appears there may be other defendants available to
respond in contract damages." ld. at 302. The same is true for the purchase of real property
without improvements on it. Therefore, there is no exception to the economic loss rule, and
Defendants request that the Court determine that Defendants had no duty toward Plaintiff with
regard to economic loss. As all of Plaintiffs damages are economic damages, Defendants
request that summary judgment be granted on all of Plaintiffs claims against the Defendants.
C.

DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TO REQUIRE THAT PLAINTIFF OBTAIN A
GEOTECHNICAL OR SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION.
A main issue in Plaintiffs claim of negligence is that the City failed to require that

Plaintiff obtain a geotechnical or slope stability analysis prior to approving the plat for Canyon
Greens, or during the construction process. This argument fails because there was no duty owed
by the City to require Plaintiff to take such steps before the plat was accepted or building permits
were issued. The current Lewiston City Code, with regard to subdivisions, does not contain any
language mandating that a slope stability or geotechnical analysis be completed during the
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subdivision process. The only language which relates to such requirements is as follows:

Sec. 32-9. Preapplication Conference.

(2) Actions by the city. The city will discuss the proposal with the subdivider and
advise him of procedural steps, design and improvement standards, and general
plat requirements. Then, depending upon the scope of the proposed development,
they will proceed with the following actions:

e. Review and discuss with the developer the potential need for special studies,
which may include but are not limited to traffic, soil, slope stability. wetlands,
foundations or other studies that may be required as a result of site conditions, and
the implications of the findings of those studies, if required. The requirement of
said special studies shall be determined by the city engineer.

Sec. 32-20. Information required for preliminary plat submittal.
(c) Existing conditions data.
(2)

Soils stability analysis when required by the city engineer.

Sec. 32-31. General.
(e) Where the tract to be subdivided is located in whole or in part in terrain having
an average slope exceeding ten (1 0) percent, design and development shall
conform to the findings of a suitability study as required by the city engineer.

Lewiston City Code, §§ 32-9, 32-20, and 32-31. As can be seen from these code sections, it is
purely within the discretion of the Lewiston City Engineer to require a slope stability or
geotechnical analysis.
Based on this language, the Defendants had no affirmative statutory or regulatory duty to
require Plaintiff to complete a slope stability or geotechnical analysis. Such decision is left to the
discretion of the City engineer and the developer (in this case Plaintiff). This conclusion is
further emphasized by the fact that in 1997, when the City revised the subdivision code, it took
out a significant amount of language requiring mandatory slope stability analysis. Statement of
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Facts,~

5. This modification of language shows a clear intent on the part of the City Council to

adopt a policy of giving City employees discretion to require such analyses.
With regard to the building permits, City Building Official John Smith has testified that
he can require certain soil stability analysis be done before issuing a building permit. Statement

of Facts,, 14. However, that is limited to compaction testing under the footings. In this case, the
compaction testing was required, and was completed. Statement of Facts,,, 14- 15. Therefore,
to the extent there was a duty to require certain soil analysis prior to construction, there is no
question of fact but that the Defendants complied with such duty by requiring compaction testing
be completed.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants request that the Court find that there was no duty to
require Plaintiff to obtain a slope stability or geotechnical analysis prior to approving the plat for
Canyon Greens or issuing the building permits, and grant summary judgment with regard to
these issues.
D.

PLAINTIFF CANNOT SHOW THAT ANY ACTION OR INACTION BY THE
CITY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES.
In order to be able to prevail on a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must prove all four

elements of a negligence claim, "(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to
conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage." Nation

v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007). "The issue of causation is usually a question of fact for the
jury." Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 831 (1997). However, it can become a
question of law when there is insufficient evidence to support an inference of causation. /d.
In this case, there is a deficiency in Plaintiff's ability to prove that the Defendants'
actions caused his damages. It is clear that the damage to the houses at 153, 155, and 159 Marine
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View Drive was caused by the slope movement. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl (dated July 13,
201 0), , 13. There is no claim that any action or inaction by the Defendants caused direct
damage to the properties (for example, there is no claim that any City employee ran into one of
the houses with a tractor). All claims of negligence against the City are for failure to warn,
inspect, give notice, prevent someone else from action, or similar actions. Complaint, , 55.
There is no evidence that any action or inaction by the City directly caused the slope movement.
As is described in Streibick's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs expert have not
provided any testimony as to what is the cause of the slope movement. Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment (dated June 7, 2010), pp. 6- 8. Because Plaintiff has failed
to do an in depth geotechnical analysis of the property, it will be impossible to ascertain what is
the cause of the slope movement (and thus the cause ofthe damage to 153, 155, and 159 Marine
View Drive). Because it is impossible to know what caused the slope movement, no evidence
can be provided to the Court stating whether or not any action or inaction by the City would have
prevented future slope movement. It is inadmissible for Plaintiff to argue that he doesn't know
what was and is causing the slopes to fail, but in the same breath say that had the City required a
slope stability analysis, no damage to the houses would have occurred. Plaintiff's cause of
action for negligence against the City must fail because Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, prove
that the Defendant's actions or inactions caused his damages.
III.
IMMUNITY ARGUMENTS

When summary judgment is requested on the grounds of immunity under the Idaho Tort
Claims Act, the Supreme Court has specified a three step analysis.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment against a governmental entity
and its employees under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), this Court must
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engage in a three step analysis. First, we must determine whether tort recovery
is allowed under the laws of Idaho. This is essentially a determination of whether
there is such a tort under Idaho Law. Second, this Court determines if an
exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged misconduct from
liability. Finally, if no exception applies, [we examine] whether the merits of the
claim as presented for consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle
the moving party to dismissal.
Rees v. State, 143 Idaho 10, 14- 15 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Defendants concede that negligence is a recognized tort in the state of Idaho, see, e.g, Nation v.
State, 144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007); Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484,487 (1995), and therefore do

not address this first step of the analysis. With regard to the second step, Defendants contend that
immunity applies to all claims pursuant to LR.C.P. §§ 6-904(1) and (7), 6-904B(3) and (4).
A.

DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FOR ANY CLAIM OF DAMAGE RESULTING
FROM THE ACCEPTANCE AND DESIGN OF SUBDIVISION PLAT MAPS
RELATING TO SUNSET PALISADES NO. 4, SUNSET PALISADES NO. 8,
CANYON GREENS, OR CANYON GREENS II.
Defendants are immune for claims arising out of
a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets,
bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is prepared in
substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in effect at the time
of preparation of the plan or design or approved in advance of the construction by
the legislative body of the governmental entity or by some other body or
administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give such approval

LC. § 6-904(7). There is no claim that the City was acting with malice or criminal intent, so

these exceptions do not apply. Complaint,

'I!

57. This language is interpreted to be broken into

two separate parts:
The addition by the legislature of the word "or" to I.C. § 6-904(7) clearly
indicates that immunity is available under the provision if the governmental entity
shows substantial conformance or advance approval. Therefore, under I.C. § 6904(7) as amended, the City was required to establish (1) the existence of a plan
or design that was (2) either prepared in substantial confonnance with existing
engineering or design standards or approved in advance of construction by the
legislative or administrative authority.
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Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 459 (1994). Defendants claim that immunity applies
under both of the "substantial conformance" and "advance approval" elements of this statute.
With regard to the "substantial conformance" portion of the immunity, a brief
background of the property is helpful. This property has been subdivided up to four times.
Originally, it was titled Block 3 of Sunset Palisades No.4. Statement of Facts,~~ 1, 6. In 2005,
it was resubdivided by Streibick as Sunset Palisades No. 8. Statement of Facts,

~

6. When

Plaintiff purchased the property, he subdivided the largest single lot in Sunset Palisades No. 8
into three lots (later designated 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Dr.), and called the subdivision
Canyon Greens. Statement of Facts,

~

11. Plaintiff then subdivided the remaining three lots of

Sunset Palisades No. 8 into eight lots, calling the subdivision Canyon Greens II. Statement of

Facts,

~

21. At each of these subdivisions, a stamped, engineered subdivision plat was submitted

to the City, including roads, sewage lines and easements, storm drain lines and easements, and
other public property. See Statement of Facts,

~~

1, 7, 12, 21. All of Plaintiffs claims against

Defendants arise out of the acceptance of these plat maps, allowing subdivision of the property.
The only way Plaintiff can avoid this immunity is by arguing that the plat maps were not
prepared in substantial conformance with design or engineering standards. However, Plaintiff
cannot do this, as the entity who prepared the plat maps for Sunset Palisades No. 8, Canyon
Greens, and Canyon Greens II is Plaintiffs engineering expert, Eric Hasenoerhl. Statement of

Facts,

~~

6 - 7, 11 - 12. If Plaintiff alleges that Sunset Palisades No. 8 and Canyon Greens

subdivision plat maps are not prepared in substantial conformance with design and engineering
standards, he essentially admits that he (and his engineer) failed to comply with the standard of
care owed.
Second, with regard to the "advance approval" element of this immunity, there is no
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question but that every plat map and building permit was approved in advance by the person at
the City who had authority to approve such documents. In fact, each plat map must be signed and
approved by the City engineer, the City clerk, the County Treasurer, the City surveyor, and the
County sanitarian. Statement of Facts,~,-[ 7, 12. There is no allegation that these persons do not
have authority to give such approval. Ultimately, each plat must be and was approved by the City
Council, as well. See Statement of Facts,,-[ 7, 12, 21. See also Lewiston City Code§§ 32-18 and
32-19 (requiring City Council approval of preliminary and final plats). The fact that each of
these plat maps was approved, and the property later subdivided, shows that the City Council did
review and approve the plan in advance. Therefore, immunity is applicable under this section.
Defendants contend that this immunity applies to all claims arising out of the plan or
design for construction of public property, including the streets and City rights of way included
on these maps. Defendants contend that this would include all damage to the properties related to
slope movement, as it affects all of the City easements included on the various subdivision plats.
Further, this immunity specifically includes all claims relating to or arising from placement of
storm water improvements, detention ponds, fill or retaining walls crossing City rights-or-way,
streets, or other improvements.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants contend that summary judgment is appropriate on all
of Plaintiffs claims pursuant to I.C. § 6-904(7).

B.

DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FOR ANY CLAIM OF DAMAGE RESULTING
FROM FAILURE TO REQUIRE A SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS, AS SUCH
DECISION RESULTED FROM A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION OF CITY
EMPLOYEES.
Defendants are immune for claims arising out of
any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity exerc1smg
ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a statutory or
regulatory function, whether or not the statute or regulation be valid, or based
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upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee
thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused
LC. § 6-904(1). As stated above, there is no claim for malice or criminal intent, and thus these

exceptions do not apply.
In order for an act to be immune under the discretionary function theory, the act must be
discretionary, and must be a planning or policy formation decision. See Dorea Enters. v. City of

Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 425 (2007). There are a number of discretionary decisions which
affected this case, and allow the immunity to apply. First, in 1997, the City of Lewiston enacted
Lewiston City Ordinance 4177, which significantly revised the Lewiston subdivision code.

Statement of Facts, ,-[ 5. This revision took out all language mandatorily requiring that slope
stability or other geotechnical analysis be completed. All that remains in the Lewiston
subdivision code discussing slope stability studies is contained in §§ 32-9 and 32-20, discussed
above. These sections clearly give discretion to the City engineer to determine whether a slope
stability analysis is necessary. Based on these changes to the Lewiston City Code, a policy shift
occurred whereby mandatory slope stability analysis was no longer required. Plaintiffs experts
repeatedly state that the City does not often require slope stability analysis. There is no evidence
that the City Council did not exercise ordinary care when passing Ordinance 4177, and therefore,
it was policy based discretionary act by the City Council.
Second, the decision of the City engineer to not require a slope stability analysis itself
was a discretionary decision. As discussed above, the City engineer had the discretion to
determine whether or not to require a slope stability or other geotechnical analysis during the
subdivision process.
Third, the City has a policy of not doing the background research for a developer when
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an application is made to open a subdivision file. Similarly, the City does not move documents
from old files into new files when a new subdivision file is created. See Statement of Facts,, 13.
In fact, the City, in its role as a records repository, does not take steps to ensure that every City
employee is aware of every document in every file that is relevant to a subdivision process.
Information stored in City files is available for use by the developer or the engineer working on a
project to inspect the information. 6 Plaintiff himself took the opportunity to inspect the files in
June, 2009, see Complaint,, 23, but for some unexplained reason, neither he nor his engineers,
surveyors, or other agents ever took the time to look at available City records. Statement of
Facts, , 9. It is clearly within the City's discretion to determine how much time, effort, and
personnel it wishes to utilize in doing background research on a property. In this and in all cases,
the City has made the decision that instead of acting as a source of all knowledge regarding the
conditions of a property, it retains information about properties in files open to the public and
available for review. See Redenbaugh Deposition, pp. 36:2- 36:23. See also I.C. § 9-337, et
seq. This policy determination meant that in this case, Plaintiff had the opportunity and
obligation to search through City files prior to working on the property, and the City had no duty
or obligation to do that search for him. Because the files were available for public review, the
City did not have to expend the manpower resources, budgetary resources, or training resources
of searching through publicly available City files.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the City is 1mmune for all claims pursuant to the
discretionary function immunity.

c.

6

DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FOR ANY CLAIM OF DAMAGE ARISING OUT
OF ISSUING BUILDING PERMITS, APPROVING SUBDIVISION PLATS, OR
MAKING OR FAILING TO MAKE INSPECTIONS.
This information is subject to the open records laws of the State ofldaho, and the only preliminary step that
is required prior to examining such information is to fill out a public records request. I. C. § 9-337, et seq.
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Defendants are immune for any claim which
3.
Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate,
approval, order or similar authorization.
4.
Arises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an
inadequate inspection of any property, real or personal, other than the property of
the governmental entity performing the inspection.
I. C. § 6-904B. This immunity language is broad enough to cover any claims of negligence which

are based on issuance of building or other permits, approving subdivision plats, and inspecting or
not inspecting the property at issue. This would cover each of the claims of negligence included
in the Complaint against the Defendants. See

Complaint,~

55. This immunity does not apply if

the Defendants acted with reckless, willful, and wanton conduct, or with gross negligence. I. C. §
6-904B. These terms are statutorily defined. I. C. § 6-904C.
As a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendants acted with gross negligence
or reckless, willful and wanton conduct. In order to establish gross negligence, Plaintiff will have
to show that Defendants did or failed to do
an act which a reasonable person in a similar situation and of similar
responsibility would, with a minimum of contemplation, be inescapably drawn to
recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and that failing that duty shows
deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others.
I.C. § 6-904C(l). As discussed above, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants had any duty to

search through public records on Plaintiffs behalf, or mandatorily require that Plaintiff obtain a
soil stability or geotechnical analysis on the defective property at issue. There is no issue of fact
that a city or its employees is not "inescapably drawn to recognize a duty" to do something that
Plaintiff could and should have done for himself, such as doing due diligence on a property.
In order to establish reckless, willful and wanton conduct, Plaintiff will have to show that
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the Defendants "knowingly [did] or fail[ ed] to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to
another, and which involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result." I.C. § 6904C(2). As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence connecting the City's
actions with the slope movement and the economic loss Plaintiff has suffered. In order for there
to be a "high degree of probability" that the slope movement would cause damage to Plaintiffs
property, it would be necessary to know at a minimum what was causing the slope movement.
Unless it is known what was causing the slope movement, it is impossible to determine that any
action or inaction by the Defendants involves a high degree of probability that any harm would
result. Further, it is impossible to show that the issuance of building permits, approving plats,
inspecting or failing to inspect the property resulted in slope movement which damaged the
houses. As discussed above, that defect was in the ground when Plaintiff bought the property.
Until an in depth geotechnical survey is done, it cannot be known whether compacting
foundations, building houses, digging pools, and installing retaining walls would have stabilized
the property or not. Because no one knows what is causing the slope movement, know one can
say whether in 2006 and 2007, when the City actions/inactions occurred regarding subdivision
and construction, there was a high degree of probability that any damage would result.
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show, as a matter of law, that there was any reckless, willful and
wanton conduct.
IV.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Pursuant to I.C. § 6-911, Plaintiffs claims against the city are "forever barred, unless an
action is begun within two (2) years after the date the claim arose or reasonably should have
been discovered, whichever is later." Plaintiff has failed to meet the required statute of
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limitations.
According to the Complaint, Defendants' negligent acts all related to acts done before
Plaintiff owned the property, or are related to the approval of subdivision plats and issuance of
building permits. Complaint, ,-r 55. All of this was completed prior to May, 2007. Complaint, ,-r,-r
14

16. With regard to the allegedly negligent acts performed by the Defendants prior to

Plaintiffs purchase of the property, liability is barred by the statute of limitations. With regard to
allegedly negligent acts committed by the Defendants after Plaintiff purchased the property, the
Complaint was not filed until October 22, 2009. Under the circumstances of this case, where
Plaintiff purchased a property with a defect in it, his damages arose immediately. Therefore,
under Plaintiffs theory of the case, where the City should not have issued permits or approved
plats, such claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
There is no question but that Plaintiff was or reasonably should have been aware of the
City's involvement prior to October, 2007. He admits that prior to construction, he knew that fill
had been placed on the properties. Statement of Facts, ,-r 15. Plaintiff knew, at a minimum, that
the property had previously been subdivided, and that the City retained records that had been
provided to it related to such subdivisions. Plaintiff knew that the City had been involved in his
own construction and subdivision process. None of the documents that Plaintiff is alleging that
the City failed to tell him about were concealed from him. They were available for him to
review, free of cost, pursuant to the Idaho Public Record laws, /.C. § 9-337, et seq., and he
simply didn't go look. Particularly where the City has no policy of history of doing background
research on properties for developers, it is reasonable for a developer or his engineer to do his
own research.
Based on the foregoing, all of Plaintiffs claims against the City are barred by the statute
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of limitations outlined in I. C. § 6-911.

v.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants City of Lewiston and Lowell Cutshaw request that
summary judgment be entered, and all claims against them be dismissed.
DATED this

Z L(

day of June, 2011.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

Brian K. Julian, Of the Firm
Attorneys for City of Lewiston and
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer
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